Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI759
2007-11-28 06:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SFRC STAFFER JANUZZI READ-OUT OF NORTH KOREA

Tags:  PREL MNUC KNNP KS KN CH 
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VZCZCXRO7496
RR RUEHCN RUEHVC
DE RUEHGH #0759/01 3320600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280600Z NOV 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6473
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6987
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000759 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2032
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KS KN CH
SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFER JANUZZI READ-OUT OF NORTH KOREA
DENUCLEARIZATION CONFERENCE IN SHANGHAI NOV 27

REF: SHANGHAI 570 AND PREVIOUS

SHANGHAI 00000759 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(h)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000759 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2032 TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KS KN CH SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFER JANUZZI READ-OUT OF NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION CONFERENCE IN SHANGHAI NOV 27 REF: SHANGHAI 570 AND PREVIOUS SHANGHAI 00000759 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate Shanghai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(h) ¶1. (C) Summary: Chinese, South Korean and United States academics and officials agreed that North Korea (DPRK) has not yet decided if it will give up its nuclear weapons according to a read-out provided by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Professional Staff Member Frank Januzzi on a November 27 conference on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in Shanghai. The DPRK is likely to recusitate its demand for a light water reactor in the near future and conference attendees expressed concern at the likely United States response to what they expect to be "an imperfect declaration" by the DPRK of its nuclear program in the very near future. South Korean participants urged the United States to lift sanctions on the DPRK as soon as this declaration is made -- and then deal with any problems it presents later. Japan appeared to still be "paralyzed" by the abductees issue and not actively engaged in the Six-Party Talks process. China continues to be concerned that DPRK intransigence on its nuclear weapons program will encourage Japan to rethink its own weapons needs. Chinese participants were concerned by disagreements between members of the South Korean delegation that broke down along politically conservative and progressive lines. Especially of concern to the Chinese was that if South Korea became more politically conservative, it would move away from China towards a closer alignment with the United States. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and the Shanghai International Culture Association sponsored an academic conference entitled: "Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula 2008 Issues, Prospects and Peace Building Mechanisms" on November 27. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Professional Staff Member Frank Januzzi joined Columbia University Professor and former State Department official Joel Wit representing the United States at the conference. Consulate General Shanghai was not invited to participate, but Januzzi provided a read-out of the conference to Econoff on Novembe
r 27. ¶3. (C) In addition to the United States, there were representatives from South Korea (ROK) and China. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Korea Nuclear Affairs Bureau Deputy Director General Choong-hee Hahn led the ROK delegation that also included Korea Institute for National Unification Senior Research Fellow Seong-whun Cheon and North Korean Nuclear Policy Division Assistant Director Han-seok Ryoo. The Chinese side was led by SASS Vice President Huang Renwei and included SASS Korean Peninsula Studies Center Deputy Director Liu Ming, Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics Professor Liu Gonglian.),China Institute of International Studies Senior Fellow Yu Shaohua. (Note: Liu Gonglian is a retired Chinese nuclear weapons physicist in his late sixties. Yu Shaohua spent 10 years as a Chinese diplomat in North Korea during the 1990s and 2000s. End note.) -------------- -------------- Even North Korea Doesn't Know If It Will Give Up Nukes -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The purpose of the conference was to allow academics and those participating government officials to assess the DPRK's progress in denuclearization. There was general agreement that the DPRK has been moving forward. Januzzi and Wit stressed the important role that Chinese and ROK interlocutors must play in conveying to the DPRK that its expected declaration must completely and accurately reflect all of its nuclear activities. ¶5. (C) There was a broad consensus among all conference attendees that the DPRK has not yet made the decision to denuclearize. The DPRK is "playing it day-by-day" and no one will know if they are willing to give up their nuclear weapons until they have already been granted the concessions they want. -------------- -------------- Expect the DPRK to Insist on an LWR and "Peaceful Use" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Januzzi, the Chinese view is that during the next year, the DPRK will not abandon the fissile material it has already processed and possibly weaponized. The DPRK will, in the near future, resuscitate its demand for a light water SHANGHAI 00000759 002.2 OF 002 reactor (LWR) as part of its compensation package and insist on its right to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Chinese are not expected to object to these stipulations and the Chinese attendees at the conference expressed the hope that the United States position on these demands would be "more flexible" and allow the LWR in exchange for the DPRK giving up its nuclear weapons capability. -------------- -------------- How Will the U.S. React to an Imperfect Declaration? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) ROK participants said that the United States should lift sanctions against the DPRK as soon as the DPRK issues its declaration. They acknowledged that the declaration might not perfectly comply with United States expectations but said that any problems should be worked out after the sanctions are lifted. The ROK delegation expected the DPRK's declaration soon. ¶8. (C) There was a "sense of anxiety" on both the part of the Chinese and ROK participants as to what the United States reaction would be to an "imperfect declaration," said Januzzi. -------------- Nobody Defending the North Koreans -------------- ¶9. (C) The Chinese side took a hard line criticizing the DPRK. No one at the conference defended the DPRK, though China Institute of International Studies Yu appeared the most sympathetic to their concerns. ¶10. (C) Chinese participants expressed frustration at Pyongyang's failure to modernize its economy. The Chinese government had sponsored the training of a group of DPRK government economists at SASS in the last year. SASS's Huang said that this sort of training was a "wasted effort" since the economists return home and nothing ever gets implemented. -------------- -- Japan: Paralyzed and Sidelined Into Irrelevance -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Japan was not been invited to send a delegation to the conference and their role in the Six-Party talks was downplayed. There was the perception that Japan is still "paralyzed by the abduction issue" and its disengagement has made it irrelevant to the Six-Party Talks. While no one explicitly criticized Japan, Japan was hardly mentioned at all, said Januzzi. However Japan was clearly motivating China's desire for progress in denuclearizing the DPRK given its concern that Japan might respond by developing its own weapons program. SASS's Liu said, "The status quo is not acceptable since other countries in the region might reconsider their non-nuclear position." -------------- Disagreements Within the ROK Delegation -------------- ¶12. (C) Januzzi said that one of the most interesting parts of the conference was the public disagreements and discussions between the ROK delegates that broke down along politically conservative and progressive lines. The ROK progressives think that the disablement process has been going well while the conservative side finds the DPRK's compliance inadequate. The Chinese delegation observed these discussions with some concern and expressed their worry that if the ROK moves in a more politically-conservative direction and a conservative is elected president, then the ROK might move away from China towards the United States. They also noted that should this happen, the United States might find itself in the awkward position of being out ahead of the ROK in terms of its Korean unification policy. ¶13. (U) Mr. Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear on this report. JARRETT

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