FRB SENIOR ECONOMIST AHMED'S VISIT TO SHANGHAI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000370 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM, EEB, AND INR/B STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD/WINTER/MCCARTIN/ALTBACH/READE STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/AHMED; SAN FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK CEA FOR BLOCK USDOC FOR ITA/MAC DAS KASOFF, MELCHER AND MCQUEEN TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN TREASURY FOR IMFP-SOBEL/MOGHTADER NSC FOR KURT TONG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL CH SUBJECT: FRB SENIOR ECONOMIST AHMED'S VISIT TO SHANGHAI This message is UNCLASSIFIED as defined by E.O. 12958 (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and for official use only. Not for distribution outside of USG channels. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: During his June 6-7 visit to Shanghai, visiting Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Division of International Finance Emerging Market Economies Section Senior Economist Shaghil Ahmed met with a cross-section of Shanghai economic experts and officials in the banking, securities, and real estate sectors. He attended a speech by Shanghai Municipal Government Financial Services Office Deputy DG Fang Xinghai on prospects for financial deregulation in China. He discussed Shanghai's stock market and related issues with Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Executive Manager of Global Business Development Department Chao Kejian (aka George). Research Works consulting head Hugh Peymann discussed the growing influence of Chinese consumerism. McKinsey and Company China Principal Wang Yi outlined the general health of China's banking system. Jones Lang LaSalle Senior Manager Kenny Ho and Cushman Wakefield Managing Director Kim Clarkson briefed Ahmed on developments in China's real estate sector. End Summary. -------------- -------------- China Needs Foreign and Private Help to Deregulate -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) At a June 6 luncheon for about 150 participants organized by AmCham Shanghai's Financial Services Committee, Shanghai Financial Services Office DDG Fang Xinghai said that the Chinese government needed to take three steps to reform its financial services sector: (1) open the financial services sector for private domestic firms; (2) open the market for foreign financial firms; and (3) relax regulatory controls. ¶3. (SBU) Fang said that the reason there were so few private domestic financial service firms was that Chinese regulators lacked the capacity to effectively regulate. Regulations were either overly restrictive or inadequate, creating a difficult environment for private enterprise. Chinese politicians also had ideological antipathy towards the financial sector. He quoted Deng Xiaoping's remarks that the financial sector was the heart of a modern economy. The government was reluctant to open up the sector too fast for fear that it would get too strong. ¶4. (U) Fang said that under China's WTO and SED commitments, foreign financial firms were "making good progress." The banking sector, which had benefited from strong WTO commitments, should be a model for reforming other financial services. Local incorporatization of foreign banks was a very good step in increasing competition for Chinese banks. And foreign banks were doing well. In the first four months of 2007, loan portfolios of foreign banks in Shanghai had increased 32 percent, compared to an 11 percent increase for domestic banks. Foreign banks in Shanghai now accounted for 15 percent of the total loan portfolio, although they represented only about two percent nationwide. ¶5. (SBU) The insurance sector was relatively well-regulated and the SED appeared to have broken the logjam in approvals by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) for wholly-owned subsidiaries in the property sector. The securities sector was not well-regulated or open, in part because there had been few WTO commitments. Although the Chinese government knew it needed to open up its market, it would do so slowly so that its domestic players would have time to adapt and adopt foreign techniques. The purpose of foreign competition was not to benefit the foreign firms; it was to strengthen the Chinese firms. ¶6. (U) Fang stressed that bilateral or multilateral negotiations were the best means to effect financial sector reforms. He said SHANGHAI 00000370 002 OF 005 "innovative back-door" approaches might benefit a firm initially, but could lead to unforeseen consequences down the road. The Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) provided an excellent forum for both the United States and China to advance their own agendas but it would be important for both sides to make commitments. ¶7. (SBU) Fang said the progress made in the SED was "encouraging," but not enough - and was too one-sided with the Chinese side seemingly making all the concessions. For political reasons, it was important that both sides make concessions - even if China's reforms would benefit China as well as the United States. China ultimately was concerned with securing access for its manufactured products. "China needs a trade surplus to grow, he said. "China needs open markets in other countries. Other countries have a right, as well, to demand that China open up its services sector." "China's underdeveloped service sector is already hurting its own growth," he said. Along these lines, Fang thought that opening up the SED to include Japan and the European Union might be a good idea since those economies' firms would benefit from concessions made to the United States. ¶8. (SBU) Fang said that there were three reasons for tight regulations in China: - Regulators were rarely responsible for the effects of regulations that they enforced. Regulations