BURMA: U/S BURNS STRESSES NEED FOR CONTINUED ASEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002191 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: BM PGOV PHUM PREL ASEAN SN SUBJECT: BURMA: U/S BURNS STRESSES NEED FOR CONTINUED ASEAN PRESSURE IN MEETING WITH MFA PERMSEC PETER HO REF: A. SINGAPORE 2115 ¶B. SINGAPORE 2086 SINGAPORE 00002191 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, accompanied by the Ambassador, urged ASEAN to find a way to step up pressure on Burma during a meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary Peter Ho December 3. Ho said that Burma had SIPDIS rejected an ASEAN role during the November 19-22 summits in Singapore, but that the grouping would still apply "moral" pressure. The Burmese regime was content with its isolation and could ignore both sanctions and ASEAN pressure, he said. China remained the only possible channel of influence apart from UN Special Advisor Gambari. Ho said there appeared to be divisions within Burma's "abnormal" leadership, but a change at the top would not necessarily improve the situation. U/S Burns reiterated that the problem would not go away and that all parties needed to maintain pressure. U/S Burns updated Ho on developments in Pakistan and India and said China appeared ready to play a more constructive role on Iran. End Summary. ASEAN Sidelined on Burma -------------- ¶2. (C) U/S Burns urged ASEAN, under Singapore's leadership, to find ways to step up pressure on Burma to engage in genuine dialogue with the opposition. He said the USG worried that "not enough is made of this channel" and asked about ASEAN's strategy for addressing Burma. Ho responded that Burma had made clear during the November ASEAN-related summit meetings, when it rejected Special Envoy Gambari's briefing of regional leaders, that it would deal only with the UN Security Council (UNSC),not with ASEAN. Burma had thus made it "impossible to do what we wanted," which included Singapore's plan to have Gambari's briefing focus discussion and attention on the need for change in Burma (reftels). ¶3. (C) Ho explained that Singapore thought it had secured Burma's agreement to a Gambari briefing a few days prior to the summits. Burma's Foreign Minister Nyan Win agreed on the morning of November 19th to a Gambari briefing of the ASEAN leaders, rather than the larger EAS grouping as initially planned. After arriving later that afternoon, however, Burma Prime Minister Thein Sein flatly rejected any ASEAN involvement, saying Gambari should only report to the UNSC. After a contentious dinner meeting involving Thein Sein and the other nine ASEAN leaders, Singapore issued a chairman's statement noting Burma's refusal to discuss its problems with ASEAN, while reflecting the view of "most leaders" that Burma must undertake specific reforms and could not "go back or stay put." Ho said Thein Sein shook throughout the meeting and was clearly under great pressure from regime leader General Than Shwe to block any ASEAN involvement. ¶4. (C) Ho said ASEAN now had limited options for pressuring Burma, a situation it had faced in 2006 after the collapse of Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar's visit to Burma as an ASEAN special envoy. That visit had turned into a "fiasco" when the regime had refused Hamid access to key players including Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK). ASEAN now had little choice but to work through Gambari to ensure that Burma moved forward and did not return to the status quo ante. Ho cautioned that the process would be slow and complicated. Burma was not a normal country, and normal pressures would not work, he warned. Burma's generals were "happy" to be isolated and only concerned about regime survival; more sanctions would be like "water off a duck's back." ASEAN Should Find a Way -------------- ¶5. (C) U/S Burns reiterated that ASEAN should find a way to pressure Burma to engage in genuine dialogue with the opposition. We could not allow the situation in Burma to continue. He noted the personal interest of the President and First Lady in Burma and said the United States would SINGAPORE 00002191 002.2 OF 003 continue to increase pressure. U/S Burns recalled that FM Yeo had agreed on the need to maintain pressure on the regime to support Gambari's mission. He stressed USG support for Gambari's mission, but said Gambari needed to spend more time in Burma to be effective and to ensure his mission did not become a "Potemkin" process. Burma's inflexibility had been a blow to ASEAN, he said, and its rejection of an ASEAN role appeared to be a tactical victory for Burma. ¶6. (C) Ho agreed on the need for pressure, but argued that the pressure ASEAN applied would necessarily differ from that of the United States and European Union. ASEAN countries, including Singapore, did not believe sanctions worked and were unwilling to apply them. Instead, ASEAN could apply "moral" pressure, he said. For example, if the Philippines held up ratification of the ASEAN Charter over the Burma issue, other members would blame Burma. Asked whether Singapore and or ASEAN members would consider delaying ratification of the Charter as a signal to Burma, Ho said "no." However, if the Philippines held up ratification, that would hold the group back from achieving its overriding goal of ASEAN integration. Delay in Charter ratification would then become a "pressure point" as other members would blame Burma for derailing the group's most important project. Ho recalled that similar group unhappiness over Burma's negative impact on ASEAN had led to Burma's agreeing to step aside in 2006, rather than taking its turn as ASEAN chairman. In another example of such peer pressure, he said that ASEAN leaders had pressed Burma during the November 19 Leaders'dinner over the fact that its behavior was complicating ASEAN's ties with its dialogue partners, including the United States, Canada, the European Union and New