Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHENYANG108
2007-06-05 04:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shenyang
Cable title:
DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN
null C O N F I D E N T I A L SHENYANG 00108 SIPDIS CXSNY: ACTION: POL INFO: RSO/RF ECON RF DISSEMINATION: POL /1 CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: ACG:DBRIZZEE DRAFTED: POL:AJHANTMAN CLEARED: BJ POL: MTESONE VZCZCSHI082 PP RUEHC RUEHOO RUEHBJ RUEHUL RUEAIIA RUEKJCS RHHJJAA RUCGEVC RHEHAAA RUEKJCS RUCNDT DE RUEHSH #0108/01 1560431 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 050431Z JUN 07 FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8081 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7821 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1738 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0031 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0022 RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0012 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0054 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0002
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000108
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INR, EAP/CM, EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN
CHINA: THE STORY OF ONE BORDER ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL DAVID BRIZZEE.
REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000108
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INR, EAP/CM, EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN
CHINA: THE STORY OF ONE BORDER ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL DAVID BRIZZEE.
REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Hours after Pyongyang's October 9, 2006
nuclear test, the PLA dispatched a team to Changbai--the
PRC border locality closest to the site of the explosion--
to test for contamination, according to Changbai County
Communist Party Secretary Miao Chunxiu. Miao said he
learned about the test "immediately" and was "terrified,"
though citizens were not notified. Changbai Customs
officials claimed to be enforcing UNSCR 1718 and reported
no change in volume or value of Changbai's trade with North
Korea. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) During a May 10-11 visit to Changbai County--the
PRC's sole ethnic Korean autonomous county, situated in
Jilin Province across the Yalu River from the large North
Korean border city of Hyesan--Poloff met a number of
officials who described the local impact of the North's
October 2006 nuclear test, as well as their actions in
enforcing UNSCR 1718.
CHANGBAI REACTS TO NEARBY NUKE TEST: PLA TEAM, NEWS CONTROL
-------------- --------------
3. (C) In a dinner with Poloff on May 10, Changbai County
Communist Party Secretary MIAO Chunxiu (strictly protect)
relayed what transpired in Changbai on the day of
Pyongyang's October 2006 nuclear test. Miao claimed that
he was "immediately" notified of the nuclear test though he
provided no further details on this. He said he was
"terrified," given that Changbai is only 70 kilometers away
from the North's test site, which, he stated, is why he
believes Beijing immediately focused its attention on
Changbai. "A few hours" following the explosion, Miao
recalled that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dispatched
a team of experts to monitor Changbai's air and water for
contamination, but found no cause for concern. He said his
heart lightened upon hearing this, and seemed to think that
the "rain and wind" later in the day also boded well for
Changbai.
4. (C) The over 80,000 residents of Changbai County were
not in a state of panic, Miao explained, because his
government did not notify them that North Korea had
detonated a nuclear device nearby. Miao said he personally
was particularly concerned about the potential impact of
the test on Changbai's investment environment, but added
that he has recently become more sanguine as a result of
"progress in the Six Party Talks" and the number of
exploratory investment delegations that have come to
Changbai in the past several months.
UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT, INSPECTIONS IN CHANGBAI COUNTY
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Several Changbai officials also spoke of their
efforts in implementing UNSCR 1718. Party Secretary Miao,
for one, seemed well aware of UNSCR 1718 and claimed that
his county--linked with Hyesan via a land bridge--was
"enforcing" the resolution, but demurred when pressed on
specifics. In a separate meeting on May 10, Deputy
Director Liu of Changbai Customs (strictly protect)--who
declined to give anything but his surname--explained that
following the passage of UNSCR 1718, the General
Administration of Customs in Beijing required local customs
offices to "strengthen inspections," an instruction which
Liu claimed Changbai "strictly implemented."
6. (C) Asked about Changbai's inspections of outgoing
traffic bound for Hyesan, Liu explained that most trucks
passing through Changbai Port are open-bed trucks, which
officers can inspect "with their eyes." For larger
shipments, cargo can generally be pre-cleared at a customs-
monitored warehouse, where goods are stored, inspected and
then loaded onto trucks bound for the port and then, the
DPRK.
7. (C) For incoming traffic from Hyesan, Liu said North
Korean vehicles and goods are inspected and taxed
"according to international regulations." Customs is on
alert, he claimed, for "sensitive" prohibited items,
including drugs and nuclear materials. Liu mentioned that
Changbai Customs' inspections process can also include
"sampling." When asked what specific tools or
technologies Changbai Customs uses to detect the presence
of restricted items, Liu replied that none are needed,
since customs personnel could conduct visual inspections.
Liu declined to answer how long the typical inspection
took, but said that since last year, Customs had found
nothing transiting Changbai Port in contravention of UNSCR
1718. (NOTE: Port authorities rejected Poloff's request
for a visit to Changbai Port, citing the sensitivity of the
North Korean side. END NOTE.)
8. (C) Changbai, Liu added, has seen essentially no change
in the volume and value of its trade with North Korea since
the passage of UNSCR 1718, primarily because the types of
good flowing through the port are not restricted by UNSCR
1718. He said Changbai primarily imports lumber, as well
as minerals and herbal products from North Korea and
exports daily consumables, grain and garments to Hyesan.
