U.S.-SINGAPORE COUNTERPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 001131 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS ISN FOR PDAS MCNERNEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017 TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP ETTC ETRD KTFN PREL SN SUBJECT: U.S.-SINGAPORE COUNTERPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE SCENESETTER REF: A. 05 SINGAPORE 3160 ¶B. 06 SINGAPORE 2854 ¶C. 06 SINGAPORE 1615 ¶D. 06 SINGAPORE 1578 ¶E. SINGAPORE 703 ¶F. 04 SINGAPORE 748 ¶G. SINGAPORE 227 ¶H. SINGAPORE 852 Classified By: E/P Chief Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(b),(c),and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: The second U.S.-Singapore Counterproliferation (CP) Dialogue in Washington June 14 offers an opportunity to review our steadily expanding bilateral CP cooperation and encourage Singapore to further strengthen its export control regime )- in particular through monitoring of transshipments and goods passing through its free-trade zone. In post's assessment, Singapore's own security concerns are increasing its willingness to be proactive on CP issues -- including through interdiction of suspect shipments. However, the GOS remains anxious about legal and financial liabilities as well as the commercial impact in any case that is not clearly subject to UN Security Council sanctions. Reassurance that the USG will refer to Singapore only serious and well-substantiated cases, provide it with sufficient evidence, and press other countries to stop shipments at their source would do much to ensure that Singapore remains responsive to our interdiction requests. End summary. Substantial Progress -------------- ¶2. (S) Singapore has significantly increased its cooperation on CP issues since the initial round of the CP Dialogue took place here in October 2005 (ref A). Key examples include: -- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Singapore continues to be active in PSI. Singapore Customs and the Ministry of Defense co-hosted a successful PSI-related Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in July 2006 focused on the legal aspects of maritime interdictions. -- Strategic Goods Control List. The GOS announced in September 2006 plans to expand its strategic goods control list to include all the items identified under the four major international control regimes -- the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (ref B). -- Training. The GOS is an enthusiastic consumer of EXBS training and invariably puts it to good use to improve its technical and enforcement expertise. USG training provided thus far has covered commodity identification, targeting and risk management, investigative techniques, pre-license checks/post shipment verification, seaport interdiction, and interview and interrogation methods for export investigations. By January 1, 2008, when Singapore's expanded strategic goods control list is set to take effect, EXBS will have provided all of the specific training Singapore requested at the last CP dialogue, as well as workshops on the Wassenaar Arrangement and WMD interdiction. -- WMD Finance and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Singapore amended its "Schedule of Serious Offenses" to include all major crimes covered by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act (SGCA) in May 2006. The Schedule serves as a list of predicate offenses for Singapore's Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation and Benefits) Act (CDSA) of 1999, and allows for seizure of all proceeds from these crimes, regardless of whether they were committed in Singapore or overseas (ref C). Singapore also amended the CDSA to include offenses related to CFT and money laundering (ref D). In December 2006, the Monetary Authority of Singapore issued new and revised anti-money laundering (AML) and CFT regulations for banks and other financial institutions that for the first time include CFT provisions in accordance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. Affected institutions include banks, finance companies, money changers and remitters, life insurers, capital market intermediaries, and financial advisers (ref E). The GOS has been extremely cooperative in the areas of UNSCR terrorist finance designations and DPRK financial activity in Singapore. ¶3. (S) While the GOS has made substantial progress, it would be fruitful for the USG to enagage the GOS in a discussion of outstanding issues. For example, an exception to the new strategic goods regulation states that transshipment and transit cargo remaining in Singapore's Free Trade Zones for 21 days or less (air, land, or rail) or 45 days of less (sea) will not require permits. This carve-out could potentially represent a large percentage of goods passing through Singapore's legal jurisdiction. Also, the announced Strategic Goods Control Act expansion represents an enormous resource challenge for the GOS. We will need to ensure that the GOS devotes sufficient resources to effectively implement the new laws, and we should be prepared to provide technical assistance as needed. Finally, we remain concerned that Singapore does not collect manifest data on transshipment or transit cargo unless it is bound for the United States, e.g., under the Container Security Initiative. Interdictions -------------- ¶4. (S) Singapore's geography and position as a leading container port and transportation hub make it a natural chokepoint through which pass suspect and potentially sanctionable shipments involving the DPRK, Burma and Iran, in addition a huge volume of legitimate trade. At USG request, the GOS has interdicted or helped monitor a number of shipments of concern transiting Singapore in recent months. In several of these cases, the chronically understaffed MFA office that deals with CP issues has responded to our urgent requests by pulling together interagency meetings at night or on weekends to take action against shipments on the basis of little more than our assurance that they were of proliferation concern or might be covered under UN sanctions. These actions represent a significant departure from the GOS' historical reluctance to take actions that might adversely affect the operations of its highly efficient and busy port, the basis of Singapore's prosperity. This increased willingness to act appears to reflect both Singapore's own concerns about proliferation and its desire to cooperate closely with the United States on security issues. ¶5. (S) Nevertheless, the GOS remains anxious about both the potentially negative commercial impact of these actions and legal and financial liability for seizing goods that are not specifically covered by UN sanctions or considered to be "dual use" items. Although the GOS has acted almost immediately in most cases, we have not always been able to provide it with evidence to fully substantiate the concerns that led to the initial request due to our need to protect sources. MFA occasionally reminds us of its seizure based on British intelligence of two Iran-bound graphite shipments in 2003 (ref F). Despite numerous requests, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom could provide assistance in building a legal case for the seizure, and the graphite was returned to the Chinese suppliers two years after the initial action. ¶6. (S) MFA has told us informally that some GOS officials questioned the USG's linking what later turned out to be a non-controlled item to UNSCR 1718 (ref G). Some reportedly wondered whether the USG had "taken advantage of how seriously Singapore viewed its international obligations in order to spur the GOS into action." The GOS frequently asks whether the USG is putting pressure on source countries, suggesting we should try to stop shipments at the ports of origin rather than rely on transit and transshipment ports to intercept cargo. While the GOS has continued to act swiftly on our requests (the most recent resulting in the seizure of a shipment of sodium perchlorate) (ref H),perceived failures on our part to provide the GOS with information it sees as essential to justify its actions could undermine over time its willingness to lean forward on our requests, with potentially serious consequences. ¶7. (S) In order to ensure the GOS remains responsive to our short-fused requests, we believe it would be useful to: -- Acknowledge that our urgent requests have imposed a heavy operational load; -- reassure the GOS that we will prioritize only the most serious cases for referral to Singapore, and will endeavor to provide the best information possible; -- discuss frankly the constraints that sometimes limit the information we provide, and explain how cases are vetted to ensure our concerns are valid; and, -- discuss other steps we are taking to disrupt suspect shipments, including interventions with source countries. HERBOLD