Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SINGAPORE2190
2007-12-12 10:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:
U/S BURNS' DEC. 3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE FM YEO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002190
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: BM PREL ASEAN SN XF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DEC. 3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE FM YEO
URGES ASEAN PRESSURE ON BURMA
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002190
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: BM PREL ASEAN SN XF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DEC. 3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE FM YEO
URGES ASEAN PRESSURE ON BURMA
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Singapore and ASEAN should step up the
pressure on the Burmese regime, U/S Burns told Singapore
Foreign Minister George Yeo on December 3. FM Yeo said ASEAN
would stand aside on the Burma issue now that Burma had made
it clear through its actions at the ASEAN Summit that it
would only deal with the UN Security Council (UNSC) and not
with ASEAN. Burma could not turn to ASEAN for support. Fm
Yeo said further pressure was needed to prevent regime
backsliding. He suggested U.S.-ASEAN ties could be harmed if
the Burma issue led to the withdrawal by the United States of
the invitation to ASEAN to a Texas Summit. On other issues,
FM Yeo congratulated the Secretary on the success of the
Annapolis meetings and urged that the United States sustain
its engagement in Asia. U/S Burns said that the United
States is a global power that is fully conscious of its
Asia-Pacific responsibilities. End Summary.
Burma/ASEAN
--------------
2. (C) U/S Burns, accompanied by the Ambassador, told
Singapore FM George Yeo on December 3 that Singapore and
ASEAN should step up the pressure on Burma's regime to engage
in genuine dialogue with the regime. FM Yeo noted that Burma
had become a sticking point in ties between the United States
and ASEAN. He recalled the Secretary's "tongue lashing" of
the Burmese representative during the September 27 ASEAN
Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. He said ASEAN states
felt that that relations with the United States should not be
defined by the Burma issue alone. He cautioned that
U.S.-ASEAN ties could be harmed if the Burma issue led to the
withdrawal by the United States of the invitation to ASEAN to
a Texas Summit for the 30th anniversary of US-ASEAN
relations. FM Yeo said he understood U.S. domestic political
pressures over Burma. ASEAN felt caught in the middle. The
United States had an interest in ASEAN integration. ASEAN
states were unhappy that Burma was holding ASEAN back, but an
"all or nothing" U.S. stance on the Summit would be
interpreted as an indication that the United States did not
attach much importance to ASEAN. Meanwhile, China's
engagement continued apace.
3. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States valued its
relations with ASEAN and did not want the Burma issue to
eclipse those ties, but Burma posed a critical problem for
ASEAN and the region. The United States would continue to
pressure the Burmese regime to engage in genuine dialogue and
expected that ASEAN would do so as well. China also needed
to do more, building on its earlier efforts in support of UN
Special Advisor Gambari's October mission. The United States
supported Gambari, but if outside pressure on the regime were
not maintained, Gambari's efforts could turn out to be a
Potemkin process.
4. (C) FM Yeo, noting the Burmese regime's extensive control
and Burma's isolation, stated that a solution would not be
quick or easy. It would require a step-by-step process. The
UN process was not perfect, but there was no alternative.
Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) difficult relations with the
military junta complicated the problem, but the military
still enjoyed some prestige and must be part of the solution.
Some of the younger generals knew that the current course
was "stupid" and that, without change, the country could
"blow up," but they also had vested interests in the system.
FM Yeo predicted that at some point the "cookie will
crumble," but he cited the warnings of Thant Myint U,
grandson of former UN SYGEN U Thant, that a sudden collapse
of the military could produce Iraq-like conditions. This was
what China, India, and the countries of Southeast Asia all
wanted to avoid, he said.
5. (C) U/S Burns expressed disappointment that Burma had
blocked Gambari's planned briefing of East Asia Summit
leaders during the ASEAN-related summits in Singapore,
SINGAPORE 00002190 002 OF 003
despite the efforts of Singapore and the Philippines. The
United States would continue to support Gambari, but he
should spend more time on the ground in Burma, given that he
was the only bridge between the top generals and ASSK. U/S
Burns noted that UN Human Rights Rapporteur Pinheiro had more
success than Gambari in gaining access to key groups. The
United States and the European Union would continue to apply
pressure on Burma, and the issue would gain more attention in
the Security Council. He urged that ASEAN exert pressure and
asked about ASEAN's strategy for addressing Burma. He
inquired whether appointing a prominent Southeast Asian envoy
would be helpful.
6. (C) FM Yeo replied that ASEAN's failure to appoint an
envoy was "not for lack of trying." Both Indonesia and
Malaysia under its previous chairmanship of ASEAN had
proposed high-level envoys but had been rebuffed by Burma.
