OPTIMISTIC KINGMAKER CHUN JUNG-BAE'S GREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000615 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS SUBJECT: OPTIMISTIC KINGMAKER CHUN JUNG-BAE'S GREAT SOLIDARITY - PIPE DREAM OR POLITICAL VISION? Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 27 luncheon meeting with the Ambassador, former Justice Minister Chun Jung-bae said that he left the Uri Party in January in order to spearhead efforts to create a new political party to revitalize progressive voters and renew support for a reform-minded party. Through creating a "Grand Solidarity," Chun said it was possible to recapture the voters who voted Roh Moo-hyun into power. Based on his 2003 experience when he formed the Uri Party, Chun said he would attempt to form a new reform party with a clear vision and policy platform that could unite and mobilize non-GNP support. While allowing that the road ahead was difficult, Chun was confident and hopeful. Chun and the Ambassador discussed the February 23 OPCON transfer agreement as well as the prospects for the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement reached at the Six Party Talks in Beijing. Chun, ever the optimist, said he thought that prospects for the DPRK to follow through on its required actions were good. Barely registering in presidential polls, Chun said he hopes to create a new party in March that can attract outside Presidential candidates such as SNU Professor Chung Un-chan. End Summary. LEAVING THE PARTY HE HELPED FOUND -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked why Rep. Chun decided to leave the Uri Party and whether Chun thought his departure and the imminent dissolution of the Uri Party would lead to a revitalization of progressive forces prior to December's Presidential elections. Chun emphasized that the Uri Party could not renew itself from within and therefore he was compelled to leave the party to spearhead efforts to create a new, reform-minded party. He added that since the Uri Party's complete loss in the May 31, 2006 local elections, the party faced a crisis. Nine months later, no progress had been made to revamp the ruling party. Therefore, without a dramatic departure from the Uri Party, there was no chance in the December elections. Additionally, there remain several lawmakers who are committed to the Uri Party until its "death" and this makes reform of the Uri Party from within impossible. ¶3. (C) Chun admitted that as one of the three main founders of the Uri Party in 2003, he should not have left the party; 
still he saw no alternative but to take responsibility for charting a new political direction. He formed a new party in 2003 because the then-ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) could not have won the April 2004 National Assembly (NA) elections. The intention was not to break up the ruling MDP (now the Democratic Party or DP) at that time, as he expected all the ruling party lawmakers to join the new Uri Party. His political instinct was correct: with the formation of the Uri Party, the ruling party was able to win 152 out of 299 seats in the 2004 elections. The political imperatives are the same in 2007 and 2008 as they were in 2003 and 2004 - without the formation of a new party, there would be no chance of winning the presidential or NA elections. GRAND SOLIDARITY: KEY TO THE BLUE HOUSE? -------------- ¶4. (C) Therefore, Chun's goal was to create a new party and a "Grand Solidarity" in 2007, just as reform-minded people did in 2002 in achieving the election of Roh Moo-hyun. When he founded the Uri Party in 2003, no one asked about the party's vision or its policy platform. Now everyone asks this and this change in just three years was amazing, Chun commented. Chun admitted it would not be easy to create this "Grand Solidarity," the new party he will form must have a clear vision and policies in order to succeed. Now, only a few have left the Uri Party (31 have left, 108 remain) and until more leave, it will be difficult to form an effective party or attract new Presidential candidates such as former Seoul National University Chancellor Chung Un-chan. Therefore, the current goal is to convince people of the need for the creation of a new policy-based political party. ¶5. (C) Former Uri Party Chairmen Chung Dong-young and Kim Geun-tae both want to form a new party as well, Chun explained. If they leave to work the Party toward this goal, it would create momentum, Chun said that while he would be happy to be president, dealing with the crisis the progressives faced and creating a new party was more important than personal ambition. Chun was confident that through the development of a centrist, reform-minded party, progressives could regain support. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked when the new party should emerge and how soon other lawmakers should leave the Uri Party. Chun replied that by June a new party should have established a party formation committee. At the Uri Party convention February 14, current Uri Party Chairman Chung Se-kyun pledged concrete steps toward the formation of a coalition party within one month. Therefore, Chun said, around March 14 there should be more defections from the Uri Party. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that finding the right Presidential candidate might be difficult and asked if it would be disadvantageous for a candidate to emerge later than June 22, when the GNP candidate will be selected. Chun said that it takes two months for a complete outsider to become known and campaign for office. In that time, a good image can be made and a candidate can be "introduced" to voters. If you campaign for longer, weak points could begin to become apparent. ¶8. (C) Chun said that during the presidential primary in 2002 he was the only lawmaker among over 100 who supported then-candidate Roh. When he formed the Uri Party, most said it would be impossible to capture a majority in the 2004 NA elections, but he succeeded. Therefore, while he admitted these results could have been luck, they led him to be confident and optimistic. REFORM PARTY AGENDA? -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked if the new party would have a more conservative policy platform or attempt to entice a GNP candidate such as former Gyeonggi Province Governor Sohn Hak-kyu to compete. Chun said that while the group of 23 former Uri lawmakers who left together February 6 hoped to recruit Sohn and gain support with a more conservative platform, Chun hoped to have a more progressive policy approach similar to that of former President Kim Dae-jung (DJ). There would be differences from DJ's policies to focus more on alleviating current economic difficulties and the growing divide between rich and poor. Chun said that there was no chance Sohn would leave the GNP since he had served all his political career in the GNP. DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S FUTURE? -------------- ¶10. (C) Asked about the future of the Democratic Party (DP), a party with strong ties to the southwest and former President Kim Dae-jung, Chun said the DJ loyalists might field their own candidate for president to help DP lawmakers in the 2008 parliamentary elections. If the DP decided to field its own candidate at its April 3 party convention, several lawmakers would likely leave the party and join the reform group. The DP supporters and the reform group supporters overlapped and since almost all progressives realized the necessity of fielding a single candidate to compete with the GNP, it was unlikely the DP would have its own candidate for president. PARTY PRINCIPLES? -------------- ¶11. (C) Chun asked the Ambassador what principles candidates and parties in Korea should follow. The Ambassador replied that he thought Koreans wanted reform and efficient leadership. While many agreed with Roh's policy goals, they were disappointed with his performance. Therefore, the next leader and any new party should have a solid reform platform and project a capacity to manage. Because of the importance of management in the U.S., governors do well on the national stage. Perhaps former Seoul Mayor Lee Myung-bak's good management of Seoul contributed to his lead in all polls. Chun agreed that because management was important; many thought Chung Un-chan could do well as Prime Minister, but not as president. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -------------- ¶12. (C) President Roh pledged to present a Constitutional Reform to the National Assembly in March that would change the president's term in office from five years to four and allow two terms in office. Chun said that the passage of the reform rested with the opposition GNP. Roh probably had some strategy that could give the reform a chance. Therefore, he thought there was a 50-percent chance the reform would pass. (Note: No pundits give the reform any chance of obtaining the necessary two-thirds support in the NA. End Note) ¶13. (C) The Ambassador said this was the most optimistic assessment he had heard. While he noted the reform made sense, it seemed the GNP wanted to block any Roh plans that would improve his legacy. The synchronization of the Assembly and presidential elections would probably help reduce election costs and increase interest. Chun agreed that synchronizing the elections would help avoid the severe lame-duck phenomenon we see in the current system, but it might give too much emphasis to the presidential election and too much power to the president. THE STATE OF RELATIONS -------------- ¶14. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S.-ROK relationship was in very good shape and we hoped that it would not be affected by -- or become an issue in -- the elections. With the February 23 agreement on the transfer of wartime operational control to Korea on April 17, 2012 between ROK Defense Minister Kim and Secretary of Defense Gates, we can now move forward with the transformation of the Alliance. On the Six Party Talks, there has been progress; the ROKG and the USG were working closely together with "no gap." On the FTA, our two sides were close to an agreement despite many as yet unresolved, complex issues. There is a real sense that we can succeed with an agreement that was a "win" for both countries. Autos, agriculture and trade remedies needed to be dealt with, but if we succeed in producing a good agreement, hopefully the National Assembly and the U.S. Congress would ratify the KORUS FTA. In addition, Korean entry into the Visa Waiver Program is becoming more likely. Indeed, our relations were in better shape than they were two years ago, the Ambassador commented. OPCON -------------- ¶15. (C) Chun agreed the U.S.-ROK relationship was strong and had a bright future. Particularly, the flexibility the U.S. showed on the date of transfer of OPCON was laudable. Chun asked why April 17, 2012 was agreed upon versus another date since April 17 could be the day of parliamentary elections in Korea. ¶16. (C) The Ambassador said the planned date of transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) was set to allow the completion of a final joint military exercise scheduled for March 2012. While some in the GNP continue to request a "renegotiation" of the agreement, over time people will understand the Alliance will be just as strong after the transfer of OPCON. The transfer of OPCON will take place in a careful, step-by-step manner and the five-year transition period will allow sufficient time for development of the necessary hardware (new facilities) as well as software (training). ¶17. (C) Chun said he understood why many retired generals and common people were concerned about the transfer since Korea has not had Wartime OPCON since it was handed over to the UN in 1950. Since then, Korea has been stable and secure under this arrangement. Many still think that the sole guarantee of Korea's safety and security is the assurance of automatic involvement by U.S. forces in case of war. Chun said he was confident that in five years we can explain to people effectively that the new arrangement does not mean a decrease in security. Also, Chun said the U.S. and Korea should work to explain the U.S. role and commitment under the new agreement. ¶18. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the strength of our commitment was based on solidarity between our countries; a shared willingness to protect each other was the key to security, not the nature of the command structure. The Ambassador noted that U.S. military was in Korea at the request of the Korean people and any physical presence was simply a reflection of our strong alliance. Under the new agreement, U.S. support for Korea will be just as strong if not stronger, the Ambassador assured Chun. FEBRUARY 13 "INITIAL ACTIONS" AGREEMENT -------------- ¶19. (C) Chun asked why Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) was not mentioned in the "Initial Actions" agreement. The Ambassador said that HEU was still an active issue, but that by design, the agreement in Beijing was limited to initial actions. The Ambassador said that Assistant Secretary Hill had been very clear in distinguishing what is known - that North Korea has centrifuges from Pakistan and acquired aluminum tubes that could be used as centrifuges - from what is unconfirmed - for example, whether or not North Korea has an operational production facility. Under the Beijing agreement, North Korea would have to explain its capability and equipment during the declaration phase to follow the initial 60-day period, the Ambassador said. The next phase would be much more difficult since in addition to these initial steps, a complete declaration and disablement of existing facilities are required. ¶20. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the potential need for humanitarian aid during the crucial late winter months, but urged a measured approach to the resumption of aid. While an initial release of aid may be appropriate once an agreement is reached, it should be conditioned on demonstrated North Korean efforts. All parties should proceed gradually, with ample time to assess the adequacy of steps taken by the North Koreans, so that we maintain our leverage. One of the strengths of the Beijing agreement is that it provides more leverage to the five parties than the 1994 Geneva Accord. Perhaps this will serve as a lesson on how to effectively use "carrots" as well as "sticks" when dealing with North Korea. Chun agreed the action-for-action and incentive-based approach was wise. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS WITH DPRK -------------- ¶21. (C) The Ambassador said President Bush wanted to denuclearize North Korea through diplomatic means. This was an excellent opportunity for North Korea to transform its relations with the U.S. and the world. Chun said it was impossible to predict how the North Koreans would act, but perhaps they thought making a deal was the only way to assure the continuation of their regime. After the 1994 Geneva Accord, one pundit said the agreement was a DPRK diplomatic victory but an even bigger U.S. victory because the nuclear crisis was averted and peace, though limited, was achieved. The "Initial Actions" agreement was just a start, but hopefully the first step on the road to a permanent peace on the Peninsula. COMMENT -------------- ¶22. (C) While Chun barely registers as a candidate in presidential polls, his past successes as kingmaker attest to his exceptional political instincts. More than this, Chun is widely respected among his colleagues. Known for his political vision, organizational skills and, above all, incorruptibility, Chun will be a factor in the next presidential election, though probably not as a candidate. VERSHBOW