PRE-PARTY CONGRESS INFIGHTING OVER PERSONNEL INTENSIFIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 SHANGHAI 000101 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: MANUAL REVIEW TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH SUBJECT: PRE-PARTY CONGRESS INFIGHTING OVER PERSONNEL INTENSIFIES REF: A) 06 SHANGHAI 6957; B) SHANGHAI 23; C) 06 SHANGHAI 5219; D) BEIJING 618 SHANGHAI 00000101 001.2 OF 006 CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary. According to multiple East China contacts, the central party leadership was increasingly split over personnel issues and would only become more fractured with the approach of the 2007 Party Congress. Vice President Zeng Qinghong was trying to work out a compromise that would allow him to remain on the Politburo Standing Committee despite having surpassed the "mandatory" retirement age of 68. Moreover, President Hu Jintao, bolstered by the death of party elder Bo Yibo, was trying to sideline other leaders who had been allied with former President Jiang Zemin and was conducting secret investigations into their activities and those of Jiang's family. Hu had already successfully removed Huang Ju from a position of influence with an internal party resolution banning Huang from all Politburo meetings and stripping him of his portfolio. Those currently expected to be promoted--possibly to the Politburo Standing Committee--included Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping, Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao, and Trade Minister Bo Xilai. End summary. SIPDIS -------------- Leadership Struggle Reaching New Heights -------------- ¶2. (S) On February 2, Nanjing University Philosophy and Law Professor Gu Su said that top level leadership infighting was increasingly "violent" and almost to the status of an "open struggle." During a February 5 conversation, Shanghai People's Congress Researcher Ms. Zhou Meiyan agreed that there was a growing division within the leadership over personnel issues, centering around President Hu Jintao and former President Jiang Zemin and his proteges. Gu said it was natural for fractures in party unity to intensify in the six months prior to a Party Congress and expected that the fighting would get much uglier in the next few months. -------------- Zeng Wants the Presidency -------------- ¶3. (S) Gu said that Vice President Zeng Qinghong was fighting for his political survival. He referenced a January 10 Reuters report that cited "Beijing sources" as trying to convince Hu to abdicate the presidency in favor of Zeng. According to Gu's Beijing contacts, Zeng himself was trying to wrest the title from Hu in an attempt to stay on the Politburo after the 17th Party Congress. Zeng had played a key role in assisting Hu get rid of both former President Jiang Zemin and former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu and felt that Hu owed him a favor. However, Hu was unwilling to relinquish the title of "President," in part because of the 2008 Olympics. Hu did not want to give up the chance to burnish his international image as a world-class leader. Since neither the Party Secretary nor the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) titles would allow Hu to interact with other world leaders, Hu was unwilling to simply be the power behind the curtain while Zeng enjoyed the international limelight. Zhou said that it would be unthinkable for Hu to voluntarily give up the title. Even though it was a figurehead position with little real authority, Hu would not want to give up the one position that allowed him to interact with foreign leaders. ¶4. (S) According to Gu, Zeng had ultimately been responsible for planting the story in Reuters in an attempt to bring international attention to the issue and hence greater pressure on Hu to find a way to keep Zeng on the Politburo. Zeng's supporters were arguing behind the scene that Hu had no right to hold all three titles. Hu had invoked former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's example of completely retiring and standing down from the CMC to pressure Jiang to step down. Now, Zeng's supporters were arguing that Hu should also follow Deng's example and give up the presidency, noting that Deng never held all three titles and chiding Hu, saying "which Deng Xiaoping are you emulating?" ¶5. (S) Gu said that according to the "68 rule," which had been applied to Politburo members in previous instances (i.e., if Politburo members were over 68 at the time of the Party Congress, they needed to retire),Zeng would need to step down at the 2007 Party Congress. The only way for Zeng to remain was either if the Politburo agreed to make an exception to the rule for Zeng or if he was granted the title of President, Party Secretary or CMC Chairman, the holders of which were allowed to SIPDIS stay on if they were 70 or below. (Note: The age "rules" SHANGHAI 00000101 002.2 OF 006 referred to by Gu above are informal norms observed in recent years within the Party. To the best of our knowledge, such norms have never been codified or adopted as Party "rules." End note.) -------------- Zeng Qinghong: The Man With the Files -------------- ¶6. (S) According to Gu, Hu's advisors were currently split on how to handle the situation, with some saying Hu should find a compromise solution that allowed Zeng to stay on as a reward for his demonstrated loyalty and assistance. Others, however, argued that Zeng was too dangerous to keep on board. Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao tended to side with the latter advisors. Zeng, as Jiang's hatchet man and head of the Organization Department for many years, had access to the personnel files of all of the top leaders, including all of their secrets. Hu and Wen were leaning towards those who argued that the longer Zeng stayed in power, the more likely he was to cause trouble. Gu compared Zeng to Kang Sheng, the infamous head of the secret police under Mao Zedong, noting that "such a figure cannot have a happy ending" in the Chinese political system. ¶7. (S) During a February 8 conversation, JP Morgan China Vice President and Treasurer Andrew Zhang characterized Zeng as a "palace eunuch" who was entrusted with significant power and answered to both Hu and, to some extent, Jiang. Separately on February 8, Carlyle Group Managing Director and Chief China Representative Luo Yi said he thought it would be better if Zeng were running the party rather than Hu. Zeng was more decisive and had a stronger power base. -------------- Hu Fights Fire With Fire... -------------- ¶8. (S) According to Gu, Hu had made his share of enemies as Party Secretary. Many provincial leaders in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Shanghai disliked Hu for his economic policies that tended to negatively impact their vested interests. Also, Jiang Zemin and many of his proteges were counted among Hu's enemies. Andrew Zhang said that Jiang's influence was fairly constrained now. He had made a deal with Hu over the summer to cooperate with the Chen Liangyu ouster in exchange for guarantees of protection for his sons and nephew, who was currently the police chief in Shanghai (Ref A). Gu said although Jiang himself was "not so strong" anymore, he still maintained some influence. Moreover, many of his proteges, who stood to lose out at the Party Congress unless Hu's power was checked, were beginning to feel desperate and were more willing to fight. Ms. Zhou agreed that Jiang did, indeed, retain some influence in Chinese politics. ¶9. (C) Zhang said he did not believe Hu feared Zeng on the presidency issue. He noted that the same day as the Reuters report was issued, Hu made a speech to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) to discuss the anti-corruption campaign. Zhang viewed the speech as Hu pointedly telling everyone in the party that he was unquestionably in charge. ¶10. (S) Moreover, Gu noted that Hu had ordered the re-arrest of Shanghai real estate tycoon Zhou Zhengyi in December because of Zhou's connections to both Chen Liangyu and Jiang Zemin's elder son, Jiang Mianheng, who was closely tied to Zhou through several real estate deals (Ref B). Indeed, at Hu's behest, the CDIC was currently "seriously investigating" Jiang Mianheng. Because of the sensitivity of the case, information was not being published, but was going directly to Hu. As Gu said, "it's up to Hu what to do with it." (Comment: Hu's reinvestigation of Jiang Mianheng, if true, would give Hu increased ammunition to use against Jiang, should Jiang forget their "agreement" and attempt to be more active on personnel issues. It may also suggest that Hu believed that Jiang's influence was still significant enough that Hu needed to actively check it in the run up to the Party Congress. End comment.) ¶11. (C) Gu opined that Hu was likely behind the removal of filters on internet searches connecting Jiang Mianheng to Zhou Zhengyi and Chen Liangyu reported in a January 28 "Asia Weekly" (Yazhou Zhoukan) article. Although he had not personally tried to run a search, Gu said that the removal of the filters would be a "significant" development. On February 3, Poloff searched "Jiang Mianheng" and both "Zhou Zhengyi" and "Chen Liangyu" in Chinese from his home computer. Several recent and past articles linking the men together with scandals did, indeed, show up under Google search results, including links for such dissident sites as "Secret China," "Renminbao," and the Falungong-controlled "Peace Hall" and "Epoch Times." While SHANGHAI 00000101 003.2 OF 006 Poloff could read the summaries of the articles, none of the articles would load. Ms. Zhou discounted the appearance of such links as a political phenomenon. Zhou had also performed similar searches at home and attributed the results to information overload, noting that it was impossible for search engines to completely block the results, although they could effectively block the content. -------------- ...and Maybe Some Water -------------- ¶12. (S) Carlyle's Yi Luo discounted the Reuters article on Zeng seeking the Presidency, noting that he had heard that a deal had been struck allowing Zeng to stay on as head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He said that the position would provide Zeng rank, status, and power--and presumably age limits--comparable to that of president, although it was less important from an international perspective. On the same day that Luo relayed this information, albeit several hours later, Reuters published another article saying that, indeed, such a deal had been proposed and "Zeng's political fate would be finalized" during the summer leadership meetings. According to the press report, Hu made the offer as a counter to calls for Zeng to take over the presidency. -------------- Hu Wins the Elders -------------- ¶13. (S) According to Gu, Hu's influence received an unexpected boost with the death of party elder Bo Yibo. Although Bo had not actively opposed Hu, he had been one of Jiang's most ardent supporters because of Jiang's willingness to help promote Bo's son, Trade Minister Bo Xilai. Bo Yibo had helped Jiang, for instance, formulate and sell the "68 rule" in order to rid Jiang of one of his top rivals, Qiao Shi, at the Party Congress in ¶1997. While the elders' role in politics has been diminished over the past decade, they still had some political influence. With the senior Bo's passing, party elder Wan Li, who strongly favored Hu, had now become the top elder. Hu was also being supported by party elders Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan. Qiao was the patron of CDIC Chairman Wu Guanzheng. Although generally seen as a neutral figure in factional politics, Wu was nonetheless providing critical assistance to Hu. -------------- Throwing the Princelings a Bone -------------- ¶14. (S) Gu said that Hu recognized he needed to maintain good relations with the elders by promoting some princelings to high-level positions. Hu, for instance, supported promoting Bo Xilai to the Politburo and a Vice Premier position, possibly to replace Wen as Premier after Wen stepped down in 2013. Hu also supported transferring Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping to Beijing as a Politburo member and possibly Vice Premier in charge of industry. Hu did not see these men as a threat to him. Moreover, promoting them played well with many elders who were concerned that the children of veteran party leaders needed leading roles themselves in order to protect the interests of the Party and the elders. ¶15. (S) Luo and Zhang agreed that Xi was moving to Beijing. Luo said that the Zhejiang Governor's son had recently told him of the transfer. Zhang noted that Xi was a contender for a slot on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Regarding Bo Xilai, Zhang said Bo was positioning himself and being considered for a promotion, noting that while Bo was not particularly well-liked by foreigners, he was respected within the Chinese bureaucracy. Luo concurred that Bo wanted to move up, assessing that he is open and capable, but added that friction between Bo Yibo and Hu Jintao had led Hu to dislike Bo Xilai. -------------- Huang Ju: Sidelined and Moving Out -------------- ¶16. (S) One of the issues being most hotly contested was who would fill Huang Ju's position as Executive Vice Premier with responsibility for economic policy. Gu said that while some were still saying that Huang was almost dead, he believed that Huang was not that sick and that there was a major political element to his "illness." Huang had been closely tied to Chen Liangyu's misdeeds and many had argued that since Chen had been arrested, Huang was no longer fit to hold a leadership position. Indeed, Gu said that three or four months ago, the party passed an internal resolution banning Huang from attending Politburo Standing Committee meetings and stripping him of his leadership responsibilities because of his "economic problems." According SHANGHAI 00000101 004.2 OF 006 to the resolution, for the sake of appearances, Huang would retain his titles, although he had effectively been fired. Gu confirmed other reports that Huang had returned to Shanghai. ¶17. (C) Zhang said that Huang would be replaced as Vice Premier at the National People's Congress. Luo believed that it would not happen that quickly, unless Huang died first. Instead, Huang would be dealt with at the Party Congress. Luo heard that Huang was genuinely ill and had asked to travel to the United States for treatment but had been denied by party leaders. At any rate, Luo said, Huang "clearly has no influence." (Comment: Other sources have also recently told us that Huang Ju was near death. End comment.) ¶18. (C) Zhang said the two top contenders to replace Huang were People's Bank of China President Zhou Xiaochuan and Finance Minister Jin Renqing. Zhang said that Zhou was seen as too focused on international issues and not enough on domestic problems. Jin, on the other hand, was seen as more focused on domestic interests, which many Chinese economists and economic policymakers saw as necessary. ¶19. (S) Luo discounted either Zhou or Jin as strong candidates and said that Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan was the front runner for the job. Wang was well regarded and had strong economic credentials. Luo said that his friend and his friend's father, who Luo said was the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office and a senior leader, had recently had dinner with Zeng Qinghong and Wang Qishan. Luo said that it was made clear at the dinner that Wang was being considered for Huang's job. Luo described Wang as capable, open, and progressive. He noted that Wang had strong financial credentials, having served as a deputy governor of the People's Bank of China and a former vice governor of Guangdong Province. -------------- -------------- Hu Pushing Jiang Supporters Out; Playing the Corruption Card -------------- -------------- ¶20. (S) According to Gu, Hu had also ordered secret CDIC investigations into PBSC members Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun and was using the evidence collected to force their resignations at the upcoming Party Congress. Li supposedly had "mafia" connections from his days in Liaoning and corruption problems from his days in Henan. Hu and Wen on several occasions had confronted Li with the information they had received leading Li to tender his resignation on several occasions. Hu had rejected his offer up to this point to keep a face of unity on the Party but intended to force Li out at the Party Congress. Hu had not yet decided if he would allow Li to be prosecuted at a later date. Gu also noted that Hu disliked current Organization Department head Wang Gang and hoped to move him to a ceremonial position. Wang had been too closely associated with Jiang. -------------- Dirty Deeds and They're Done Dirt Cheap -------------- ¶21. (S) Zhang claimed that Hu was untouchable from the corruption standpoint in that he, his wife, his son, and his daughter were all clean. As a point of comparison, he noted that both Zeng Qinghong and Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan were of "the same type but for a different price." He noted that the base rate to purchase influence with Zeng Qinghong was around 500,000 RMB, while it only cost 50,000 RMB for influence with Zeng Peiyan. -------------- -------------- Wen Jiabao: Great Administrative Assistant, Lousy Leader -------------- -------------- ¶22. (S) Gu noted that there was no daylight between Hu and Wen on policy or personnel issues. According to Zhang, Wen operated as a "butler, a personal secretary, or a staff assistant" to Hu. He made sure that all the paper was in order, but was not, himself, decisive nor was he a strategic thinker. Zhang noted that Wu Yi had been a primary contender for Wen's position at the last Party Congress but that Jiang had blocked her from taking on that position. Wu had more support and respect than Wen did throughout the leadership. -------------- Li Yuanchao: Leaving Jiangsu -------------- ¶23. (C) On February 2, Nanjing University History and Anthropology Professor Hua Tao said there were concrete signs that indicated Li Yuanchao might be promoted soon. While initial rumors had him going to Shanghai as Party Secretary, lately people had been saying Li would move to Beijing. Hua SHANGHAI 00000101 005.2 OF 006 noted that Li Mingchao had recently been transferred to Jiangsu as Deputy Party Secretary. Li Mingchao was originally from Jiangsu, where he had worked as director of the Jiangsu Public Security Bureau. From there, he had transferred to Yunnan as Deputy Party Secretary. Hua understood Li Mingchao's lateral return to Jiangsu indicated he was in line to replace Li Yuanchao. ¶24. (S) Gu said that according to recent rumors, Jiangsu Party Secretary and Hu protege Li Yuanchao was heading to Beijing and SIPDIS the Politburo with a concurrent post as either head of the Organization Department or Director of the General Office. Zhang expected that Li had a good chance at winning a slot on the Politburo Standing Committee. Luo said that Li had told mutual friends in Beijing that he expected to be going back to Beijing soon. It was not clear, however, if it was to head the Organization Department or to take up a position as vice premier. ¶25. (C) On February 2, Nanjing University Sociology Professor Zhou Xiaohong relayed that he too had heard Li Yuanchao would be leaving Jiangsu as either head of the Organization Department or Shanghai Party Secretary. Li had good leadership skills and was very low key. Professor Zhou acknowledged that it would be difficult for an outsider to govern Shanghai and said that there was some basis for sending Li there as a "Shanghainese." Zhou said that Li's father had served as a vice mayor of Shanghai during the Mao Era or early Deng Era. Separately, William Doo, a senior executive with the Hong Kong-based New Century real estate development company, said on February 12 that he had been told by "informed persons" that Li had been born in Shanghai and spent his childhood there. Shanghai's Zhou Meiyan said that it was possible that Li's father had something to do with the former East China Bureau (Huadong Ju) early on in the days of the regime, but doubted he had ever served directly in the city. Ms. Zhou, however, did not view Li as a Shanghainese, but rather saw recent discussion of Li's Shanghai ties as efforts to bolster Li's credibility should he end up coming to Shanghai. (Note: Li had previously pointed out to the Ambassador (Ref C) that his son was studying at Shanghai's Fudan University, as he had in his youth. End note.) -------------- --- Li Yuanchao Happy to Discuss Anything But Taiwan -------------- --- ¶26. (S) Luo described Li as very strategic, open and pro-U.S. and joked that if China were a democracy, he would quit his day job to campaign for Li. At a January 31 dinner with Carlyle co-founder Daniel Daniello and Carlyle Member and former Office of Management and Budget Director Dick Darman, Li said that China and the United States could discuss and resolve many different issues, from foreign exchange rates, to IPR, to the bilateral trade imbalance. Certain issues, such as Taiwan, however, were non-negotiable. If Taiwan provoked China, China would have to retaliate, even "if there were another country involved." Li expressed concern that Chen Shui-bian might "try to do something stupid" this year. Li also asked Darman many questions about the current political climate in the United States, including the views toward China of Speaker Nancy Pelosi and various U.S. presidential candidates. Li also raised concerns about former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani because of his views on Taiwan, noting that the Mayor had warmly welcomed Chen Shui-bian in 2001 on a stopover in New York, but had not been available for visiting PRC officials. -------------- Smear Campaign? -------------- ¶27. (S) Gu said that Zeng or his followers were likely behind recent rumors that Li Yuanchao was coming under investigation by the CDIC (Ref D). Gu said that his contacts were not too concerned about the rumor, noting that Li did not appear to have any "real problems," unlike Chen Liangyu. Gu explained that the former "Jiang Clique" might be trying to discredit Li since he was also a candidate to replace Huang Ju as Executive Vice Premier, a slot that members of the "Jiang Clique" felt should go to someone they preferred. Both Luo and Zhang agreed that the rumor might indeed be a sign that Li was being considered for higher positions. ¶28. (S) Hua Tao and Chairman of the Nanjing University Taiwan Research Institute Professor Cui Zhiqing also dismissed those rumors, although Hua noted that decisions on whom to investigate were generally political decisions and that a person with even a few problems could have difficulties if the right people wanted to create them. Although Ms. Zhou felt that it would be impossible for someone that close to Hu to come under investigation, she did note that there had been a number of SHANGHAI 00000101 006.2 OF 006 Jiangsu officials to come under CDIC investigation and arrest over the past year, including a vice governor and head of the Provincial Construction Department. -------------- -------------- Hu Looking to Move His Fifth Generation Team to Beijing -------------- -------------- ¶29. (S) According to Gu, Hu needed to move some of his key Fifth Generation supporters to the Politburo in order to pave the way for them to take over the reigns when he retires. According to Luo, one of the only people Hu had from his "team" in a position of influence in Beijing right now was Deputy Director of the General Office Ling Jihua. In fact, if Li Yuanchao did not take the job as Organization Department head, Luo assessed that it would go to Ling. ¶30. (S) Gu said that Hu planned to bring Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang up to Beijing as well. Both Zhang and Luo SIPDIS agreed with this assessment, noting that Li Keqiang was a prime candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee. Zhang pointed out that Li Keqiang's career had virtually mirrored Hu Jintao's. Luo said that Li Keqiang was the clear frontrunner to move up and potentially succeed Hu as Party Secretary. ¶31. (S) In a conversation with Hu's son, Hu Haifeng, Luo had tried to point out that frontrunners did not, in fact, always make the best candidates and often ended up not getting the job. Luo put in a plug with Hu Haifeng for Li Yuanchao, suggesting Hu Haifeng advise his father that Li Yuanchao should also be considered as a successor. Separately, Luo pointed out to Pol/Econ Section Chief that Hu Jintao, himself, had not been the top pick to succeed Jiang, but had, instead, been the number three choice. However, when last Luo met Li Yuanchao in late January, Li lamented that he was not as young as the other contenders for Hu's job. JARRETT