In rejecting the idea of Gambari's briefing the EAS in late
November, Burma had made clear its preference for dealing
directly with the UNSC and that it would accept no ASEAN
role, Yeo stated. Southeast Asian countries could continue
to press bilaterally, but ASEAN as an organization would
"stand aside." All ASEAN leaders except Burma's had stood
with Singapore PM Lee when he read the Chairman's statement
on Burma after the ASEAN leaders' dinner. Burma would now
not be able to seek ASEAN's support if the regime came under
further UNSC pressure. FM Yeo acknowledged that the regime
was "playing a game" with Gambari and agreed China should do
more. Progress would be slow; the international community
should lock in concessions the regime made along the way.
Singapore would not impose sanctions on Burma, he said, but
it did believe all parties had a role to play in maintaining
pressure to ensure the regime did not backslide.
Middle East Peace Process
--------------
7. (C) Foreign Minister Yeo asked U/S Burns to convey his
congratulations to the Secretary on the success of the
Annapolis meetings. U/S Burns responded that there were two
developments at Annapolis that provided hope. First, both
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas had committed to a negotiation that would
address all sensitive issues. He highlighted PM Olmert's
statement that, without a two-state solution, Israel's future
as a Jewish state could not be assured. Meanwhile, Fatah's
split with Hamas had strengthened President Abbas's resolve;
without hope of peace, Fatah knew it would likely face
increasing radicalism in the West Bank.
8. (C) U/S Burns said a second positive indication was the
decision of twelve Arab countries, including Syria, to go to
Annapolis. This would give the Arab countries a stake in the
success of the process, he noted. The United States was
realistic about the difficulties ahead but would press
forward because progress was essential to addressing many
other problems in the Middle East. FM Yeo noted that it is
particularly important to have the Saudis involved, and said
he thought PM Olmert's tenacity has been underestimated. FM
Yeo applauded President Bush's commitment to the process,
saying it was "the right thing to do."
U.S. Engagement in Asia
--------------
9. (C) FM Yeo highlighted Singapore's deep bilateral ties
with the United States, founded on a bedrock of shared
interests. Our defense relationship was particularly strong,
reflecting Singapore's view that the United States needs to
be engaged in the region "forever." U/S Burns said that the
United States was a global power fully conscious of its
Asia-Pacific responsibilities. There was bipartisan
consensus on the importance of Asia. The United States would
continue to make Asia and the Pacific a top priority, along
with the Middle East and South Asia. We would take account
of changes of government in Australia, Japan, and South
Korea, build our important relationship with China, and
SINGAPORE 00002190 003 OF 003
attend to other interests including APEC and ASEAN. FM Yeo
noted that American interests with the "big players" were
well established, but suggested U.S. ties with ASEAN were
more in doubt due to Burma.
10. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: BM PREL ASEAN SN XF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DEC. 3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE FM YEO
URGES ASEAN PRESSURE ON BURMA
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Singapore and ASEAN should step up the
pressure on the Burmese regime, U/S Burns told Singapore
Foreign Minister George Yeo on December 3. FM Yeo said ASEAN
would stand aside on the Burma issue now that Burma had made
it clear through its actions at the ASEAN Summit that it
would only deal with the UN Security Council (UNSC) and not
with ASEAN. Burma could not turn to ASEAN for support. Fm
Yeo said further pressure was needed to prevent regime
backsliding. He suggested U.S.-ASEAN ties could be harmed if
the Burma issue led to the withdrawal by the United States of
the invitation to ASEAN to a Texas Summit. On other issues,
FM Yeo congratulated the Secretary on the success of the
Annapolis meetings and urged that the United States sustain
its engagement in Asia. U/S Burns said that the United
States is a global power that is fully conscious of its
Asia-Pacific responsibilities. End Summary.
Burma/ASEAN
--------------
2. (C) U/S Burns, accompanied by the Ambassador, told
Singapore FM George Yeo on December 3 that Singapore and
ASEAN should step up the pressure on Burma's regime to engage
in genuine dialogue with the regime. FM Yeo noted that Burma
had become a sticking point in ties between the United States
and ASEAN. He recalled the Secretary's "tongue lashing" of
the Burmese representative during the September 27 ASEAN
Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. He said ASEAN states
felt that that relations with the United States should not be
defined by the Burma issue alone. He cautioned that
U.S.-ASEAN ties could be harmed if the Burma issue led to the
withdrawal by the United States of the invitation to ASEAN to
a Texas Summit for the 30th anniversary of US-ASEAN
relations. FM Yeo said he understood U.S. domestic political
pressures over Burma. ASEAN felt caught in the middle. The
United States had an interest in ASEAN integration. ASEAN
states were unhappy that Burma was holding ASEAN back, but an
"all or nothing" U.S. stance on the Summit would be
interpreted as an indication that the United States did not
attach much importance to ASEAN. Meanwhile, China's
engagement continued apace.
3. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States valued its
relations with ASEAN and did not want the Burma issue to
eclipse those ties, but Burma posed a critical problem for
ASEAN and the region. The United States would continue to
pressure the Burmese regime to engage in genuine dialogue and
expected that ASEAN would do so as well. China also needed
to do more, building on its earlier efforts in support of UN
Special Advisor Gambari's October mission. The United States
supported Gambari, but if outside pressure on the regime were
not maintained, Gambari's efforts could turn out to be a
Potemkin process.
4. (C) FM Yeo, noting the Burmese regime's extensive control
and Burma's isolation, stated that a solution would not be
quick or easy. It would require a step-by-step process. The
UN process was not perfect, but there was no alternative.
Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) difficult relations with the
military junta complicated the problem, but the military
still enjoyed some prestige and must be part of the solution.
Some of the younger generals knew that the current course
was "stupid" and that, without change, the country could
"blow up," but they also had vested interests in the system.
FM Yeo predicted that at some point the "cookie will
crumble," but he cited the warnings of Thant Myint U,
grandson of former UN SYGEN U Thant, that a sudden collapse
of the military could produce Iraq-like conditions. This was
what China, India, and the countries of Southeast Asia all
wanted to avoid, he said.
5. (C) U/S Burns expressed disappointment that Burma had
blocked Gambari's planned briefing of East Asia Summit
leaders during the ASEAN-related summits in Singapore,
SINGAPORE 00002190 002 OF 003
despite the efforts of Singapore and the Philippines. The
United States would continue to support Gambari, but he
should spend more time on the ground in Burma, given that he
was the only bridge between the top generals and ASSK. U/S
Burns noted that UN Human Rights Rapporteur Pinheiro had more
success than Gambari in gaining access to key groups. The
United States and the European Union would continue to apply
pressure on Burma, and the issue would gain more attention in
the Security Council. He urged that ASEAN exert pressure and
asked about ASEAN's strategy for addressing Burma. He
inquired whether appointing a prominent Southeast Asian envoy
would be helpful.
6. (C) FM Yeo replied that ASEAN's failure to appoint an
envoy was "not for lack of trying." Both Indonesia and
Malaysia under its previous chairmanship of ASEAN had
proposed high-level envoys but had been rebuffed by Burma.
In rejecting the idea of Gambari's briefing the EAS in late
November, Burma had made clear its preference for dealing
directly with the UNSC and that it would accept no ASEAN
role, Yeo stated. Southeast Asian countries could continue
to press bilaterally, but ASEAN as an organization would
"stand aside." All ASEAN leaders except Burma's had stood
with Singapore PM Lee when he read the Chairman's statement
on Burma after the ASEAN leaders' dinner. Burma would now
not be able to seek ASEAN's support if the regime came under
further UNSC pressure. FM Yeo acknowledged that the regime
was "playing a game" with Gambari and agreed China should do
more. Progress would be slow; the international community
should lock in concessions the regime made along the way.
Singapore would not impose sanctions on Burma, he said, but
it did believe all parties had a role to play in maintaining
pressure to ensure the regime did not backslide.
Middle East Peace Process
--------------
7. (C) Foreign Minister Yeo asked U/S Burns to convey his
congratulations to the Secretary on the success of the
Annapolis meetings. U/S Burns responded that there were two
developments at Annapolis that provided hope. First, both
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas had committed to a negotiation that would
address all sensitive issues. He highlighted PM Olmert's
statement that, without a two-state solution, Israel's future
as a Jewish state could not be assured. Meanwhile, Fatah's
split with Hamas had strengthened President Abbas's resolve;
without hope of peace, Fatah knew it would likely face
increasing radicalism in the West Bank.
8. (C) U/S Burns said a second positive indication was the
decision of twelve Arab countries, including Syria, to go to
Annapolis. This would give the Arab countries a stake in the
success of the process, he noted. The United States was
realistic about the difficulties ahead but would press
forward because progress was essential to addressing many
other problems in the Middle East. FM Yeo noted that it is
particularly important to have the Saudis involved, and said
he thought PM Olmert's tenacity has been underestimated. FM
Yeo applauded President Bush's commitment to the process,
saying it was "the right thing to do."
U.S. Engagement in Asia
--------------
9. (C) FM Yeo highlighted Singapore's deep bilateral ties
with the United States, founded on a bedrock of shared
interests. Our defense relationship was particularly strong,
reflecting Singapore's view that the United States needs to
be engaged in the region "forever." U/S Burns said that the
United States was a global power fully conscious of its
Asia-Pacific responsibilities. There was bipartisan
consensus on the importance of Asia. The United States would
continue to make Asia and the Pacific a top priority, along
with the Middle East and South Asia. We would take account
of changes of government in Australia, Japan, and South
Korea, build our important relationship with China, and
SINGAPORE 00002190 003 OF 003
attend to other interests including APEC and ASEAN. FM Yeo
noted that American interests with the "big players" were
well established, but suggested U.S. ties with ASEAN were
more in doubt due to Burma.
10. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD