SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000601 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN REF: A) SHANGHAI 570 B) SHANGHAI 573 CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Section Chief, Political/Economic Section, U.S. Consulate Shanghai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a series of meetings in late August, Shanghai cross-Strait experts expressed concerns about Taiwan's referendum on UN membership, which they believed touched on the redline of the Anti-Secession Law and created a basis for Taiwan independence. While there were many voices in China about Taiwan, President Hu Jintao still controlled Taiwan policy and had yet to make a decision on what actions Beijing will take in reaction to the referendum. The academics urged the United States do more to stop the UN referendum. Fudan University Center for American Studies Vice Dean Wu Xinbo asserted that there was a great deal of pressure on President Hu to take action against Taiwan before the October 15 Party Congress. During this time period, it was especially important for the United States to appear to be doing more and saying more on Taiwan. Beijing would likely not take any military action before the Party Congress as long as it appeared that the United States was managing the situation. All of the experts were disappointed with the KMT's efforts against the referendum and worried that the KMT had become too focused on winning the election. End Summary. A Challenge to Hu's Taiwan Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 28-30, Poloff accompanied two visiting Taiwan analysts to meetings with some of Shanghai's leading Taiwan academic experts. In an August 28 meeting, Shanghai Institute for East Asia Studies (SIEAS) President Zhang Nianchi worried that the referendum was putting pressure on President Hu Jintao to abandon his current policy towards Taiwan that emphasized patience. According to Zhang, President Hu's Taiwan policy recognized that reunification was a long-term process and supported a patient approach to Taiwan. The policy had four aspects: 1) increase exchanges; 2) strengthen three direct links between Taiwan and the Mainland; 3) support dialogue and negotiations with political parties in Taiwan, including the DPP; and 4) respect the wishes of the Taiwan people and trust that they will make the right choice. The referendum was causing some people to lose patience with Hu's policy and demand that Hu take action against Taiwan. ¶3. (C) Taiwan Research Center Executive Vice President Yan Anlin voiced similar concerns during his meeting with Poloff and Taiwan analysts on August 28. He said that Hu's basic Taiwan policy was to maintain stability through exchanges and discussions. As Taiwan moved closer to establishing independence, people were beginning to question Hu's ability to contain Taiwan. He predicted that if the referendum did take place, enormous DOMESTIC pressure would force Hu to change his policy. ¶4. (C) Zhang said currently there was a fierce debate in governmental and academic circles about Taiwan. He noted, however, China was still a country in which power was concentrated in the center. There might be multiple voices with multiple ideas, but President Hu makes the final decision. Until now, Hu has yet to make any statement on Taiwan or make known his views on Taiwan. Unlike former President Jiang Zemin, Hu liked to hear different opinions and has hosted regular meetings with academics on Taiwan. In addition, many organizations had "channels" to pass information to Hu. The PLA, State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, MFA and even Zhang's organization, SIEAS, all had their channels to Hu. ¶5. (C) Fudan University Center for American Studies Vice Dean Wu Xinbo in a discussion on August 28 said that while China's official policy came from the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, it was also important to look at statements made by the PLA, MFA and other organizations. These statements were not necessarily "test balloons" or signals of policy changes but provided insight into the debate occurring in China on Taiwan. (Comment: Wu just returned from a year-long fellowship at the U.S. Institute of Peace and is, perhaps, more sensitive to the role played by different agencies in governmental decision SHANGHAI 00000601 002 OF 004 making. End Comment.) A Fuzzy Redline -------------- ¶6. (C) Academics were reluctant to say that the referendum had crossed the Anti-Secession Law's redlines. Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) South Asia Studies Deputy Director Shao Yuqun on August 30 said China did not want to clearly define the Anti-Secession Law's redline. At the same time, it did not want to give Taiwan too much flexibility. This ambiguity made it difficult to definitively say whether the referendum would violate the Anti-Secession Law. This would depend on many factors including which candidate wins Taiwan's presidential election. ¶7. (C) According to Fudan's Wu Xinbo, the language in the Anti-Secession Law was purposely vague to allow Beijing space to maneuver. The law said that Beijing must act if there was a "major and serious" change to the status quo. One could argue that the referendum would not violate the Anti-Secession Law because even if the referendum did pass, Taiwan would still be considered a part of China. He concluded that, in the end, the question of whether the referendum would or would not violate the law depended on the political will of the Central Government. SIEAS's Zhang Nianchi believed that the referendum "touched" the Anti-Secession Law's redline. However, the Central Government was not sure whether it should let the public know this for fear that it would have to react. Beijing Constrained, So Far -------------- ¶8. (C) Wu Xinbo asserted that both the upcoming 17th Party Congress and the Olympics played a strong influence on the debate on Taiwan in Beijing. President Hu was under great pressure in the run-up to the 17th Party Congress to show that he was capable of managing the Taiwan situation. After the 17th Party Congress, this pressure should decrease. The Olympics was also a factor. Wu, like Zhang Nianchi and Yan Anlin, noted that Beijing's top priority was the Olympics and it did not want to cancel the Olympics because of Taiwan. According to Wu, so far, Beijing has been constrained in its actions partly because the United States had made its position clear. As long as the situation does not get too out of control, Beijing was content to allow Washington to manage the situation. ¶9. (C) Wu believed that there was a good chance Beijing would not take any action before the Party Congress. However, as the elections in Taiwan heat up and the referendum gets closer, Beijing might need to take some kind of symbolic action to show its reserve and unhappiness as well as to show that it has the capability to take care of the Taiwan problem. Beijing's Possible Actions -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Wu, Beijing was taking a two-step approach to the problem. First, it was looking to the international