SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' DECEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR HERBOLD FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON BM SN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' DECEMBER
2-3 VISIT TO SINGAPORE

REF: SINGAPORE 2086

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold. Reasons 1.4(a)(b)(d)


1. (C) My team at Embassy Singapore and I greatly look
forward to your December 2-3 visit. While the United States
and Singapore are not allies, we enjoy a close military and
economic relationship based on overlapping strategic views
and substantial trade and investment ties. Singapore is a
keen observer of regional developments and, as the current
chairman of ASEAN, hosted the annual round of ASEAN-related
summits in November. However, Singapore's unique status in
Southeast Asia usually requires it to adapt to, rather than
shape, regional dynamics. Your meetings with senior
Singapore Government officials including Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, and Foreign
Minister George Yeo offer an excellent opportunity to:

-- stress the need for ASEAN members, individually and
collectively, to send strong and consistent messages on the
need for change in Burma;
-- seek GOS views on regional developments and the
ASEAN-related summits; and
-- express thanks for GOS support in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Singapore, Burma and ASEAN
--------------


2. (C) Singapore is clearly fed up with the incompetence,
brutality and insularity of the Burmese regime, but
unconvinced that stepping up international pressure on the
regime can actually bring about positive change in Burma.
Singapore was a key driver of ASEAN's tough September 27
Chairman's statement on Burma and sought to have UN Special
Advisor Ibrahim Gambari brief the East Asia Summit in
Singapore on November 21 to focus attention on the issue.
That plan collapsed when Burma, which had initially signaled
to Singapore that it could accept a Gambari briefing,
reversed course and rejected such a briefing (reftel). This
brought back into play sharp underlying divisions between
ASEAN's more developed members and its "newer" members
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma). While Singapore has
sought to maintain a tough rhetorical stance, it does not
support expelling Burma from ASEAN or imposing sanctions,
which it believes would only further isolate the regime.
While Singapore would be happy to see the end of Burma's
ossified senior leadership, it also worries that a rapid
transition that sidelined the military altogether could be
highly destabilizing in light of Burma's ethnic divisions and
lack of alternative national institutions.


3. (C) The Burma issue overshadowed the November
ASEAN-related summits in Singapore, which were to be a
celebration of ASEAN's 40th anniversary and an opportunity to
further develop the role of the East Asia Summit. With the
signing of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic
Blueprint, which aims to establish a "single economic entity"
by 2015, ASEAN is seeking to transform this highly diverse
group of countries into a more cohesive and effective
organization. Singapore sees this transformation as a
strategic imperative in order for the small countries of
Southeast Asia to maintain political and economic leverage
relative to the region's growing powers. A more integrated
ASEAN (collectively our fifth largest trading partner and
fourth largest export market in 2006) would also benefit U.S.
strategic and economic interests in Asia.

Partners, not Allies
--------------


4. (C) Our close bilateral cooperation with Singapore is
founded on a convergence of views on key strategic issues and
substantial trade and investment ties. Singapore, as a tiny,
wealthy, predominantly ethnic-Chinese state surrounded by
much larger, poorer, Malay/Muslim-majority neighbors, has an
acute sense of vulnerability. It is also grappling with the
economic and strategic impact of China's and India's
reemergence on the world stage. Consequently, Singapore
views a strong U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military
presence in the region as essential to its own and the
region's peace and prosperity.


SINGAPORE 00002112 002 OF 003



5. (C) Singapore is a valuable logistics hub for U.S.
forces. President Bush and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
signed a bilateral "Strategic Framework Agreement" (SFA) in
2005, which updated our military access arrangements and
enshrined a broader commitment to strategic cooperation.
However, Singapore worries about being seen in its
neighborhood as "too close" to the United States, and thus
does not wish to be a treaty ally. Our military leases
facilities here; there are "places, not bases" on the island.
The GOS seeks greater interoperability with the U.S.
military and prefers U.S. equipment and training for its
small, highly trained military.

Economic Success and the FTA
--------------


6. (SBU) Singapore, with its commitment to free trade,
attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),and sound
economic management, has enjoyed four decades of high growth,
giving it a per capita GDP of approximately USD 30,000. Our
bilateral economic ties are flourishing. The 2004
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been a
tremendous success, helping produce a nearly 50-percent
growth in U.S. exports to Singapore and a USD 6.9 billion
trade surplus (our fifth largest) in 2006. Some 1,500 U.S.
companies operate here, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in Singapore exceeds USD 60 billion.

Domestic Scene
--------------


7. (C) The People's Action Party (PAP) has held power in
Singapore since 1959 and won another landslide victory at the
polls in May 2006. While the PAP's hardball treatment of the
opposition, gerrymandering, and tight media controls
contributed to the magnitude of victory, there is no doubt
the PAP enjoys broad public support based on its record of
delivering security, prosperity, excellent services, and
clean government.


8. (C) Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew (LKY),founding father
of modern Singapore, remains active and continues to
inculcate younger ministers with his hard-nosed approach to
promoting Singapore's interests, as he defines them. His
continued prominence has made it difficult for his son, Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong, to put his own stamp on the
Singapore political system, however. Most observers agree
that fundamental change toward a more democratic system is
unlikely until the older generation of leaders passes from
the scene, and even then is likely to occur slowly.

Foreign Policy - Focus on the Region
--------------


9. (C) As a small, vulnerable state, Singapore seeks to
leverage its ties with larger powers (in particular, the
United States),to maintain friendly ties with everyone, and,
as a longer-term project, to promote ASEAN integration. It
is a keen and wary observer of developments in places that
directly affect its interests -- defined traditionally as
neighboring Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, but
increasingly to include South Asia and the Middle East. It
claims special insights into China, though Singaporeans
readily admit a growing cultural gap with the mainland.
Singapore sees the rise of China and India as both a
challenge and an opportunity for the smaller states of
Southeast Asia.

Iraq and Afghanistan
--------------


10. (C) Singapore continues to provide support for Coalition
forces in Iraq, and GOS leaders have publicly stressed that
failure in Iraq would have dire consequences for the region
and beyond. Singapore's leaders are equally concerned about
the "Arabization" of Southeast Asia's traditionally tolerant
approach to Islam and the potential spread of Middle
East-inspired radicalism here. In Afghanistan, Singapore
provided modest humanitarian support in the context of a New
Zealand-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) this year
and has indicated it will expand those efforts next year.


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Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD