BURMA: LEADING ACADEMIC CALLS FOR ASEAN TO SUSPEND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 001851

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL BM SN
SUBJECT: BURMA: LEADING ACADEMIC CALLS FOR ASEAN TO SUSPEND
BURMA

REF: SINGAPORE 1832

Classified By: CDA Daniel Shields. Reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: ASEAN should suspend Burma's membership in
the organization, one of Singapore's leading academic and
establishment figures argued in an October 4 op-ed piece in
the government-linked Straits Times Newspaper. Think tank
director and former Ambassador Barry Desker said Burma has
been an "albatross around ASEAN's neck for the past decade"
and asserted that ASEAN's policy of noninterference was
outdated. The Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary
Lawrence Wong told the CDA on October 4 that suspending Burma
could be considered if the situation gets much worse. MFA
Permanent Secretary Peter Ho made a similar statement to CDA
on October 2. End Summary.

Comment
--------------


2. (C) Desker is a senior member of Singapore's tight-knit
establishment. His op-ed piece carries weight and the
comments by Wong and Ho suggest suspension is an option the
GOS would consider if the situation in Burma deteriorates
greatly. Desker's op-ed could be a trial balloon to
socialize the public to the idea of suspending Burma and
indicate where the GOS may feel forced to go if the situation
in Burma deteriorates further. Beyond Burma, it also may
reflect an attempt by the "older" ASEAN members to reassert
their leadership role and push forward with ASEAN integration
regardless of the concerns of the "newer" members. End
Comment.

Suspend Burma
--------------


3. (U) ASEAN should suspend Burma's membership in the
organization, one of Singapore's leading academic and
establishment figures argued in an October 4 op-ed piece in
the government-linked Straits Times Newspaper. Ambassador
Barry Desker, Director of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS) and former GOS Ambassador to
Indonesia, said the crisis in Burma has made it "imperative
that ASEAN move beyond statements to action." Desker's
comments followed suggestions in other quarters in ASEAN in
recent days that Burma should be suspended. He characterized
ASEAN's 1997 decision to admit Burma without any
conditionality as a "mistake" and said the regime has been an
"albatross around ASEAN's neck for the past decade." While
he praised the tough September 27 ASEAN Chair's Statement, he
said "ASEAN should now go further" and suspend Burma's
membership in ASEAN. He criticized the regime for its many
economic and political failings domestically and the fact it
doesn't play "an effective role within ASEAN either."

Nonintervention Policy Outdated
--------------


4. (U) Beyond suggesting a hard line on Burma, Desker went
further, arguing that ASEAN's long standing principle of
noninterference and nonintervention in the internal affairs
of other members was outdated. Desker asserted that the
noninterference principle had served its purpose in the early
days of the organization. However, "geopolitical realities
have changed" and "undermined the logic of the policy of
non-intervention and non-interference." With Burma in the
organization, ASEAN will "have a credibility problem" when it
confronts humanitarian issues elsewhere in the world. As
ASEAN moves forward to the establishment of an ASEAN
Community, it can not afford to have Burma as a member unless
it can live up to its basic commitments to "ensure the
well-being of its people." Furthermore, when ASEAN leaders
adopt the Charter to give the organization a "legal
personality" it has to adopt clear standards of behavior for
its members and agree on what it will do when a member
"flouts these conventions."

If Things Get Worse
--------------


5. (C) On the margins of the October 2 meeting with MFA
Permanent Secretary Peter Ho reported reftel, the CDA asked
Ho about a Straits Times editorial that day that concluded:
"if the harsh rule and killings go on without let up, a stage
will be reached when the other member nations must ask
themselves whether Myanmar's continued membership would
damage irreparably ASEAN's standing." Ho said changing the
status of Burma in ASEAN is something that would only be
considered if the situation got much worse. The issue must

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be addressed unemotionally and strategically, considering
whether such a move would actually have the desired impact,
Ho said.


6. (C) Desker's article reflected a mood, at least in the
"older" ASEAN members, that ASEAN should not be caught on the
wrong side in Burma (i.e. standing with the regime against
the people),the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary
Lawrence Wong told the CDA during an October 4 meeting. Wong
said Burma could be suspended if the situation gets much
worse. He added that a suspension would remove an albatross
from the neck of ASEAN and make it easier for ASEAN
integration to move forward. However, the "newer" ASEAN
members believe such a dramatic step would weaken ASEAN unity
and leave them vulnerable in the future. The idea of
suspension will have to evolve and will not happen quickly
even if it does. Wong predicted that the question of how to
deal with Burma will be the center of attention in the run-up
to the ASEAN leaders summit in November in Singapore.

Op-Ed Piece
--------------


7. (U) Begin Text of Desker Op-Ed piece:

October 4, 2007
Suspend Myanmar from Asean
By Barry Desker

Last week's crisis in Myanmar makes it imperative that Asean
move beyond statements to action.

The 1997 Asean decision to admit Myanmar under the current
military leadership without any conditionality was a mistake.
Myanmar took shelter under Asean's wings but there was no
commitment by the junta to open up the economy or restore its
fledgling democracy. Frankly, Myanmar has been an albatross
around Asean's neck for the past decade.