community to constrain Taiwan. Recently, Beijing urged other countries to publicly say that they would not support Taiwan's entry into the UN and to also clarify their Taiwan policy. Second, Beijing needed to take some action on its own that would show the people of Taiwan that the referendum would hurt their interests. Despite everything that Chen Shui-bian has done, the economic relationship between the Mainland and Taiwan continued unaffected. Economic actions should be on the table. He acknowledged, however, that such a move could backfire and anger the Taiwan people, leading more people to support the DPP and independence. The elections in Taiwan were a constraining effect on Beijing. Beijing understood that it must carefully consider the consequences of any action on the election. ¶11. (C) Wu added that Beijing was also trying to reach out to the DPP and it was considering inviting Frank Hsieh to the Mainland before the Taiwan Presidential Elections in 2008. According to Wu, Beijing has been trying to establish communications with the DPP for several years now. After the visit of James Soong and former KMT Chairman Lien Chan to the Mainland, Beijing realized that it needed to also reach out to the DPP. It has taken some time to build channels of SHANGHAI 00000601 003 OF 004 communication. He indicated that there has been some progress and noted that there were some DPP members who had a long-term and more practical view. The U.S. Role -------------- ¶12. (C) Most of the academics argued that the United States had far greater influence on Taiwan then Beijing and urged the United States to do more to force Taiwan to give up the referendum. They were very appreciative of recent U.S. statements on Taiwan. However, some believed that the United States had the capacity to do more. Shao Yuqun suggested that the USG make clear to the DPP that the referendum would hurt the DPP's relationship with the USG. SIIS Deputy Director of Japanese Studies Lian Degui in the same meeting with Shao suggested that the United States to utilize Taiwan's media to tell the people of Taiwan that the referendum would have a negative impact on Taiwan. Many of the academics believed that the people of Taiwan did not clearly understand what the referendum meant and asserted that if the people of Taiwan were better informed and educated on the impact of the referendum then they would oppose it. ¶13. (C) Zhang Nianchi acknowledged that the United States was doing a great deal and thanked the USG for its recent statements. However, there was a "perception problem." Most Chinese people believed that the United States was responsible for the Taiwan problem because it gave Taiwan too much support and tolerance. Chinese people believed that, if the United States really wanted to, it could stop Taiwan from pushing for independence. The fact that Taiwan independence continued to be a problem meant that the United States really did not want to stop it. Wu Xinbo made a similar point in his meeting. Wu said that the United States was indeed doing a lot, but Beijing expected the United States to do even more. As long as Washington was managing the situation, there was less pressure on Beijing to take strong action against Taiwan. Wu stressed that in the period before the 17th Party Congress, the United States must say more and do more or at least appear to be saying more and doing more. KMT: No Longer Restraining the DPP -------------- ¶14. (C) All of the academics were disappointed with the KMT and its role in stopping the referendum. Zhang Nianchi said the KMT was no longer restraining the DPP. It was becoming too localized (bentu hua) and too focused on gaining votes and winning elections. According to Zhang, the election was now a competition of "who loves Taiwan more." Shao Yuqun declared that the KMT was not sure if it wanted to become the Chinese KMT or the Taiwan KMT. The KMT has not made its position clear on the referendum and was suffering from many internal problems. ¶15. (C) Yan Anlin said the Chinese Government was very disappointed with KMT Presidential Candidate Ma Ying-jeou and not confident that he could stop the DPP. Wu Xinbo noted in his meeting that Beijing was uncomfortable with Ma for three reasons. First, Ma talks too much about democracy and human rights. If he wins, it would be difficult for the Chinese Government to deal with Ma on these issues. While one could criticize Chen Shui-bian for playing the independence card, it would be difficult to criticize Ma for playing the democracy card. Second, under Ma's leadership the KMT has become too localized (bentu hua). Ma believes that the future of the KMT depended on it becoming more of a local political party. Finally, many people were suspicious of Ma because he appeared to be too close to the United States. ¶16. (C) Nevertheless, all of the academics preferred Ma Ying-jeou to DPP Presidential Candidate Frank Hsieh. According to Shao, it was hard to predict who would win the Taiwan Presidential Elections. While Ma posed some problems, Hsieh would never give up independence. In addition, if the DPP won the election, the KMT would be finished and there would be no one to check the DPP's power. Taiwan Businessmen: Not Very Influential -------------- SHANGHAI 00000601 004 OF 004 ¶17. (C) The academics believed that Taiwan businessmen in China would not have a big influence on the upcoming Presidential election. Zhang Nianchi said Taiwan businessmen were a lost cause. China protected many Taiwan businessmen and gave them status on the mainland. However, when most of the businessmen returned to Taiwan they refused to acknowledge that they received any help from the Chinese Government and attributed their success on the mainland to their own abilities. Zhang concluded that the economic relationship was not a good platform for discussion. Zhang added that even if all of the estimated 250,000 Taiwan businessmen living on the Mainland wanted to return to Taiwan to vote it would be impossible. There were not enough flights to Taiwan to accommodate this number. Yan Anlin also discounted the influence of Taiwan businessmen on the elections and noted that not all Taiwan businessmen were KMT supporters. Patience is the Key -------------- ¶18. (C) In all of the meetings with academics, Poloff and Taiwan analysts urged that China continue to be patient with Taiwan and adopt a long-term view of the relationship. A strong reaction could have a negative affect on the relationship and paint China in a corner. Comment -------------- ¶19. (C) Poloff has had the opportunity to discuss Taiwan with more than a dozen different Shanghai academics in the past two weeks. (See Reftels.) The academics have been consistent in their views. While some have argued that the referendum does indeed cross the Anti-Secession Law's redline, most argue that it only touches the line and should not automatically trigger a military action from Beijing. How Beijing reacts depends, in part, on whether the United States can contain Taiwan or at least appears to be doing all it can on the issue, according to these Shanghai academics. JARRETT