URI PARTY CHAIRMAN, JAPAN, RUSSIA, CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000695 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS SUBJECT: URI PARTY CHAIRMAN, JAPAN, RUSSIA, CHINA AMBASSADORS MEET, TALK SIX PARTY TALKS Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With over 20 reporters present at a March 2 lunch, Uri Party Chairman Chung Se-kyun, the Ambassador, Ambassador Ning Fukui of China, Ambassador Shotaro Oshima of Japan, Ambassador Gleb Ivanshentsov of Russia, along with Uri Party leaders lauded the Six Party February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement. After the press left, the group had an in-depth discussion of the future of the Uri Party and the details of the next steps needed to move forward toward a nuclear-free North Korea. Chung said that the goal of the Uri Party was to create one coalition party to include the Democratic Party and ex-Uri members as well as NGO leaders. ¶2. (C) On North Korea, Chung said the action-for-action and incentive-based linkage system was wise and all the Ambassadors agreed that the Beijing agreement was just a start, but that "once started up the mountain, hopefully it will be hard to turn around," and the parties will continue toward peace on the Peninsula. The group talked about the various working groups that were set up at the Six Party Talks and all were optimistic there would be step-by-step progress toward a denuclearized North Korea. The Ambassador and Ambassador Oshima said there was hope for normalized relations with North Korea. Chung concluded by saying he was encouraged by the commitment of all parties and the lunch was helpful for Uri Party members to learn about the progress in the Six Party Talks, but also hoped the event helped increase understanding among the Ambassadors. End Summary. FUTURE OF THE URI PARTY - COALITION? -------------- ¶3. (C) Uri Party Chairman Chung Se-kyun hosted a March 2 luncheon meeting for the Ambassadors to Korea from the U.S., China, Japan and Russia to discuss the Six Party Talks. Each Ambassador made a short opening statement with journalists present explaining the significance of the February 13 agreement or "Initial Actions". After the press had departed and before discussing North Korea, Chung explained that as Chairman of the Uri Party, he was responsible for regaining the trust and support of the people by creating a new coalition party. With the Uri Party receiving only 10 percent support, all admit the party must change but there were many differing opinions on how the party should reform. Some have left the party (31 lawmakers) and claim the party should disintegrate and reform in order to gain support. Those who remain in the party (108 lawmakers) will address the party's shortcomings from within and attempt to create a coalition by bringing in other parties (Democratic Party, People First Party) and NGO leaders. Only through a coalition of all progressive forces could a candidate compete with the opposition GNP candidates, Chung said. In order to have enough time to prepare for the December presidential elections, the coalition party should form no later than May. ¶4. (C) Chung said that the coalition would not only give the new party a chance to win the presidential election, but also would improve democracy as it would encourage more political participation. Also, the party would seek to improve average Koreans' living conditions. The coalition would be different than past political coalitions since it would be an equal partnership between participants (minor parties, NGO leaders, ex-Uri members, etc.). The ideal would be to create a single coalition party, but if not possible, all progressive groups would support a single candidate. The final choice of the coalition candidate would likely occur in September. FTA --- ¶5. (C) Chung said that the inclusion of products made at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) as Korean products in the KORUS FTA and the resolution of the trade remedies issue were crucial. The Ambassador said recent talks on the FTA during Trade Minister Kim's visit to Washington were positive. Deputy National Security Advisor Crouch had noted during his February 28 visit to Seoul that relations between our two countries were headed in the right direction and the FTA negotiations were promising. FEBRUARY 13 "INITIAL ACTIONS" AGREEMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement was positive and the step-by-step cross-check system established in the agreement would provide more leverage, Chung noted. The Ambassador agreed and added that the follow-on steps after the initial actions phase would be challenging. The Beijing agreement was stronger than the 1994 Geneva Accord because there was strong political support for the agreement from China, Russia, Japan and the ROK, as well as the U.S. If all the parties worked together we could encourage North Korea to make a full declaration of its capabilities and disable its facilities. There was no reason to extend the denuclearization process more than 12 or 18 months - the faster the process goes, the faster the benefits for the North Korean people. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS? -------------- ¶7. (C) Rep. Song Young-gil asked if there would be a North Korea-U.S. summit in 2007. The Ambassador responded skeptically, noting that the establishment of relations with North Korea could occur only when there was a full and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. While there were some possible interim steps to improve our relations with the DPRK, full relations or a peace treaty were not possible as long as North Korea had nuclear capabilities. Song suggested that a security guarantee from the U.S. might encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear program. ¶8. (C) Song then asked Ambassador Oshima of Japan about the prospects for improved Japan-DPRK relations. Oshima said the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration laid out the requirements for Japan-DPRK relations to normalize. Oshima expressed appreciation for other members' support for Japan's focus on the abduction issue. After the abduction issue and other pending issues were resolved in the Japan-DPRK working group, Japan could begin contributing aid to North Korea. HURDLES TO OVERCOME -------------- ¶9. (C) Uri Party Floor Leader Chang Young-dal said North Korea needed guarantees on three issues: security, energy assistance, and food aid. The DPRK has developed a nuclear program to secure these guarantees. North Korea wants to denuclearize, but only if the five parties guaranteed security, energy and food. The Ambassador assured Chang the U.S. had no interest in attacking North Korea and said since the parties had agreed to share the burden of aid to North Korea he was confident this guarantee could be made if the DPRK denuclearized. Hopefully Japan could begin contributing aid as well once pending issues were resolved. Just as important as concrete steps on aid was an increase in trust between all parties. The quicker North Korea "climbs the mountain" toward denuclearization, the more momentum and trust would build. The Minister-level Six Party Talks scheduled after the initial steps are taken (after the 60-day period is completed under the February 13 agreement) should send a strong signal of U.S. commitment to normal relations with North Korea and to the completion of the Six Party process, the Ambassador said. BDA --- ¶10. (C) Chinese Ambassador Ning asked if the accounts in Banco Delta Asia (BDA) had been released and asked if the U.S. planned to lift financial sanctions on North Korea. The Ambassador replied that the agreement to resolve BDA was not related to other sanctions and that North Korea was aware of this distinction. The BDA situation was widely misunderstood; it was a limited action against one bank. The action against BDA, however, had had a broader effect because it raised general doubts about dealing with North Korean accounts. North Korea has to earn the trust of banks around the world. ¶11. (C) The BDA accounts were a concern not only because of counterfeiting, but because its use for money-laundering of the proceeds for other illicit activities. Since proliferation and illegal sales of WMD and drugs are often tied to money-laundering, the problems at BDA attracted attention, the Ambassador said. Floor Leader Chang said he was surprised how upset DPRK officials were about the freeze on BDA accounts when he went to Pyongyang in April, 2006. Therefore, he was amazed only 24 million dollars were in the BDA accounts. PEACE AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked Russian Ambassador Gleb Ivanshentsov what the planned agenda was for the GOR-led Northeast Asia Peace and Security Working Group. Ivanshentsov said he had no official guidance, but thought the working group should focus on security on and around the Peninsula and not in any wider regional framework. The DPRK opted to develop nuclear weapons because they thought their security was being infringed by threats from the international community. Guarantees were needed to keep smaller states from acquiring nuclear weapons, he added, by reassuring them against the use of force. The Peace and Security Working Group's agenda depended on the result of the two bilateral working groups (U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK) but would likely concentrate on military security and confidence-building measures. Also, the group would discuss the format of any possible peace treaty since in 1953 there were only three signatories to the treaty. The Ambassador suggested the-long term focus of the group might be on regional cooperation on issues that could unite the region, such as energy, as well as military CBMs. STATE SPONSORS OF TERROR AND TRADING WITH THE ENEMY LISTS -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Ambassador Ivanshentsov asked if Congressional approval was necessary to remove the DPRK from the State Sponsors of Terror List or the Trading with the Enemy list. The Ambassador said we would begin discussing the State Sponsors of Terror list and the Trading with the Enemy Act in the bilateral working group. He cautioned that the decisions to remove North Korea from these lists would not be imminent. Removal of a country from the State Sponsors of Terror list involved notification to the Congress, not new legislation. Progress on the abduction issue with Japan would indirectly affect these issues since abduction could be considered an act of terror. VERSHBOW