Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SINGAPORE1304
2007-07-06 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN

Tags:  ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN 
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DE RUEHGP #1304/01 1870909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060909Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3552
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0767
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4056
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5654
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001304 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR MATTHEW WAXMAN, STATE FOR JAMES B. GREEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN
DURING S/P WAXMAN'S VISIT

Classified By: Economic/Political Chief Ike Reed for Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001304 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR MATTHEW WAXMAN, STATE FOR JAMES B. GREEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 TAGS: ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN SUBJECT: SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN DURING S/P WAXMAN'S VISIT Classified By: Economic/Political Chief Ike Reed for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Singapore officials and academics urged greater and more sophisticated U.S. regional engagement during meetings with Policy Planning (S/P) Principal Deputy Director Matthew Waxman June 25-27. GOS leaders argued that a USG failure to understand the importance of "process" in Asia and our senior officials, preoccupation with crisis management were causing us to lose influence to China. When pressed, Singapore counterparts seemed to have little complaint with the substance of U.S. engagement, but rather focused on perceptions of a divergence in U.S. and Chinese attentions to the region. (NOTE: These meetings took place just before the GOS was informed of the postponement of the U.S.-ASEAN summit, originally planned for September in Singapore. END NOTE.) Interlocutors noted the tolerant traditions of Southeast Asian Islam but warned that a process of "Arabization" was shifting the terms of debate in a more conservative and, in some cases, radical direction. End Summary. -------------- Form As Important As Substance -------------- ¶2. (C) In familiar terms, Singapore officials and academics told visiting Policy Planning (S/P) Principal Deputy Director Matthew Waxman that the United States needed to step up its engagement in Asia to avoid losing influence to China. Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore,s former UN Ambassador and current Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, agreed that the United States had demonstrated commitment to the region, but said Washington,s failure to adopt "radical new thinking" would allow Southeast Asia to become a "Chinese lake." Pressed for specifics, he emphasized the need for Washington to demonstrate leadership in APEC, such as through the proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTA-AP), which would make the East Asia Summit (EAS) "not so important." Mahbubani complained that senior USG officials focus too much on crisis management rather than pursuit of strategic interests. Recalling that the Secretary was unable to attend the 2005 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting due to events in the Middle East, Mahbubani said "there will always be a crisis in the Middle East."
;¶3. (C) In a similar vein, MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan asserted that the USG was good at short-term problem solving but failed to understand the importance of process, especially in Asia. He said the United States should pay more attention to the various overlapping regional architectures and find cross-cutting issues (such as climate change) that it could use to breathe new life into APEC and the ARF. At a roundtable lunch hosted by the Ambassador, academics echoed these themes. They emphasized the importance of "gestures," and urged the United States to find "low-cost" means to engage, such as by sending senior officials to regional meetings or signing on to initiatives like the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Both Kausikan and a think-tanker who focuses on ASEAN suggested that the USG work to revitalize the ARF as it was trying to do with APEC. -------------- China's "Charm" Offensive -------------- ¶4. (C) Interlocutors spoke of the effectiveness of China's "charm offensive," noting that China showed great enthusiasm for various regional fora and agreements, even if the substance of its engagement was questionable. They cited China,s offer of an FTA with ASEAN as an example. Even though the FTA was not as comprehensive as a U.S. FTA, the Chinese had been flexible and negotiations had progressed rapidly. Given China's complicated history in the region, the ASEAN countries had been wary of China up until the late 1990's. But China had since assuaged such concerns through gestures of goodwill towards the region. Some saw China,s engagement as more "strategic" than others; MFA's Kausikan said that China was mostly interested in internal stability and securing resources to fuel its economy. Mahbubani thought China had a clear plan to extend its influence over coming decades. Providing his own scorecard on the SINGAPORE 00001304 002 OF 002 sophistication of current foreign policy (on a scale of 10), Mahbubani gave China an 8, the United States a 6, the European Union a 4 ("rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic") and Russia a 2. -------------- "Arabization" of Indonesia and Malaysia -------------- ¶5. (C) Officials and academics pointed to the spread of a more conservative Islam from the Middle East into traditionally tolerant Southeast Asia ("Arabization") as a worrying trend, noting that religion was playing a greater part in politics. Mahbubani noted that Islamist political parties in Malaysia and Indonesia had not increased their historical share of the vote, but they had succeeded in forcing "moderate" parties to shift in their direction. He said that even this region,s many well-educated moderates were "very angry" about U.S. policies. His prescriptions: "shut off Saudi money" and get 50,000 Indonesia university students to study in the United States. Kausikan noted that Malaysia,s courts had recently allowed Islamic law to be applied to non-Muslims, a development that seemed inconceivable in the past. He cited similar trends in Indonesia, though the high level of disorganization and regional diversity in Indonesia made a consolidated movement toward Islamic law less likely. ¶6. (C) Otherwise, Kausikan appeared to think Indonesia was doing as well as could be expected. The new system had still not reached a state of "equilibrium" to replace Soeharto,s "New Order," but President Yudhoyono was "the best they,ve got" and had a good economic cabinet. Key questions were whether Yudhoyono would be able to reach an accommodation with Vice President Kalla ahead of the 2009 election and whether Indonesia could generate enough foreign direct investment to generate jobs for millions of young people entering the labor force. Kausikan said the conflict in Southern Thailand was more about ethnicity than religion but suggested that the incompetence of the current Thai leadership was only making matters worse. He thought the election later this year would do little to solve Thailand,s underlying divisions. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) When pressed on the substance of U.S. engagement, GOS officials and academics had few suggestions other than to follow up strongly on initiatives like FTA-AP and try to show similar leadership in the ARF. Rather, they focused on the substantial gains China was making with goodwill gestures and a diplomatic game played according to Asian expectations, and the contrasting perception that the United States is preoccupied elsewhere. For Singapore, more U.S. engagement is always better, so we are unlikely ever to hear that we,re doing enough. In fact, our economic, military and diplomatic presence is enormous, and as long as it remains so, the threat of Southeast Asia becoming a "Chinese lake" appears exaggerated. China will likely make mistakes and eventually will be expected to meet higher expectations. But for now the perception that we are not willing or able to match China,s "charm" is real, adding to a sense that we do not fully grasp modern Asia or its trajectory. That alone can complicate our diplomatic efforts in the region. ¶8. (U) S/P Deputy Director Waxman has cleared this message. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm HERBOLD

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