A FUND MANAGER'S VIEW ON THE CHINA MARKET

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000332 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK CEA FOR BLOCK USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER AND OCEA/MCQUEEN TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER NSC FOR KURT TONG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL CH SUBJECT: A FUND MANAGER'S VIEW ON THE CHINA MARKET REF: SHANGHAI 251 (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and for official use only. Not for distribution outside of USG channels. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Lombarda China Fund Manager Ian Midgely told visiting Embassy Finatt, on May 16, that the Chinese government was attempting to rein in an overvalued stock market without an overly heavy-handed approach that would undermine the market reforms put in place to promote capital market development. The real problem, said Midgely, was that there was simply too much liquidity in China and not a broad enough array of financial products, most importantly a vibrant government bond market. Foreign joint venture fund management companies enjoy a de facto level playing field with Chinese counterparts, unlike the situation in securities and banking. Launching financial futures derivatives products would be "suicidal" in the current overheated and speculative environment, he said. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Visiting Embassy Finatt met with Lombarda China Fund Manager Ian Midgely, the only non-Chinese fund manager in China, on May 16. Midgely said that there were currently 58 fund companies in China; 32 of these were 100 percent Chinese-owned and 26 were joint ventures between Chinese and foreign investors. Chinese mutual funds were currently split 75 percent to 25 percent between retail and institutional investors. Midgely described most managers of funds in China as "traders, not managers." Their turnover rate was over 500 percent. Midgely said his own approach was much more conservative since he tried to base investments on sound fundamentals. Highlighting the competitive challenges of using traditional stock selection techniques in China's raging bull market, Midgely noted his returns were not as high as some of his competitors. Nonetheless, he would be somewhat embarrassed to show his investments to his peers in Hong Kong or London. -------------- Too Much Money, Not Enough Options -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Midgely noted that the Chinese government was attempting to let air out of the market without using an overly heavy-handed approach that would run counter to the many market-oriented reforms instituted in the last several years. Part of the problem, he said, was that most people did not think the problem was as bad as it actually was. He described the disconnect between CSRC public statements that claimed to have "warned" fund managers about risks and the actual circular that fund managers received from CSRC. The memo actually commented on how well things were going. The basic problem, Midgely said, was that there was simply too much money in China's "massively inefficient" banks and not enough in other financial assets. ¶4. (SBU) Midgely said that, in the short term, overheated speculation in China's stock markets could be dampened by raising the required reserve ratio by 1 percentage point and raising the interest rate by 50 basis points. The fundamental problem would remain, however. Chinese investors simply did not have enough financial products to choose from. (Note: Two days after the meeting, on Friday, May 18, China hiked the one-year lending rate by 18 bps and the one year deposit rate by 27 bps. China also raised the reserve requirement ratio by another 50 bps to 11.5%, effective 5 June. End note.) -------------- Launching Financial Futures Would Be Suicidal -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Midgely said that since China did not have an effective bond market and lacked a risk free yield curve, it was almost impossible to accurately price riskier assets like equities. To strengthen its financial system, China needed to develop both its interbank and exchange-traded bond markets. ¶6. (SBU) It would be "suicidal" for China to launch its SHANGHAI 00000332 002 OF 003 financial futures market, which would most likely start with a stock index futures, in the current frothy and speculative market environment, said Midgely (Ref A). Chinese investors were not educated about the risks inherent in a futures market, he added, with too many believing that futures trading only had an upside and was without risk. (Note: In separate recent conversations, Shanghai Financial Services Office Deputy Director Fang Xinghai and JP Morgan Greater China General Manager Andrew Zhang said they expected the China Financial Futures Exchange to launch a stock index fund in late June or early July. Both claimed that risk could be controlled by limiting access for those eligible to trade in the product. End note.) -------------- Fund Management is a Level Playing Field -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In contrast to the situation in more developed markets, fund management companies in China were more profitable than full service securities firms. Midgely attributed this to the fact that Chinese brokerages were hugely overstaffed, along the lines of traditional state-owned enterprises, and full of people who had no idea what they were supposed to be doing. This inefficiency was further exacerbated by the relatively low commissions they earned per trade, and by traders reluctant to take aggressive positions. One exception, Midgely noted, was Citic. Should a foreign company be allowed a minority stake in a JV brokerage with a Chinese partner, Midgely was pessimistic as to the possibility of that company's success. "Unless they have real control of the company, they will have real problems," he said. ¶8. (SBU) Midgely speculated that the CSRC had allowed foreign companies to own up to 49 percent of fund management companies, rather than the more restrictive equity caps in securities, since fund managers could only deal in products that already existed, he said. Real power, he said, was in the hands of the securities firms since they were able to create products and influence which firms are able to come to market. For foreign firms, "fund management is a level playing field," said Midgely. "There is no reason why a foreigner shouldn't do well here." The restrictions Lombarda faced were those requiring a certain number of years of experience before offering new products, an issue not unique to foreign firms. -------------- More Discretion is Coming -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The CSRC would soon grant approval for fund managers to set up individually tailored fund management products. Currently, investors in funds - be they large investors or small investors -- were only allowed to purchase shares in existing funds. This meant that large investors, who would be able to sustain more risk, were not given the types of products best suited to their needs. Discretionary fund management products, said Midgely, would be open to investors with a minimum of RMB 50 million (USD 6.5 million). These investors would be able to work with fund managers to tailor a product that fit their investing goals. CSRC would control the fees that the fund managers could charge to at least 60 percent of what the fund charged normal customers. ¶10. (SBU) According to Midgely, CSRC was implementing this discretionary fund innovation to address the burgeoning problem of unregulated "private funds." These illegal private funds (in Chinese, ziwo jijin) now number in the thousands. Private funds had staged a comeback, along with the rising stock market, since they operated outside of CSRC's controls and thereby more cheaply and with a more individually tailored investment approach. Of course, being unregulated, these private funds also represented a greater risk to their customers. Midgely noted that lots of legal fund management firms had lost staff to SHANGHAI 00000332 003 OF 003 these unregulated funds. -------------- Anatomy of a JV: The Lombarda China Fund -------------- ¶11. (SBU) According to Midgely, the Lombarda China Fund was a joint venture between Banca Lombarda e Piemontese (49 percent), Guodu Securities (47 percent) and Pingdingshan Coal Group (4 percent). The JV fund was formed in May 2006 and received China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) permission in January 2007 to launch its first fund. Under the terms of the partnership, Lombarda's Chairman and Chief Compliance Officer were nominated by the local partners while the Chief Executive Officer, who exercised operational and managerial control, was nominated by Banca Lombarda. Midgely noted that resolving management and cultural problems had been an ongoing process. These disputes included such things as questions of responsibility, the rate of fund enlargement, and employee compensation. ¶12. (U) Embassy Finatt cleared this cable. JARRETT