Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SINGAPORE1404
2007-07-30 07:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:
PM LEE HSIEN LOONG: ME AND MY (DAD'S) SHADOW
VZCZCXRO5519 PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC DE RUEHGP #1404/01 2110729 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 300729Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3661 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1941 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4061 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5660 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1339 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001404
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EFIN SN
SUBJECT: PM LEE HSIEN LOONG: ME AND MY (DAD'S) SHADOW
REF: A. SINGAPORE 728
B. 06 SINGAPORE 1486
Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Chris Kavanagh. Reasons 1.4(b)(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001404
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EFIN SN
SUBJECT: PM LEE HSIEN LOONG: ME AND MY (DAD'S) SHADOW
REF: A. SINGAPORE 728
B. 06 SINGAPORE 1486
Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Chris Kavanagh. Reasons 1.4(b)(d)
1. (C) Summary: After almost three years as Prime Minister,
Lee Hsien Loong still has not come out of the shadow of his
father, modern Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew
(LKY). Long seen as arrogant and preordained to take over
the reins of government, PM Lee has been successful in
softening his image and assuring Singaporeans that he is not
the same stern, autocratic figure his father is. Policy
continuity has marked PM Lee's tenure, as he has focused on
promoting economic growth and competitiveness. At critical
and even routine times, however, LKY takes center stage,
seemingly relegating his son to the sidelines, notably during
last year's elections. The two have even offered different
explanations to the press on LKY's role in the cabinet.
Singaporeans, possibly including the PM, seem to find LKY's
prominence and engagement reassuring. But PM Lee could pay a
political price after LKY's passing if he fails to establish
himself as a force in his own right. End Summary.
The Anointed One
--------------
2. (C) Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong long seemed preordained
to take over the reins of government from his father,
Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew (LKY),who now has
the peculiar title of "Minister Mentor." Following a
brilliant academic career at Cambridge and his meteoric rise
in the Singapore Armed Forces (he made Brigadier General at
age 32),Lee Hsien Loong left the military and entered
politics in 1984. He soon joined the cabinet and became
Deputy Prime Minister in 1990 to then-Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong, who had succeeded LKY when the latter "retired" in
1990. Lee succeeded Goh as Prime Minister in August 2004.
Despite his acknowledged intellectual and analytical skills,
Lee had long been dogged by perceptions that his rise to
power had as much to do with his family connections. (The
Lee family bristles at the word "nepotism" and threatens or
sues for defamation anyone who mentions it.) Lee also
acquired a reputation as brash and arrogant in his younger
days.
Let the Son Shine
--------------
3. (C) Even before he became PM, Lee Hsien Loong began
working to soften his public image and leadership style
to project a more caring side to Singaporeans and assure them
that he was not the same stern autocratic figure his
father is. PM Lee has largely succeeded in portraying
himself as a more approachable and sympathetic character. At
the same time, he has failed to put a strong personal stamp
on government policy, even as he has largely abandoned the
consultative approach to governing that Goh Chok Tong
employed as PM. Goh frequently used public committees
(consisting of representatives from the private sector,
academia, and government) to review government policies and
identify new options, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS)
researcher Gillian Koh told us. Instead, PM Lee and the GOS
have contracted with local think tanks to research policy
issues (such as the impact of the government's "baby bonus"
scheme on Singapore's low birth rate) and present
recommendations privately to the GOS. Thus, he has
established himself neither (like LKY) as a visionary and
dominant leader nor (like Goh) as a skilled
consensus-builder.
4. (C) Rather, policy continuity has characterized Lee Hsien
Loong's first three years in office. Retaining his portfolio
as Minister of Finance, PM Lee remains most focused on the
sound economic policies and strategic thinking that have
produced Singapore's remarkable prosperity. The PM appears
to have given the ministers a freer hand to develop and
implement new policies, observed Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy Assistant Dean Kenneth Tan. The PM has kept a
relatively low profile on many issues, but has reserved the
right to step in at the end and have the final word. The one
major policy initiative the PM is identified with is
reversing a ban on organized gambling, when he decided in
2005 to license two casinos. If the economy continues to
SINGAPORE 00001404 002 OF 003
grow and stay competitive, the electorate will not question
the People's Action Party's (PAP's) firm grip on power,
argued National University of Singapore Professor Bilveer
Singh.