LUXURY GOODS
--------------
9. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on May 10, Director Wang of
Changbai's Port of Entry Administration Office (strictly
protect)--who also declined to give his full name--
expressed surprise when Poloff informed him that the United
States had formulated an official list of specific luxury
goods prohibited for export to the DPRK in accordance with
UNSCR 1718. Wang was curious about specific goods the U.S.
had prohibited and inquired at several points about the
overall purpose of the luxury goods restrictions. He, like
Liu, declined to offer specifics on Changbai Port's
measures to enforce the luxury-goods provisions of UNSCR
1718.
BRIZZEE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INR, EAP/CM, EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN
CHINA: THE STORY OF ONE BORDER ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL DAVID BRIZZEE.
REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Hours after Pyongyang's October 9, 2006
nuclear test, the PLA dispatched a team to Changbai--the
PRC border locality closest to the site of the explosion--
to test for contamination, according to Changbai County
Communist Party Secretary Miao Chunxiu. Miao said he
learned about the test "immediately" and was "terrified,"
though citizens were not notified. Changbai Customs
officials claimed to be enforcing UNSCR 1718 and reported
no change in volume or value of Changbai's trade with North
Korea. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) During a May 10-11 visit to Changbai County--the
PRC's sole ethnic Korean autonomous county, situated in
Jilin Province across the Yalu River from the large North
Korean border city of Hyesan--Poloff met a number of
officials who described the local impact of the North's
October 2006 nuclear test, as well as their actions in
enforcing UNSCR 1718.
CHANGBAI REACTS TO NEARBY NUKE TEST: PLA TEAM, NEWS CONTROL
-------------- --------------
3. (C) In a dinner with Poloff on May 10, Changbai County
Communist Party Secretary MIAO Chunxiu (strictly protect)
relayed what transpired in Changbai on the day of
Pyongyang's October 2006 nuclear test. Miao claimed that
he was "immediately" notified of the nuclear test though he
provided no further details on this. He said he was
"terrified," given that Changbai is only 70 kilometers away
from the North's test site, which, he stated, is why he
believes Beijing immediately focused its attention on
Changbai. "A few hours" following the explosion, Miao
recalled that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dispatched
a team of experts to monitor Changbai's air and water for
contamination, but found no cause for concern. He said his
heart lightened upon hearing this, and seemed to think that
the "rain and wind" later in the day also boded well for
Changbai.
4. (C) The over 80,000 residents of Changbai County were
not in a state of panic, Miao explained, because his
government did not notify them that North Korea had
detonated a nuclear device nearby. Miao said he personally
was particularly concerned about the potential impact of
the test on Changbai's investment environment, but added
that he has recently become more sanguine as a result of
"progress in the Six Party Talks" and the number of
exploratory investment delegations that have come to
Changbai in the past several months.
UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT, INSPECTIONS IN CHANGBAI COUNTY
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Several Changbai officials also spoke of their
efforts in implementing UNSCR 1718. Party Secretary Miao,
for one, seemed well aware of UNSCR 1718 and claimed that
his county--linked with Hyesan via a land bridge--was
"enforcing" the resolution, but demurred when pressed on
specifics. In a separate meeting on May 10, Deputy
Director Liu of Changbai Customs (strictly protect)--who
declined to give anything but his surname--explained that
following the passage of UNSCR 1718, the General
Administration of Customs in Beijing required local customs
offices to "strengthen inspections," an instruction which
Liu claimed Changbai "strictly implemented."
6. (C) Asked about Changbai's inspections of outgoing
traffic bound for Hyesan, Liu explained that most trucks
passing through Changbai Port are open-bed trucks, which
officers can inspect "with their eyes." For larger
shipments, cargo can generally be pre-cleared at a customs-
monitored warehouse, where goods are stored, inspected and
then loaded onto trucks bound for the port and then, the
DPRK.
7. (C) For incoming traffic from Hyesan, Liu said North
Korean vehicles and goods are inspected and taxed
"according to international regulations." Customs is on
alert, he claimed, for "sensitive" prohibited items,
including drugs and nuclear materials. Liu mentioned that
Changbai Customs' inspections process can also include
"sampling." When asked what specific tools or
technologies Changbai Customs uses to detect the presence
of restricted items, Liu replied that none are needed,
since customs personnel could conduct visual inspections.
Liu declined to answer how long the typical inspection
took, but said that since last year, Customs had found
nothing transiting Changbai Port in contravention of UNSCR
1718. (NOTE: Port authorities rejected Poloff's request
for a visit to Changbai Port, citing the sensitivity of the
North Korean side. END NOTE.)
8. (C) Changbai, Liu added, has seen essentially no change
in the volume and value of its trade with North Korea since
the passage of UNSCR 1718, primarily because the types of
good flowing through the port are not restricted by UNSCR
1718. He said Changbai primarily imports lumber, as well
as minerals and herbal products from North Korea and
exports daily consumables, grain and garments to Hyesan.
LUXURY GOODS
--------------
9. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on May 10, Director Wang of
Changbai's Port of Entry Administration Office (strictly
protect)--who also declined to give his full name--
expressed surprise when Poloff informed him that the United
States had formulated an official list of specific luxury
goods prohibited for export to the DPRK in accordance with
UNSCR 1718. Wang was curious about specific goods the U.S.
had prohibited and inquired at several points about the
overall purpose of the luxury goods restrictions. He, like
Liu, declined to offer specifics on Changbai Port's
measures to enforce the luxury-goods provisions of UNSCR
1718.
BRIZZEE