KIM GEUN-TAE SILENT ON ELECTIONS, VOCAL ON FTA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000794

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: KIM GEUN-TAE SILENT ON ELECTIONS, VOCAL ON FTA AND
CHINA

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) While deflecting direct questions about his
presidential aspirations, former Uri Party Chairman Kim
Geun-tae spoke candidly over lunch with the Ambassador on
March 15 about a number of issues including the KORUS FTA,
Comfort Women, an inter-Korean Summit, and the Six-Party
Talks. On the FTA, Kim said that he would issue a statement
saying the FTA should not be concluded until the next ROK
administration when there would be more time to adequately
evaluate the merits of the deal (the Ambassador explained
that, with TPA expiring, it was now or probably never). Kim
said that he was still hopeful that Kaesong Industrial
Complex products would find their way into the final FTA
agreement. On Comfort Women, Kim said that Koreans held very
deep feelings about the issue but were not yet speaking out
because they trusted that the U.S. would adequately rebut
Japanese PM Abe's recent statement. Kim said that the push
for an inter-Korean summit was to create a "synergy" with the
6PT, not to get ahead of the talks. Further, the Six-Party
Talks should be held on the Korean Peninsula as it was
ultimately a question of the relationship between the North
and South. China should be excluded from talks on a
permanent peace regime; only the three countries with forces
still facing off in the DMZ should be included. National
Assembly Representatives Lee In-young, Hong Mi-young, and Woo
Won-shik accompanied Kim to the meeting. END SUMMARY.

--------------
WHAT KOREANS ARE THINKING
--------------


2. (C) Uri Rep. Kim Geun-tae, in a March 15 luncheon meeting
with the Ambassador, said that during his eight-month tenure
as Uri Party Chairman, he faced many tough challenges
including the DPRK's missile launches and nuclear test. Kim
said that the Korean people were "bored" with the current
administration. Working people complained they did not have
enough money. Despite some improvements, people were not
satisfied with the current administration. This was clear in
the May 31, 2006 local elections where Uri received little
support. Kim said he hoped that President Bush would keep up
his support for President Roh until the end of Roh's term in
office. If Bush, Roh and Kim Jong-il held a summit, it would
provide much needed support for Roh.

--------------
KORUS FTA DIVIDED KOREANS
--------------


3. (C) Rep. Woo noted that the KORUS FTA was a divisive
force in Korea. As the negotiations entered the final stage,
Koreans still hoped that Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
goods would be admitted as they were a sign of inter-Korean
cooperation and hope. The Ambassador agreed that the KIC
represented a good opportunity to expose the DPRK to free
market principles and broader economic reforms; moreover, the
U.S. had contributed to the project by granting licenses to
employ certain technologies at KIC. Inclusion in the FTA was
another matter, however. For now, the U.S. did not have a
normal relationship with the DPRK. If the relationship
improved and if labor and human rights concerns were
adequately addressed, the U.S. might reconsider its view on
KIC products.


4. (C) Kim echoed Woo's comment on the divisive nature of
the FTA. Similar public affairs campaigns focusing on
economic growth were used in 1996 when Korea joined the OECD,
only to have those hopes dashed by the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis. While some people had high hopes for the FTA's
impact on the Korean economy, many were concerned about
vulnerable sectors like agriculture. The Ambassador
responded that Korea's quick rebound from the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis showed the strength and depth of its
economy. The FTA had prompted Korea to look at and reform
many of its sectors that would be challenged by outside
markets, regardless of the KORUS FTA.


5. (C) Kim explained that the Uri base was generally opposed
to the KORUS FTA. To appease the base without speaking out
directly against the deal, Kim said he planned to issue a
statement asking the Roh administration to delay a decision
until the next administration takes control. The Ambassador
replied that this position was tantamount to opposing the
FTA. There would not likely be another opportunity in a long
time, given the upcoming expiration of TPA. Korea would
benefit greatly from the FTA. For example, Korea was poised
to see rapid growth in service exports, just as Australia
experienced in the year following ratification of its FTA
with the U.S.


6. (C) Rep. Lee expressed two concerns with the FTA. First,
many Koreans correlated their support for the FTA to the
inclusion of KIC products. Second, there were not enough
protections for vulnerable industries in Korea. If Korea
were admitted to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP),that would
build support for the FTA and the U.S. in general. The
Ambassador said that the Senate recently put forward an
amendment to a bill that would make expansion of VWP possible.

--------------
COMFORT WOMEN AND JAPAN
--------------


7. (C) According to Kim, Japan had lost its appeal to the
U.S. Perhaps, Korea now had the upper hand in its bilateral
relations with the U.S. Kim said that this was a critical
time in the region and he hoped that the U.S. would work hard
to establish security and order with the ROK's help. Kim
cited the successful negotiation of a compromise on the
timing of wartime OPCON transfer as proof that sensitive
issues could be resolved without an ideological debate. The
Ambassador agreed that the U.S.-ROK alliance was indeed key
to effectively resolving regional issues, as was the
U.S.-Japan alliance; this was not a zero-sum game.


8. (C) Rep. Hong said that she traveled to the U.S. in
support of the Comfort Women issue when she was a member of
the Women's Committee. This was the seventh time that the
issue was considered by the U.S. Congress, Hong had high
hopes for success. The Ambassador assured Hong that the
Comfort Women issue was a high priority for the USG and that
Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte had raised it with
Japanese officials during his recent trip to the region. In
the early 1990s, Japan had acknowledged government
involvement with Comfort Women, the Ambassador noted. It was
not clear why PM Abe was retreating from those earlier
findings--although he had stated he would not renounce the
Kono Statement of 1993. Kim said that Koreans held very deep
feelings about the issue but were not yet speaking out
because they trusted that the U.S. would adequately rebut
Abe's recent statement.

--------------
INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT
--------------


9. (C) Kim said that he realized that some within the USG
were concerned that an inter-Korean summit would get in the
way of the 6PT. Rather than hinder the 6PT, Kim said a
synergy was needed between the 6PT and an inter-Korean
summit. As for the effect that a North-South summit might
have on the Presidential elections, Kim remained skeptical.
The announcement of the 2000 North-South Summit did little to
help the then ruling party in parliamentary elections held
just after the announcement. The Ambassador assured Kim that
the U.S. would view the question of a North-South summit on
the basis of whether it helped the 6PT process and the goal
of denuclearization. The best chance for success was for the
five parties to coordinate all their efforts.

--------------
PEACE REGIME NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


10. (C) Turning to the question of negotiations to establish
a permanent peace regime that would replace the armistice and
end the Korean War, Kim said that China should be excluded
from the talks. Any peace agreement should be among the
North the South and the U.S., as the only three countries

with forces still facing off along the DMZ. A Recent TV
drama captivated 40-50 percent of the population because it
embodied the hope for a better future; a view shared by those
who watched the program (NOTE: The drama, set in the Koguryo
period of Korea's history, portrayed the country as defiant
and strong versus China. END NOTE.).

--------------
SIX-PARTY TALKS
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador asked Kim if he thought the DPRK was
ready to make a strategic decision to denuclearize. Kim
responded that he thought that if the U.S. was ready to
provide a security guarantee, the DPRK would be ready to
denuclearize. Kim Il-sung was still alive, in a figurative
sense, in the North. His dying wish was the denuclearization
of the Korean peninsula. Even today, many DPRK officials
repeated this phrase. Kim expressed dismay that the 6PT were
held in Beijing, rather than on the Korean peninsula. The
Ambassador said that China has been helpful in using its
leverage and influence to keep the DPRK motivated in the
talks. The first real test of the DPRK's intentions was
whether the DPRK would proceed with the disablement of their
nuclear facilities in the second phase of the process
launched by the February 13 agreement.
VERSHBOW