Overshadowed by the Father
--------------
5. (C) However, PM Lee continues to be overshadowed by his
father, LKY. In some ways, this is inevitable. LKY is a
towering and larger-than-life figure. Despite his hardball
approach to politics, he is widely hailed as a world-class
strategic thinker and visionary nation-builder who
transformed Singapore from a dirty Third World port city into
a gleaming First World metropolis in less than two
generations. This would be a tough act for anyone to follow.
But LKY's need for control and street-fighter instincts have
not diminished now that his son is PM. At critical moments,
LKY seems unable to control an impulse to take center stage
in public, leaving PM Lee to appear almost marginal. A
classic example was during last year's parliamentary
election, when LKY took over the PAP campaign and dominated
the media coverage as he sought to crush a hapless opposition
candidate (Ref B). Lee came off almost as a by-stander in
his first campaign as PM, and the opposition seized on
several of his gaffes to score political points. Another was
during the debate earlier this year over the huge increase in
ministerial salaries (Ref A). LKY has long been a proponent
of paying GOS ministers very well and, with many people
grumbling about the increase, LKY spoke in Parliament for the
first time in two years to defend the raise and to savage an
opposition MP who criticized it. On a regular basis, LKY's
pronouncements are treated as front page news in the local
press, on topics as varied as learning a second language to
how Singaporeans are enjoying a "golden age." Even his
musings on property prices and homosexuality are covered
prominently in the press.
6. (C) Behind the scenes, it is unclear how much say LKY has
over policy decisions. Ostensibly, he gave up control 17
years ago when he handed the premiership to Goh, and as
Minister Mentor, his job is to "mentor" younger ministers.
When asked about LKY's role, PM Lee told the press in June
that "All the routine business, we (the cabinet) settle. I
think even the major issues, it's up to us to decide ... he
(LKY) gives us the benefit of his perspective, his experience
and judgment." Even so, few here believe the government
would take any major policy decision without first obtaining
LKY's support. And just recently, LKY spoke to the press
about a future Singapore "after I am no longer in charge."
What is clear is that LKY remains highly active, traveling to
meet foreign leaders and speaking regularly on policy issues,
firing off late-night emails to government ministers
(according to a senior MFA official) and critiquing
think-tank papers (according to one researcher.)
7. (C) Without public polling, it is difficult to gauge
popular sentiment towards PM Lee. In the 2006 election, he
was re-elected comfortably, but embarrassingly failed to
match his party's percentage of the vote island-wide despite
running against very weak opposition. A media relations firm
CEO observed to us that the Prime Minister looked in his
public appearances like a man who didn't enjoy his job. A
group of prominent government critics we met with last fall
surprised us by expressing genuine sympathy for the PM in
light of LKY's dominant personality. One told us she
believed Lee's instincts were toward a loosening of political
controls more in keeping Singapore's developed status and the
times, but that the strength of his father's character would
prevent any real change as long as LKY is alive.
Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom - and Wilt
--------------
8. (C) Given LKY's stature and continued prominence, it is
not surprising that PM Lee has been unwilling or unable to
tone down Singapore's many restrictions on freedom of speech
and assembly. In his first major address as PM, he
encouraged Singaporeans to "speak your voice, be heard" and
promised a greater openness for political dialogue. One
ruling party MP told us that PM Lee had recognized the need
for openness as a means to encourage creativity and risk
taking in a society where many looked to the government to
take the lead. The pay off would come by fostering the
SINGAPORE 00001404 003 OF 003
entrepreneurship and innovation Singapore's economy needed to
stay competitive, but not lead to anyone challenging the
PAP's political dominance. However, that early promise for
more openness was quickly cast aside. In case after case, PM
Lee and the GOS have maintained tight controls on political
speech and discouraged people from speaking out or taking
risks by: banning films (by Singaporeans) and foreign
publications, suing critics for defamation, and jailing
political opponents for going beyond accepted limits on
public discourse. In one sad case in 2006, the police warned
a bunch of school girls they might break the law if they wore
"en masse" t-shirts with a tongue-in-check political image.
Comment
--------------
9. (C) PM Lee seems regularly to pass up opportunities to
define himself as Singapore's true leader. In the short and
medium term, he may not pay a political cost for this. The
economy is humming along, the opposition remains weak and
divided, and with LKY looking over everyone's shoulder, it is
hard to imagine a rival emerging from within the tight-knit
PAP.
