U/S BURNS' 12/3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE PM LEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002184 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PREL SN BM CH IN AF JA SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' 12/3 MEETING WITH SINGAPORE PM LEE Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold. Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns urged in a December 3 meeting with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong that Singapore and ASEAN do more to put pressure on the Burmese regime to engage in genuine dialogue. PM Lee said ASEAN would do its part, but claimed the real leverage lay with China and India. Lee urged the United States to dispel lingering misperceptions that it was biding its time until UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari stepped down. U/S Burns stressed the USG fully supported Gambari but wanted him to take a more active approach to foster dialogue inside Burma. On China, PM Lee observed that Beijing had become more skillful and sophisticated in conducting its relations with Southeast Asia, in contrast to Japan and India, which continued to lack focus and strategic vision. Lee called on the United States to enhance its engagement with ASEAN. U/S Burns urged Singapore to increase its contribution in Afghanistan. Lee said Singapore hoped to modestly increase its contribution, but was constrained by limited resources. End Summary. Burma -------------- ¶2. (C) Under Secretary Burns, joined by the Ambassador, met Singapore Prime Minister Lee December 3 and urged that Singapore and ASEAN do more to put pressure on the Burmese regime to engage in genuine dialogue with the democratic opposition. PM Lee said there were no easy options for resolving the Burma problem. Short of a major upheaval, the process would be a long one. The dialogue taking place was a positive development, and Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK) accepted that the military must have a role in Burma's reform and reconciliation. ASEAN would do its part, but the real leverage lay with China and India, he asserted. However, China feared a failed state on its doorstep and therefore would strongly resist taking a hard line towards the junta. The original ASEAN-6 -- Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand -- were more willing to take a strong position against the regime, PM Lee said. In contrast, the newer members were more cautious. Laos remained in close consultation with Burma. Vietnam had been prepared to sign a statement critical of the regime, but was wary of appearing to coerce the regime. Cambodia was aligned more closely with the ASEAN-6, but China had been discouraging this, PM Lee claimed. ¶3. (C) PM Lee noted that he had invited UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari to brief the ASEAN and East Asia Summit leaders in Singapore in late November to help regional leaders understand better how the UN is engaging the regime. Burma's Premier Thein Sein had responded by telling assembled ASEAN leaders that he would be the only one giving briefings on Burma. He held firm to the regime's claims that the media had exaggerated Burma's difficulties and that the regime had the political situation under control. ¶4. (C) PM Lee said that the United States should dispel misperceptions that it was biding its time until Gambari stepped down so that it could try to replace him with a U.S.-supported ASEAN emissary to Burma. PM Lee noted that ASEAN had appointed an emissary two years ago with little success. Burma wanted to work with the UNSC, not ASEAN, he stated. U/S Burns replied that the USG fully supported Gambari, but wanted to see him take a much more active role inside Burma fostering genuine dialogue between the Burmese government and ASSK, rather than the current Potemkin-like channel. China Trumps Japan, India -------------- ¶5. (C) PM Lee observed that China had become skillful and sophisticated in its engagement of ASEAN. For example, Premier Wen Jiabao came to meetings prepared to discuss "lofty principles followed by a list of concrete suggestions." In contrast, Japan had a long list of suggestions, but lacked strategic focus by its senior leadership. India was similarly clumsy with its initiatives. PM Lee urged the United States to focus more on its SINGAPORE 00002184 002 OF 002 relationship with ASEAN, noting that a good opportunity had been missed when President Bush was unable to visit the region ahead of the APEC Leaders, Meeting in Australia in September. PM Lee said that ASEAN wanted to be friends with the United States, but there must be willingness on both sides for this to happen. India -------------- ¶6. (C) PM Lee cited increased U.S. engagement with India as a positive development and encouraged the USG to keep pushing India in this direction. He questioned whether PM Singh could persuade the Communist Party to support the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Although India was looking outward much more than before, it still needed to refine its interests in relation to regional bodies like ASEAN and the East Asian Summit, as well as on multilateral issues, such as how to best manage maritime and shipping concerns in the Strait of Malacca. Iraq and Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) PM Lee reiterated Singapore's often-stated support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. He cautioned that a premature pullout from Iraq would create serious problems for Southeast Asia and elsewhere. U/S Burns urged Singapore to increase its contribution in Afghanistan. PM Lee said Singapore hoped to modestly increase its contribution, but was constrained by limited resources. ¶8. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm HERBOLD