Zealand. ¶7. (C) Ho said that ASEAN's moral pressure would not in itself persuade the regime to change, but rather was a "piece" of broader international efforts. These efforts could not be "harmonized" he said, and western countries and ASEAN should "agree to disagree" on tactics. Recalling a U.S. demarche questioning Singapore Prime Minister Lee's November letter inviting the Burmese Prime Minister to the ASEAN summits, Ho argued that Singapore did not like the regime but as the "instrument of the group," had no choice but to invite Burma in order to maintain ASEAN's channel of communication. "These are the realities of our neighborhood," he added. Ho thought that Gambari's role was ignificant "in and of itself," though it was too soon to tell how he would use it or to assess whether he was making progress, due to the "murky and opaque" character of the regime. Whatever its shortcomings, Gambari's was the only channel Burma had committed to working through, Ho maintained. China's Role -------------- ¶8. (C) Ho argued that while some in the regime believed that its rejection of an ASEAN role was a victory, the "smarter ones know they have lost," as Burma would no longer be able to look to ASEAN for support as it faced increasing international pressure. Ho thought that Burma's rejection of an ASEAN role had left China without "cover" and more on the spot to address the Burma problem. China's efforts were mixed, suggesting it might be trying to protect its broader interests in Burma. Ho recalled that China arranged a meeting with Than Shwe during Gambari's first post-crackdown visit to Burma, but apparently not during the second. Ho was unsure of India's efforts to help, but expressed doubt that it had a direct channel to the senior generals. U/S Burns mentioned that Chinese Political Director He Yafei had told him December 1 that China would continue to support Gambari's mission and would work to convince Burma to engage in a meaningful dialogue. New Regime Not Necessarily Better -------------- ¶9. (C) U/S Burns reiterated that the Burma problem would not go away and that all parties needed to maintain pressure. Burma's September crackdown on monks had marked a SINGAPORE 00002191 003.2 OF 003 "qualitatively different" chapter. Recalling FM Yeo's remark that the "cookie" (i.e., regime) would eventually crumble, he said the United States hoped to see a change in Burma. Ho noted that Burma's "abnormal" leadership and its isolation made it difficult to understand its dynamics. There appear to be some divisions among regime generals, he said, with Than Shwe representing one extreme. PM Thein Sein, FM Nyan Win, and Shwe Mann were "probably more open," but were clearly afraid to step out of line. Muang Aye, the second ranking general, had differences with Than Shwe but was probably even more hard-line, while Ho described Tin Aung Myint Oo, a former Rangoon Quartermaster General who was promoted last month to the fifth ranking position in the regime, as "psychotic." If Than Shwe were to fall, Ho said, it would not necessarily produce better leaders. Nevertheless, it was clear the army would have to be part of any solution. Afghan PRT, South Asia -------------- ¶10. (C) U/S Burns thanked Singapore for its support of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. He said he had encouraged Defense Minister Teo to expand Singapore's next deployment, because the entire mission in Afghanistan needed to be larger and more effective. U/S Burns noted we had urged UN SYGEN Ban Ki-moon to appoint a senior political leader as the next civilian administrator in Afghanistan, which would provide a more effective civilian partner for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). U/S Burns expressed concern about growing violence and the Taliban's increasing use of asymmetric tactics. Instability in Pakistan's border region has complicated the situation, he added. ¶11. (C) U/S Burns said that South Asia had become a priority for the United States since 9/11. Despite the current problems, Pakistan remained our most important partner in dealing with Al Qaeda. President Musharraf's declaration of an emergency was a mistake that we hoped he would soon rectify. Musharraf's decision to take off his military uniform and lift emergency rule December 15 offered hope that he might still reach an accommodation with the political opposition. ¶12. (C) U/S Burns noted that India had become an important strategic partner. Our civil nuclear deal was moving forward; we planned to strengthen military and counter-terrorism cooperation. Our economic relationship with India was taking off, with private sector ties in front of government relations. On former Japanese PM Abe's proposal for a quadrilateral process, U/S Burns said the United States, Australia and India all wanted to avoid any impression of an effort to contain China. Meetings of the four countries would not take place at a ministerial or sub-ministerial level. China's International Role and Iran -------------- ¶13. (C) U/S Burns assessed that China had a mixed record on international issues, but recent trends were positive. China had been helpful on North Korea, but was not doing all it could on Sudan/Darfur, and certainly not on Burma. U/S Burns said China lacked a strategic view and took an excessively mercantilistic approach to Iran. However, AFM He Yafei had been much more forthcoming during December 1 meetings in Paris in discussing the possible elements of a new sanctions resolution. U/S Burns stressed that the United States was committed to diplomacy but that greater economic pressure would be required to force Iran "to the table." Ho observed that Chinese diplomacy had been successful in Southeast Asia. Overcoming the deep suspicions it had faced just a few years ago, China had taken pains to project a positive image. China's "peaceful rise" was now taken as a given, he said. ¶14. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm HERBOLD