FUDAN UNIVERSITY ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN AND NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000570 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/5/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR CH TW KN SUBJECT: FUDAN UNIVERSITY ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN AND NORTH KOREA CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate , Shanghai . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During an August 30 lunch discussion with Fudan Center for American Studies Director Shen Dingli and Deputy Director Xin Qiang, the academics predicted that Beijing would not take any military measures in reaction to the referendum on UN membership in Taiwan. However, anger was building up in Beijing and unless Taiwan moderated its positions, this anger would explode. While they were pleased with Deputy Secretary Negroponte's statements in his interview with Phoenix television, the United States still must do more to rein in Taiwan. This would give Beijing more confidence and decrease the pressure on Beijing to take actions against Taiwan. Fudan Center for China's Foreign Policy Studies Director Ren Xiao made similar statements about Taiwan in an August 31 lunch discussion, calling Chen Shui-bian's planned referendum a very provocative action that might change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. DPO strongly urged that Beijing take a mature and calm attitude towards Taiwan and consider the consequences of its actions on future cross-Straits relations. It was important to encourage Taiwan to be more realistic and responsible. On North Korea, Shen doubted that North Korea had indeed decided to give up its nuclear weapons. He said that in the best case scenario, North Korea would only give up its nuclear weapons after a regime change and there had been stability for 20 to 30 years. Ren commented that plans to develop the Tumen River area were basically moribund, but still thought there were long-term grounds to be optimistic for development of that area. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) DPO, Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff discussed Taiwan and North Korea with Fudan Center for American Studies Director Shen Dingli and Deputy Director Xin Qiang during a lunch on August ¶30. Shen is considered to be one of China's premier U.S.-China relations and regional security experts. Xin is a Taiwan expert, who, according to Shen, was given an award from the Shanghai municipal government for his book on cross-Straits relations. Subsequently, DPO and Pol/Econ Chief discussed Taiwan and other issues with Fudan Center for China's Foreign Policy Studies Director Ren Xiao at an August 31 luncheon. Ren's forte is East Asian regional security. Stop the Referendum -------------- ¶3. (C) Shen and Xin were concerned about the potential referendum on UN membership in Taiwan. According to Shen, the referendum was putting China in a very difficult position. If Taiwan had declared independence then China could simply take military action, although it was unlikely that this action would be a full-scale attack. However, if Taiwan does not declare independence, but did everything else to promote independence as it was now doing, then Beijing had to make some difficult decisions. If it did not take some type of military action then Taiwan would continue to push for independence. If it did take military action and attacked Taiwan, then Beijing would end up being the ultimate loser. Beijing's accounts would be frozen and the government would have to deal with oil and other energy shortages. In addition, Beijing would be in open conflict with the United States, which would have inconceivable consequences on global security. The best solution was to prevent this situation and force Taiwan to cancel the referendum. ¶4. (C) Xin added that the mainland government feared the referendum also because of its effect on domestic politics in Taiwan. The referendum was changing the political dynamics and balance in Taiwan. There was great concern that the DPP would be able to use the issue to rally support and gain enough votes to win the 2008 Presidential election. According to Xin, it would be a "nightmare" for the mainland government to have to deal with another DPP government. Although Frank Hsieh appeared to be more moderate than Chen Shui-bian, he was still a member of the DPP and would implement DPP policies. ¶5. (C) Ren called the UN membership resolution a provocative step that would alter the status quo and draw Taiwan closer to SHANGHAI 00000570 002 OF 004 independence. With plans for the referendum, Chen Shui-bian had broken his "Four No's" pledge to the United States. A U.S. warning to Chen was not the same as the United States punishing Chen for violating his pledge. Chen, a rogue politician, was not concerned about his domestic popularity as the end of his Presidential term nears, nor concerned about the Taiwan economy nor even about improving the livelihoods of people on Taiwan. Rather, Chen was pursuing his own political objectives. China supports maintaining the status quo and allowing for a future peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Chen's pursuit of creeping independence, the "normal country" resolution and the UN referendum all threaten the status quo, Ren stressed. Possible Actions -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Xin and Shen agreed that it was unlikely that the Beijing would take any military action in response to the referendum. Xin said that Beijing had learned its lessons and would not repeat its actions in 1995. Shen added that even if there was a referendum it would still be within the parameters that should not require the use of force. However, anger was building up in Beijing and both were concerned that this anger would one day explode, unless Taiwan moderated its positions. Shen noted that there was pressure on the center to make a hard decision and take military action. He saw on the Internet that President Hu had met with military leaders and the purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to attack Taiwan. In addition, Beijing recently announced a new military budget with a 25 percent increase over last year. This was a message to Taiwan. Officers' wages were also increased 100 percent. The military was becoming more competent and better equipped. ¶7. (C) Shen added that the mainland government was considering sponsoring a resolution at the UN General Assembly which stated that Taiwan was a part of the Peoples Republic of China. He said Beijing would understand if the Untied States did not support the resolution, but hoped that the United States would not campaign against this. DPO asserted that the resolution might have a negative impact on cross-Straits relations and make Taiwan feel even more isolated. Shen agreed and noted that some people in the Mainland held the same view and opposed the idea. They believed that the resolution would have a negative impact on long-term mainland-Taiwan relations. Therefore, the idea had not yet been adopted. Regardless, Beijing believed it needed to take some kind of action. It could not let Taiwan continue to push for independence. If it did not oppose Taiwan then the Taiwan government will believe that Beijing did not have the "guts" to punish Taiwan. On the other hand, if it did take action, it might have a negative impact on Taiwan domestic politics and further complicate matters. Calm and Mature Approach Needed -------------- ¶8. (C) DPO repeatedly urged that Beijing take a mature and calm approach to Taiwan and not take any strong actions that would further aggravate the situation. He noted that even if the referendum passed, that it would not change Taiwan's legal status. In addition, it was important to take actions that encouraged Taiwan to be realistic and responsible. It was important to fully consider what consequences any actions will have in future relations between the Mainland and Taiwan. The United States Needs to Do More -------------- ¶9. (C) Professors Shen, Xin and Ren urged that the United States do more to rein in Taiwan and to stop the referendum. As noted above, Beijing was in a difficult position and could not take action without having negative consequences. Shen asserted that the Mainland was not in a position to speak frankly or take action as it might push the crisis "past the limit." Beijing needed the United States help in controlling Taiwan. The academics were pleased with recent U.S. statements on Taiwan, particularly the statements made by Deputy Secretary Negroponte in his interview with Phoenix television. Shen also noted the statement made by the Secretary of State's Press spokesperson in which he clarified that the Taiwan Relations Act did not say that the United States would automatically come to Taiwan's SHANGHAI 00000570 003 OF 004 defense if it was attacked. The Executive Branch must first consult with Congress before the United States could take any action. ¶10. (C) According to Shen, it was important for the United States to state its policy towards Taiwan clearly and to make it clear that a referendum would affect the Taiwan-U.S. relationship. If the United States was ambivalent about this issue then this would give Chen more confidence and he would continue to push for independence. If the United States was "truthful" and took a harder line with Taiwan then this would sooth Beijing's concerns and reduces the pressure on Beijing to take military action. ¶11. (C) Shen urged that the United States temporarily withdraw the offer to sell military weapons to Taiwan until after Chen Shui-bian stepped down. Further in the conversation, Shen asserted that Taiwan was a "kind of puppet state" of the United States. If the United States abandoned weapon sales and the Taiwan Relations Act, then Taiwan would become more moderate. Xin urged that the United States do something aimed at the political parties. Taiwan was a democracy in which the political parties checked each other. These parties wanted legitimacy from Washington. Xin and Shen agreed that the KMT was facing a crisis. If the KMT loses the 2008 election, it would not be able to come back. Ma Ying-jeou was more focused on obtaining power then on leading Taiwan in the right direction. There was no more internal check on the DPP. North Korea: Still Keeping the Nukes -------------- ¶12. (C) Shen noted a recent report from the IAEA that said North Korea was "a done deal" and that "history was explained." He doubted this report and said he was reviewing some documents on this issue. According to Shen, North Korea has yet to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons. While it has agreed to abandon Yongbyon, it still was building a civilian nuclear facility. It was difficult for outsiders to detect nuclear activity at such a facility. He said that the best case scenario for North Korea was one in which after a regime change and 20 to 30 years of stability, the North Korean leadership would decide that it no longer needed nuclear weapons. He noted that a few countries, including South Africa and South Korea, had taken the route of abandoning nuclear weapons ambitions. South Africa never admitted that it was developing nuclear weapons until it announced that it was giving up the weapons. Hopefully, the North Koreans would follow the same path. North Korea and Tumen River Development -------------- ¶13. (C) Ren, who visited Jilin Province's Yanbian Prefecture along the North Korean border during his summer 2007 university holiday, said early 1990s enthusiasm about development of the Tumen River area under UNDP auspices cooled over the last decade due to the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, lack of investment in infrastructure and the hesitancy of private investors to enter into joint ventures in North Korea. China's Central Government and especially provincial authorities in Jilin remain enthusiastic about eventual economic development in the Tumen River area, but funding for even an initial project to improve the road from the Chinese border to Rajin-Sonbong had not been secured from Jilin Province or Central Government sources. The first two companies selected to provide estimates and plans for improving that road had quit; a third company is now working on that assessment. The National Development and Reform Commission in Beijing still staffed a coordination mechanism for Tumen River development issues, Ren said, and the Ministry of Commerce also had a role in intragovernmental coordination on those issues. Tumen River development faced many difficulties in the short-term, but in the long term, the respective economic advantages of China, Russia, North Korea and Japan should come into play to develop that area. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Shen's, Xin's and Ren's comments are consistent with the view of other Taiwan experts in Shanghai reported septel. SHANGHAI 00000570 004 OF 004 Shanghai experts all opposed the referendum, but grudgingly acknowledged that Beijing will probably not take any actions. They all stress the importance of the U.S. role and the need for the United States to take more actions to prevent, ideally, or, at the very least, limit the impact of the referendum. JARRETT