DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000108 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR, EAP/CM, EAP/K E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON KN KS CH SUBJECT: DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: THE STORY OF ONE BORDER ADMINISTRATION Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL DAVID BRIZZEE. REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Hours after Pyongyang's October 9, 2006 nuclear test, the PLA dispatched a team to Changbai--the PRC border locality closest to the site of the explosion-- to test for contamination, according to Changbai County Communist Party Secretary Miao Chunxiu. Miao said he learned about the test "immediately" and was "terrified," though citizens were not notified. Changbai Customs officials claimed to be enforcing UNSCR 1718 and reported no change in volume or value of Changbai's trade with North Korea. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a May 10-11 visit to Changbai County--the PRC's sole ethnic Korean autonomous county, situated in Jilin Province across the Yalu River from the large North Korean border city of Hyesan--Poloff met a number of officials who described the local impact of the North's October 2006 nuclear test, as well as their actions in enforcing UNSCR 1718. CHANGBAI REACTS TO NEARBY NUKE TEST: PLA TEAM, NEWS CONTROL -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In a dinner with Poloff on May 10, Changbai County Communist Party Secretary MIAO Chunxiu (strictly protect) relayed what transpired in Changbai on the day of Pyongyang's October 2006 nuclear test. Miao claimed that he was "immediately" notified of the nuclear test though he provided no further details on this. He said he was "terrified," given that Changbai is only 70 kilometers away from the North's test site, which, he stated, is why he believes Beijing immediately focused its attention on Changbai. "A few hours" following the explosion, Miao recalled that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dispatched a team of experts to monitor Changbai's air and water for contamination, but found no cause for concern. He said his heart lightened upon hearing this, and seemed to think that the "rain and wind" later in the day also boded well for Changbai. ¶4. (C) The over 80,000 residents of Changbai County were not in a state of panic, Miao explained, because his government did not notify them that North Korea had detonated a nuclear device nearby. Miao said he personally was particularly concerned about the potential impact of the test on Changbai's investment environment, but added that he has recently become more sanguine as a result of "progress in the Six Party Talks" and the number of exploratory investment delegations that have come to Changbai in the past several months. UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT, INSPECTIONS IN CHANGBAI COUNTY -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Several Changbai officials also spoke of their efforts in implementing UNSCR 1718. Party Secretary Miao, for one, seemed well aware of UNSCR 1718 and claimed that his county--linked with Hyesan via a land bridge--was "enforcing" the resolution, but demurred when pressed on specifics. In a separate meeting on May 10, Deputy Director Liu of Changbai Customs (strictly protect)--who declined to give anything but his surname--explained that following the passage of UNSCR 1718, the General Administration of Customs in Beijing required local customs offices to "strengthen inspections," an instruction which Liu claimed Changbai "strictly implemented." ¶6. (C) Asked about Changbai's inspections of outgoing traffic bound for Hyesan, Liu explained that most trucks passing through Changbai Port are open-bed trucks, which officers can inspect "with their eyes." For larger shipments, cargo can generally be pre-cleared at a customs- monitored warehouse, where goods are stored, inspected and then loaded onto trucks bound for the port and then, the DPRK. ¶7. (C) For incoming traffic from Hyesan, Liu said North Korean vehicles and goods are inspected and taxed "according to international regulations." Customs is on alert, he claimed, for "sensitive" prohibited items, including drugs and nuclear materials. Liu mentioned that Changbai Customs' inspections process can also include "sampling." When asked what specific tools or technologies Changbai Customs uses to detect the presence of restricted items, Liu replied that none are needed, since customs personnel could conduct visual inspections. Liu declined to answer how long the typical inspection took, but said that since last year, Customs had found nothing transiting Changbai Port in contravention of UNSCR ¶1718. (NOTE: Port authorities rejected Poloff's request for a visit to Changbai Port, citing the sensitivity of the North Korean side. END NOTE.) ¶8. (C) Changbai, Liu added, has seen essentially no change in the volume and value of its trade with North Korea since the passage of UNSCR 1718, primarily because the types of good flowing through the port are not restricted by UNSCR ¶1718. He said Changbai primarily imports lumber, as well as minerals and herbal products from North Korea and exports daily consumables, grain and garments to Hyesan. LUXURY GOODS -------------- ¶9. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on May 10, Director Wang of Changbai's Port of Entry Administration Office (strictly protect)--who also declined to give his full name-- expressed surprise when Poloff informed him that the United States had formulated an official list of specific luxury goods prohibited for export to the DPRK in accordance with UNSCR 1718. Wang was curious about specific goods the U.S. had prohibited and inquired at several points about the overall purpose of the luxury goods restrictions. He, like Liu, declined to offer specifics on Changbai Port's measures to enforce the luxury-goods provisions of UNSCR ¶1718. BRIZZEE