SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE EVP ON CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000174 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER; SAN FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK CEA FOR BLOCK USDOC FOR ITA DAS LEVINE AND OCEA/MCQUEEN TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER NSC FOR KURT TONG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON CH SUBJECT: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE EVP ON CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS REF: A. Shanghai 159 ¶B. Shanghai 133 This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified. For official use only, not for transmission outside USG channels. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a March 8 meeting with Beijing Financial Attache David Loevinger, Treasury DAS Robert Dohner, Asia Office Director Mathew Haarsager and Congenoffs, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Executive Vice President Liu Xiaodong (aka James Liu) shared his views on necessary reforms to China's capital markets. Liu said the major current challenge for China's capital markets was how to manage the excess liquidity. Other challenges included: the lack of risk management and technical skills of China's broker dealers, the lack of investment options beyond fixed income available for Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) quota, and the difficulties that many Chinese companies had in getting their financial statements clean enough to apply for a public listing. Liu agreed with Treasury Secretary Paulson's views (Ref A) that foreign JV security companies had not been successful in China, but reached a different conclusion - that approvals of further foreign-invested securities JVs should be slowed. Liu was particularly disappointed that the Goldman/Gaohua JV hadn't been more active in promoting China listings of foreign-invested enterprises in China, particularly U.S. companies. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and SSE were actively pursuing discussions with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on the possibility of approving China Depository Receipts (CDRs) to allow companies listed on foreign exchanges to be traded in China as a possible compliment to QDIIs as a way for Chinese households and firms to invest in foreign companies. Liu hoped the idea of CDRs could be discussed in the upcoming Strategic Economic Dialogue meetings in May. End Summary. -------------- Managing China's Excess Liquidity -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Liu said excess liquidity was the major challenge for China's capital markets, particularly as most Chinese broker dealers and bankers have sub-standard risk management practices. Even though SSE was perhaps the best stock market in the world in terms of its technology, many of China's broker dealers were so far behind technologically that they couldn't even accept new accounts. The best way to manage excess liquidity was to allow dollars to flow out to diversify risk and go international. China was moving slowly on QDII. Liu acknowledged that CSRC might be moving slowly on QDII in part to avoid a negative impact on SSE. He said the Shanghai Municipal Government also had "lots to say" on this issue. Shanghai was not happy with the current situation where many PRC nationals took cash to Hong Kong and deposited it there. Liu wasn't happy, either; it was illegal, unsafe and inefficient. It was clear CSRC was not yet comfortable with the ability of Chinese financial institutions to invest overseas since it awarded the contracts for overseas fund management of China's social security fund to exclusively to foreigners, a politically sensitive decision. Liu agreed that it probably made sense to expand the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) quota. Even if China doubled or tripled the quota, it "wouldn't be a big deal." ¶3. (SBU) Liu said another problem was that many Chinese companies were unable to get their financial statement clean enough to list. Many had problems with their land titles, unpaid taxes or even lacked the requisite three to five years of records. -------------- -------------- SHANGHAI 00000174 002 OF 002 Why Haven't Foreign Security JVs Worked Out as Hoped? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Liu, like Paulson, was disappointed with the track record of foreign securities JVs in China. He said it was easier for foreign asset management JVs to be successful in China. First, their business model was simpler since they just dealt in secondary market listings. Second, asset management companies were new, most about 2-3 years old and the oldest with only about a five-year history; thus they had stronger balance sheets. Third, they were under strong supervision. Finally, all had performed well in the 18 month-long bull market; 99 percent had made money, no matter what they had done. ¶5. (SBU) China's broker dealers were a different story. Ninety percent were old companies and had been financially weakened by the long stock market drop and weak corporate governance. No new securities companies had been formed in the last 6-7 years. Securities firms were also more complicated to manage since they were involved in a broader range of financial services. The last 18 months had been an anomaly; all had done well because the market was skyrocketing. ¶6. (SBU) Liu was particularly disappointed with Goldman's JV with Gaohua. China's leaders had been watching it closely. They recognized that it would have higher operating costs than Chinese securities firms, but had expected it to be more successful in increasing the number of share listings in Chinese markets by persuading foreign-invested enterprises in China to list in China. For example, Microsoft China was interested in listing in China, but he hadn't seen Goldman/Gaohua making a sales pitch. There had been a few foreign listings, including a Japanese company two years ago and a Taiwan company this year. However, it appeared that Gaohua was more interested in chasing the listings of large Chinese companies, carving up slices of the existing pie, rather than expanding the market. Liu wondered whether there was some regulatory reason Goldman wasn't pushing such deals, perhaps related to Sarbanes-Oxley provisions. Given the unclear benefits of securities JVs, Liu thought the Chinese regulators should be cautious before approving any further JVs. -------------- Interest in CDRs or Similar Instruments -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Liu said he had accompanied the CSRC to meet with SEC Chairman Christopher Cox to discuss the possibility of China Depository Receipts (CDRs) allowing Chinese investors to purchase U.S. dollar-denominated stocks on China markets. They agreed to set up a dialogue to discuss the issue. At the time, CDR was not on the top of China's agenda, now it was. SSE had also talked to NYSE CEO John Thain two or three months ago about the possibility of trading NYSE-listed companies in China and they had set up a task force to explore. Liu thought it was a good approach. If U.S. blue chips were listed in China, it would help China's fund management companies and would be good for promoting corporate governance. Liu hoped China would have a CDR or similar concept operational in 12 months and hoped the upcoming SED could take the issue up to speed progress. JARRETT