also were a form of power, and many often gave in to the temptation to abuse it. - Chinese financial firms had no effective internal risk controls. Regulators, who must approve all new products and innovations before they can be implemented, had thus been very conservative. If a regulator approved a new product, and there were problems, he would be blamed. Thus, there was no incentive to approve innovation. - The rapid growth over the economy for a long period of time had concealed lots of structural problems. When everything was going well, these problems were not visible. When the economy slowed down, they would become more painfully obvious. Tight regulations inhibited innovation and the economy needed innovation to grow. But so far, no one had complained. ¶9. (U) Fang said that the government should encourage private financial service firms -- both foreign and domestic -- to expand in China. These firms had a strong incentive to make money and thus were required to be innovative. They also tended to have better internal risk controls, which should give regulators more confidence and lead to better and more effective regulation. ¶10. (U) Fang noted that during Premier Wen Jiabao's recent visit to Shanghai, he had held a meeting with government agencies responsible for financial services. Wen emphasized that China's central government continued to support Shanghai's development into an international financial center and explicitly instructed Shanghai's municipal leaders to speed up the process. He also told them to contact him directly to solve any policy roadblocks that stood in the way of accomplishing this goal. -------------- - Shanghai's Stock Market Is Not China's Economy -------------- - ¶11. (SBU) SSE's Chao, also on June 6, acknowledged that the SSE's Composite Index was not representative of China's economy. He did note, however, that the equity market over time had become increasingly more representative of the economy. Chao said the market capitalization of the SSE had increased from 18 percent of China's GDP in 2003 to about 80 percent of China's GDP in 2006. Total market value of Chinese equity market, SHANGHAI 00000370 003 OF 005 recently, was RMB 15 trillion (USD 1.97 trillion). ¶12. (SBU) Despite this high market cap, however, Chao pointed out that only about 1/3 of the total shares on the SSE were in the "tradable" category. Although the non-tradable share reform process was basically complete, these shares had largely not entered the market due to required holding periods. Chao also noted that the majority of Chinese blue chip companies (sometimes referred to as "red chips") were not listed on the SSE. Some were listed on the Hong Kong or New York stock exchanges; some were not listed at all. ¶13. (SBU) Chao said that there were four factors driving the recent gains in the stock market: 1) the success of the non-tradable share reform; 2) the expectation of continued strong RMB appreciation; 3) high inflation risks that depressed bank savings; and 4) the lack of any other investment channels besides property. Furthermore, Chao laughed, "Chinese people love to gamble" and this had caused a great deal of speculative investing in the equity market. ¶14. (SBU) Chao said that the best way to cool the market was to increase the numbers of listed companies. The SSE had lobbied the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to allow more blue chips listed in overseas market to be listed in the A share market. But, increasing supply took time since companies needed to jump through so many regulatory hoops to list. -------------- More Shareholders Than Party Members -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Chao said that there were over 100 million individual share accounts and less than 1,000 institutional share accounts in China. The peak record for the daily new account opened was 350,000, set this month. He noted that there were more trading account holders than Communist Party members, which he estimated at about 70 million, although he noted that many Party members were stock owners as well. Currently, retail investors owned about 80 percent of market value while institutional investors owned about 20 percent. Chao speculated that mutual funds companies controlled about RMB 500 billion of the total market capitalization. Of the 100 million open trading accounts, only one third were active; with active defined as at least one trade per week. ¶16. (SBU) Chao said that a great number of investors were very angry with the SSE, since SSE had changed its circuit breaker trading rules on June 4 and 5 without any notice. According to these rules, trading of shares that had declined or advanced by the maximum 10 percent per day over two days (down total of 20 percent) would be halted during the first four hours of trading on the third day. Also, any share that increased or decreased by 10 percent from its closing price the day before would be closed for trading on that day. Chao said that, under CSRC pressure, the SSE did not enforce this rule on June 4 since this would have meant that more than one third of its shares wouldn't trade. Some share owners had been caught off guard by this change in policy and SSE's legal office had been getting phone calls from investors planning to sue. This sort of problem, he commented, was caused by the fact that few high-level government officials understood the equity market and its rules. -------------- -------------- Chinese Now Confident Enough in Future to Become Consumers -------------- -------------- ¶17. (SBU) In a separate meeting on June 6, Research Work's Peymann observed that China's consumers were increasingly confident about their future. He said that in the 1980s and 1990s as the cradle-to-grave social contract with the government and state-owned enterprises had fallen apart, people began to SHANGHAI 00000370 004 OF 005 pour their earnings into precautionary savings. They were afraid of the future and the uncertainty it then held. The success of China's economic transition to a more market-oriented economy and its continued year-on-year growth had reduced Chinese people's uncertainty about the future. With time, people would feel the need to save less and ultimately would consume more. Chinese people now wanted to enjoy the benefits of the booming economy. ¶18. (SBU) Household expectations were now what controlled the economy; not the government. Chinese individuals now had more choices and more money than they had ever had in China's history. He expected that China's individual savings rate would decline as people spent money and took on more debt to finance their purchases of "luxuries." ¶19. (SBU) While this was good for the economy, Peymann said, he was less sanguine about what this meant for China's ability to increase its energy efficiency and decrease its environmental degradation. The polluting and energy intensive industries, such as steel, cement, plastics, automobile, textiles, were the same ones that needed to keep producing to make the things that Chinese consumers wanted to buy, like houses, cars, clothes, televisions. The government could, by fiat, rein in these polluting, energy intensive industries, but then would face a strong backlash. -------------- -------------- China Uses Foreign Banks to Improve Chinese Banks -------------- -------------- ¶20. (SBU) McKinsey's Wang told Ahmed on June 7 that based on McKinsey's experience, the published data and statistics on China's banks were a fairly accurate reflection of reality and China's banking system was currently healthy. Chinese banks had not, however, been able to change their business model from one of taking in deposits from individuals and lending to large state-owned enterprises. They were dependent on the fixed interest rate spread and not ready for competition or interest rate deregulation - or a downturn in the economy or collapse of the stock market. ¶21. (SBU) All of China's banks appeared to operate under the underlying assumption that economic growth would continue as it has for the past several years. They had not factored in any risk to their loan portfolios. So while current non-performing loans (NPLs) were low, an economic downturn would quickly reverse this trend. Chinese bankers lacked the experience and know-how to conduct proper risk analysis of companies and so were unable to evaluate loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Fundamental to these bank's calculations was the implicit understanding that the government would never allow banks to fail, said Wang. ¶22. (SBU) Wang said that China has allowed foreign banks into China not to benefit foreign companies, but to strengthen their own banks. Central Government policymakers aimed to introduce just enough competition so that Chinese banks would be spurred to improve without being overwhelmed. Foreign competition educated Chinese bankers and helped them to adapt. Wang said that the Chinese government generally believed that "foreign investors have been positive agents for change." Nevertheless, China would not fully open up to foreign banks until Chinese banks could compete. -------------- Real Estate: Building for the Rich -------------- ¶23. (SBU) According to Jones Lang LaSalle's Ho and Cushman & Wakefield's Clarkson, China's real estate market was healthy and booming despite the government's best efforts to rein it in. SHANGHAI 00000370 005 OF 005 One major issue the government faced in understanding the market was determining what constituted "affordable housing." Government statistics on income did not include any of the wealth effect caused by capital gains in the real estate or equity markets. Furthermore, private enterprises underreported salaries in order to avoid taxes. This led to the market appearing to have been priced out of average people's reach, and yet continuing to grow. ¶24. (SBU) While industrial, commercial, and residential property prices had risen in Shanghai and Beijing, Ho said, there was a great deal of development taking place in China's secondary cities. China was on track to urbanize 250 million people over the next 10 years. The government hoped to stimulate the development of other cities. The ideal size for Shanghai was no more than 25 million people. Clarkson said that there was incredible demand for commercial space in Shanghai and that rents were rising. Vacancy was 5 percent, below the ideal level. While there was a lot of building going on now that would be opening in two to three years, this was desperately needed as Shanghai developed as China's services capital. ¶25. (SBU) Ho said that the government's policy restricting 70 percent of all new housing units to 90 square meters or less was not being enforced at the local level anywhere in China. While most developers were continuing to mainly build high-end units in Shanghai, there were still not enough luxury apartments to meet demand. Sales prices in Shanghai for high-end apartments were roughly RMB 80,000/square meter (USD 978/square foot) while low-end units sold for about RMB 15,000/square meter (USD 183/square foot). There was also insufficient low-income housing, but developers were not generally building this. ¶26. (SBU) Foreign real estate service companies, in contrast to financial service companies, had no special government restrictions on their operation in China. Clarkson noted that both Cushman & Wakefield and Jones Lang LaSalle were wholly-owned foreign enterprises that had operated in China for more than 10 years. Capital account controls had not been a problem for Cushman & Wakefield, said Clarkson, since due to its growth his company had been plowing all of its earnings into development in China. ¶27. FRB Senior Economist Ahmed cleared on this cable. JARRETT