Asean broke new ground on Sept 27 when the Asean foreign
ministers agreed to a statement by the current Asean chair,
Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo, stating
that they were appalled to receive reports of automatic
weapons being used to quell the demonstrations in Myanmar and
demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from
the use of violence against demonstrators. They strongly
urged Myanmar to seek a political solution and to work
towards a peaceful transition to democracy, and called for
the release of all political detainees, including Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi.

The Asean ministers recognised that what the junta has done
is unacceptable. Asean should now go further. It is time
that Myanmar was suspended from the privilege of Asean
membership.

As Asean's leaders will be adopting the Asean Charter to give
the organisation a legal personality when they meet in
Singapore on Nov 18, Asean needs to adopt clear standards of
behaviour for its members.

Key provisions of the Charter will call for the promotion of
democracy, human rights and obligations, transparency and
good governance and strengthening of democratic institutions.
But Asean needs to agree on what it will do if a member
blatantly flouts these conventions.

Previously, it had adopted the practice of raising its
discomfort with developments in Myanmar privately at meetings
with Myanmar leaders and at informal retreats of Asean
ministers, where no official records were kept.

Since its founding, Asean's formal position was that every
member had the right to lead its existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion. This principle of
non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs
of one another helped each state to develop its own identity
in the first years of the grouping's existence.

The primary concern of each member from 1967 was that it
should be allowed to forge its own post-colonial identity.

Memories of Indonesia's Konfrontasi policy towards Malaysia
and hostility to post-independence Singapore, the bitter
Singapore separation from Malaysia, the Philippines' claim to
Sabah and Thai fears of spillover from the conflicts in
Indochina shaped Asean's handling of domestic developments in
the region. An emphasis on developing mutual confidence,
understanding the different perspectives of each member and

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creating an awareness of the regional environment and
regional sensitivities marked interactions in the early
years.

In 1967, Asean leaders were more attuned to the political
environment of the former metropolitan countries and needed
to become familiar with their neighbours.

This process of developing cohesion and the habit of
cooperation received a boost from the challenge posed by the
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in December

1978. Asean's resolute response to the invasion and ability
to build an international coalition opposed to the
intervention marked a high point for the policy of
non-interference. It meant supporting the genocidal Khmer
Rouge regime in Cambodia but it also led to international
credibility and recognition for Asean as the only Third World
regional grouping able to influence United Nations debates
and shape the conflict negotiation process.

In 1967, a policy of non-interference and non-intervention
also made sense to the post-colonial regimes in Southeast
Asia as they were faced with domestic insurgencies by
communist revolutionary movements assisted by China.

As the Asean states sought improved ties with China after the
historic Nixon visit to China in 1971, calls for an end to
Chinese support for the communist parties in the region were
coupled with the need to uphold the principles of non-
interference and respect for the sovereignty of the region's
states.

Forty years later, geopolitical realities have changed. The
end of the Cold War undermined the logic of the policy of
non-intervention and non-interference. Doctrines of
humanitarian intervention and 'the responsibility to protect'
are increasingly the basis of decision-making in the UN
Security Council, especially as the impact of bloodshed and
the consequences of riots, revolutions and bombings are
covered hour by hour on television screens and in widely
circulated blogs and on the Internet.

In 1988, the scale of the much larger crackdown by the
Myanmar military only became known several weeks later.
Today, these images are transmitted instantaneously around
the world by mobile phones and YouTube.

As long as Myanmar is part of the highest councils of Asean,
the region will have a credibility problem when it seeks to
address issues of humanitarian concern elsewhere around the
globe.

Not only is the junta a failure when it comes to ensuring
Myanmar's economic development, it has also failed to build a
cohesive society or ensure a political transition from
military rule.

Myanmar does not play an effective role within Asean either.
When former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad
succeeded in getting Asean approval for Myanmar's admission
in 1997, it was believed that Myanmar's participation would
lead to learning by example: As Myanmar interacted with Asean
states, it would realise that outward-looking policies,
increased foreign investment and expanded trade, tourism and
other exchanges would lead it to move in the direction of a
more open society increasingly integrated with the rest of
South-east Asia. These hopes were soon dashed.

As the Singapore co-chair of the Singapore/Myanmar senior
officials working group on economic issues, I realised in
1998 that we were going nowhere. As we were preoccupied with
the Asian financial and economic crisis, we decided not to
proceed with these meetings as our hosts were more interested
in taking us on a week-long jaunt to gem mines and tourist
attractions than engaging in serious exchanges on policy
issues.

As Asean moves towards the establishment of an Asean
Community based on the three pillars of a Security Community,
a Socio-Cultural Community and an Economic Community, can it
afford to have a member seen as having a government that has
failed to ensure the well-being of its people not just
recently but since it joined Asean?

Old Asean hands will say that Myanmar is part of Asean and
should be a member. Yes, but only when Myanmar can uphold
its commitments. Until then, the forthcoming Asean Summit
should agree on the suspension of Myanmar's membership.


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The writer is director of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore
End Text.

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