INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000615 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN, WRIGHT USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG E.O. 12958: DECL: X1, MR TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI ECON CH SUBJECT: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS? REF: A) SHANGHAI 549; B) BEIJING 5974; C) SHANGHAI 379 SHANGHAI 00000615 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: According to a long-time Consulate contact, there would be more candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) than there were slots, reflecting a greater focus on intra-party democracy. Meanwhile, separate contacts reported differing accounts of the party's commitment to adhering to the practice implemented at the last party congress of forcing leaders who had already reached the age of 68 to retire. These rumors may reflect President Hu Jintao's continued efforts either to promote Vice Premier Wu Yi or to retire Vice President Zeng Qinghong. While we await the ultimate outcome of the Party Congress, Hu has prepositioned some of his supporters to take up seats on the Central Committee to increase the likelihood that voting for Politburo and PBSC members goes his way. End summary. -------------- Extra PBSC Candidates -------------- ¶2. (C) During a September 12 meeting, Tongji University Professor Frank Peng (protect) said that in line with pushing forward President Hu Jintao's more liberal, democratic agenda, the central leadership had determined that, for the first time, there would be more candidates for seats on the PBSC than actual slots. There were currently eleven candidates: Hu, Wen, National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Wu Bangguo (also currently on the PBSC),PBSC member Li Changchun, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, NPC Executive Vice Chairman Wang Zhaoguo, Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao, Minister of Public Security Zhou SIPDIS Yongkang, Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping, and one other whom Peng could not recall. Peng said that two weeks earlier he would have pegged United Front Work Department head Liu Yandong as the eleventh candidate but she has since lost some of her standing (Note: Peng either would not or could not elaborate on �0A;Liu's position. End note.) Peng did not know if there would be seven or nine PBSC slots. ¶3. (C) Peng said that rumors to the contrary aside, the PBSC intended to enforce the age limits on PBSC membership and would require everyone 68 or older to step down. Vice President Zeng Qinghong, Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) head Wu Guanzheng, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Chairman Jia Qinglin, and Luo Gan would all be retiring from the PBSC this fall. In addition, Commerce Minister Bo Xilai was virtually guaranteed a slot on the Politburo although Peng was likewise confident that Bo was not on the PBSC short list. ¶4. (C) In contrast, during a September 13 discussion with Pol/Econ Section Chief, Shanghai Stock Exchange Global Business Development Deputy Director Chao Kejian (protect) said that according to "very recent" information, Vice Premier Wu Yi, who will be 69 in November, would be promoted to the PBSC. The party needed a high-ranked female and Wu had demonstrated the skills needed to continue in a high-level position. Separately, Chao noted that current China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Chairman Shang Fulin would take up the post of People's Bank of China (PBOC) Governor. While this was ostensibly a lateral move, Chao explained that the CSRC Chairman and other heads of the financial regulatory agencies were not members of the cabinet, while the PBOC Governor was. Chao also predicted that current PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan would be promoted to State Councilor. ¶5. (C) Comment: We have been hearing back and forth rumors of the enforcement or lack thereof of the so-called "seven up, eight down" rule that would force people over the age of 68 to retire while leaving anyone 67 or younger in place. Most of these rumors seem to have been regarding the fortunes of Zeng and Wu Yi. These constantly fluctuating rumors likely reflect the continuing posturing by both Zeng and Hu. Since as early as June, our contacts have reported a link between Zeng's efforts to stay on and Hu's desire to promote Wu (Ref C). It appears to be somewhat of an "either/or" package deal. End comment. -------------- SHANGHAI 00000615 002.2 OF 002 Pre-Packaging the Party Congress -------------- ¶6. (C) Peng explained that when the Party Congress convenes on October 15, one of its first orders of business would be to elect the Central Committee. Towards the end of the Party Congress, the Central Committee would elect the Politburo, which in turn would elect the PBSC. There were likely to be more candidates for both the Central Committee and the Politburo than actual positions. In practice, every one of the Politburo candidates would be elected, with those garnering the fewest votes being relegated to the status of "alternate member." PBSC candidates will be selected from among the ranks of the PBSC, meaning that if they failed to be elected to the Standing Committee, they could still retain their Politburo status. (Comment: We assess it would be unlikely for current PBSC member Li Changchun to remain on the Politburo if he were not re-elected to the PBSC. End comment.) ¶7. (C) To ensure that voting goes his way, Peng said, Hu was driving the current provincial and ministerial reshuffles in an effort to preposition more of his people to be in line for Central Committee slots at the Party Congress. If Hu were able to control the Central Committee, he would have an easier time securing the votes he needs to ensure his picks for the Politburo and, subsequently, the PBSC will be elected. Hu was also using the pre-congress personnel changes to oust loyalists of former President Jiang Zemin. Peng pointed to the recent ouster of Finance Minister and Jiang protigi Jin Renqing amidst allegations of corruption and sexual misconduct as an example. Jin was transferred to a Vice-Ministerial-level position at the State Council Development Research Center, but had yet to take up his new post, which appears to be a sinecure at best. Peng believed that Hu had timed the investigation to free up the position for someone more politically palatable to himself. Hu was also behind recent reshuffles in the military, including the replacement of the Nanjing Military Region Commander and Political Commissar, to ensure that people loyal to him were in charge. ¶8. (C) Comment: While having more candidates than PBSC seats appears marginally democratic, in reality much of the selection of Politburo and PBSC members will be a foregone conclusion. For instance, if the central leadership has already come up with the name list for the PBSC candidates, it would seem that they will be elected as full Politburo members. Nevertheless, having more candidates than slots for the PBSC could be a first step--even if largely symbolic--toward intra-party democracy. End comment. JARRETT