10. (C) LKY's death will touch off a period of national angst
-- he has been in control for so long that few in Singapore
can remember life without him. If Singapore or the PAP were
to face a major crisis during this period, PM Lee's failure
to establish himself as a strong leader in his own right
could come back to haunt him. He could be vulnerable and his
leadership abilities would be tested like they never have
before. If no crisis occurs or the PM handles it
effectively, Singapore's well-oiled PAP-led political system
may very well chug along with Lee Hsien Loong serving another
decade or more as Prime Minister.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EFIN SN
SUBJECT: PM LEE HSIEN LOONG: ME AND MY (DAD'S) SHADOW
REF: A. SINGAPORE 728
B. 06 SINGAPORE 1486
Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Chris Kavanagh. Reasons 1.4(b)(d)
1. (C) Summary: After almost three years as Prime Minister,
Lee Hsien Loong still has not come out of the shadow of his
father, modern Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew
(LKY). Long seen as arrogant and preordained to take over
the reins of government, PM Lee has been successful in
softening his image and assuring Singaporeans that he is not
the same stern, autocratic figure his father is. Policy
continuity has marked PM Lee's tenure, as he has focused on
promoting economic growth and competitiveness. At critical
and even routine times, however, LKY takes center stage,
seemingly relegating his son to the sidelines, notably during
last year's elections. The two have even offered different
explanations to the press on LKY's role in the cabinet.
Singaporeans, possibly including the PM, seem to find LKY's
prominence and engagement reassuring. But PM Lee could pay a
political price after LKY's passing if he fails to establish
himself as a force in his own right. End Summary.
The Anointed One
--------------
2. (C) Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong long seemed preordained
to take over the reins of government from his father,
Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew (LKY),who now has
the peculiar title of "Minister Mentor." Following a
brilliant academic career at Cambridge and his meteoric rise
in the Singapore Armed Forces (he made Brigadier General at
age 32),Lee Hsien Loong left the military and entered
politics in 1984. He soon joined the cabinet and became
Deputy Prime Minister in 1990 to then-Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong, who had succeeded LKY when the latter "retired" in
1990. Lee succeeded Goh as Prime Minister in August 2004.
Despite his acknowledged intellectual and analytical skills,
Lee had long been dogged by perceptions that his rise to
power had as much to do with his family connections. (The
Lee family bristles at the word "nepotism" and threatens or
sues for defamation anyone who mentions it.) Lee also
acquired a reputation as brash and arrogant in his younger
days.
Let the Son Shine
--------------
3. (C) Even before he became PM, Lee Hsien Loong began
working to soften his public image and leadership style
to project a more caring side to Singaporeans and assure them
that he was not the same stern autocratic figure his
father is. PM Lee has largely succeeded in portraying
himself as a more approachable and sympathetic character. At
the same time, he has failed to put a strong personal stamp
on government policy, even as he has largely abandoned the
consultative approach to governing that Goh Chok Tong
employed as PM. Goh frequently used public committees
(consisting of representatives from the private sector,
academia, and government) to review government policies and
identify new options, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS)
researcher Gillian Koh told us. Instead, PM Lee and the GOS
have contracted with local think tanks to research policy
issues (such as the impact of the government's "baby bonus"
scheme on Singapore's low birth rate) and present
recommendations privately to the GOS. Thus, he has
established himself neither (like LKY) as a visionary and
dominant leader nor (like Goh) as a skilled
consensus-builder.
4. (C) Rather, policy continuity has characterized Lee Hsien
Loong's first three years in office. Retaining his portfolio
as Minister of Finance, PM Lee remains most focused on the
sound economic policies and strategic thinking that have
produced Singapore's remarkable prosperity. The PM appears
to have given the ministers a freer hand to develop and
implement new policies, observed Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy Assistant Dean Kenneth Tan. The PM has kept a
relatively low profile on many issues, but has reserved the
right to step in at the end and have the final word. The one
major policy initiative the PM is identified with is
reversing a ban on organized gambling, when he decided in
2005 to license two casinos. If the economy continues to
SINGAPORE 00001404 002 OF 003
grow and stay competitive, the electorate will not question
the People's Action Party's (PAP's) firm grip on power,
argued National University of Singapore Professor Bilveer
Singh.
Overshadowed by the Father
--------------
5. (C) However, PM Lee continues to be overshadowed by his
father, LKY. In some ways, this is inevitable. LKY is a
towering and larger-than-life figure. Despite his hardball
approach to politics, he is widely hailed as a world-class
strategic thinker and visionary nation-builder who
transformed Singapore from a dirty Third World port city into
a gleaming First World metropolis in less than two
generations. This would be a tough act for anyone to follow.
But LKY's need for control and street-fighter instincts have
not diminished now that his son is PM. At critical moments,
LKY seems unable to control an impulse to take center stage
in public, leaving PM Lee to appear almost marginal. A
classic example was during last year's parliamentary
election, when LKY took over the PAP campaign and dominated
the media coverage as he sought to crush a hapless opposition
candidate (Ref B). Lee came off almost as a by-stander in
his first campaign as PM, and the opposition seized on
several of his gaffes to score political points. Another was
during the debate earlier this year over the huge increase in
ministerial salaries (Ref A). LKY has long been a proponent
of paying GOS ministers very well and, with many people
grumbling about the increase, LKY spoke in Parliament for the
first time in two years to defend the raise and to savage an
opposition MP who criticized it. On a regular basis, LKY's
pronouncements are treated as front page news in the local
press, on topics as varied as learning a second language to
how Singaporeans are enjoying a "golden age." Even his
musings on property prices and homosexuality are covered
prominently in the press.
6. (C) Behind the scenes, it is unclear how much say LKY has
over policy decisions. Ostensibly, he gave up control 17
years ago when he handed the premiership to Goh, and as
Minister Mentor, his job is to "mentor" younger ministers.
When asked about LKY's role, PM Lee told the press in June
that "All the routine business, we (the cabinet) settle. I
think even the major issues, it's up to us to decide ... he
(LKY) gives us the benefit of his perspective, his experience
and judgment." Even so, few here believe the government
would take any major policy decision without first obtaining
LKY's support. And just recently, LKY spoke to the press
about a future Singapore "after I am no longer in charge."
What is clear is that LKY remains highly active, traveling to
meet foreign leaders and speaking regularly on policy issues,
firing off late-night emails to government ministers
(according to a senior MFA official) and critiquing
think-tank papers (according to one researcher.)
7. (C) Without public polling, it is difficult to gauge
popular sentiment towards PM Lee. In the 2006 election, he
was re-elected comfortably, but embarrassingly failed to
match his party's percentage of the vote island-wide despite
running against very weak opposition. A media relations firm
CEO observed to us that the Prime Minister looked in his
public appearances like a man who didn't enjoy his job. A
group of prominent government critics we met with last fall
surprised us by expressing genuine sympathy for the PM in
light of LKY's dominant personality. One told us she
believed Lee's instincts were toward a loosening of political
controls more in keeping Singapore's developed status and the
times, but that the strength of his father's character would
prevent any real change as long as LKY is alive.
Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom - and Wilt
--------------
8. (C) Given LKY's stature and continued prominence, it is
not surprising that PM Lee has been unwilling or unable to
tone down Singapore's many restrictions on freedom of speech
and assembly. In his first major address as PM, he
encouraged Singaporeans to "speak your voice, be heard" and
promised a greater openness for political dialogue. One
ruling party MP told us that PM Lee had recognized the need
for openness as a means to encourage creativity and risk
taking in a society where many looked to the government to
take the lead. The pay off would come by fostering the
SINGAPORE 00001404 003 OF 003
entrepreneurship and innovation Singapore's economy needed to
stay competitive, but not lead to anyone challenging the
PAP's political dominance. However, that early promise for
more openness was quickly cast aside. In case after case, PM
Lee and the GOS have maintained tight controls on political
speech and discouraged people from speaking out or taking
risks by: banning films (by Singaporeans) and foreign
publications, suing critics for defamation, and jailing
political opponents for going beyond accepted limits on
public discourse. In one sad case in 2006, the police warned
a bunch of school girls they might break the law if they wore
"en masse" t-shirts with a tongue-in-check political image.
Comment
--------------
9. (C) PM Lee seems regularly to pass up opportunities to
define himself as Singapore's true leader. In the short and
medium term, he may not pay a political cost for this. The
economy is humming along, the opposition remains weak and
divided, and with LKY looking over everyone's shoulder, it is
hard to imagine a rival emerging from within the tight-knit
PAP.
10. (C) LKY's death will touch off a period of national angst
-- he has been in control for so long that few in Singapore
can remember life without him. If Singapore or the PAP were
to face a major crisis during this period, PM Lee's failure
to establish himself as a strong leader in his own right
could come back to haunt him. He could be vulnerable and his
leadership abilities would be tested like they never have
before. If no crisis occurs or the PM handles it
effectively, Singapore's well-oiled PAP-led political system
may very well chug along with Lee Hsien Loong serving another
decade or more as Prime Minister.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD