PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CHUNG DONG-YOUNG DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000592 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CHUNG DONG-YOUNG DISCUSSES POLITICS, SIX PARTY TALKS AND FTA Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a February 26 luncheon meeting with the Ambassador, former Unification Minister and presidential hopeful Chung Dong-young and National Assembly members Chae Su-chan and Chung Eui-young discussed Korean politics, the Six Party process and resumption of aid to North Korea and the inclusion of Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) goods as an item for discussion in the KORUS FTA. On politics, Chung articulated a need for the creation of a new, integrated political party if the progressives were to have any chance of winning the December 19 presidential election. On the Six Party Talks (6PT),the former Minister asked for clarification of the USG position on the HEU program and urged quick resumption of humanitarian assistance to North Korea given the prospective food shortage. Agreeing the KORUS FTA was essential, Chung proposed listing Kaesong in the final agreement as an item for future resolution. END SUMMARY. FORMATION OF NEW PARTY -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Unification Minister Chung told the Ambassador that a new, integrated party would likely emerge by June ¶2007. Chung expressed skepticism that President Roh could save the Uri Party by leaving it and said that the formation of an entirely new party or "a new house built on a clean slate" was essential. Chung said the concerns of his supporters paralleled those of the defectors from the party (31 so far this year),and he and others would find strength in a new, integrated party that still had yet to take shape. While small numbers of Roh loyalists may fight to keep the Uri Party alive, the departure of the party's founders would make it impossible for the party to field meaningful presidential candidates, Chung said. BEIJING RECAP -------------- ¶3. (C) Chung thanked the USG for its role in brokering the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement, and noted that the results obtained would not have been possible without the seriousness and creativity of USG efforts. The timing of the agreement was crucial, as North Korea lacks food, fuel, oil, and morale. The former Minister assessed the solid U.S. and ROK cooperation as the key factor leading to the agreement, and that it was important to maintain a common bilateral perspective in approaching North Korea. He said he was "cautiously optimistic" that North Korea would keep its promises. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of linkage of performance to energy assistance in the February 13 agreement even after the initial 60-day period, and emphasized the need for North Korea to take new steps toward the disablement and eventual dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement in order to assure the continued provision of energy. The Ambassador also highlighted the ROKG decision to suspend humanitarian assistance following DPRK's July 4 missile tests as having had a major impact on the negotiations. ¶5. (C) National Assembly member Chae sought clarification on the USG position regarding North Korea's HEU program, and asked why it was not mentioned in the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement. The Ambassador said that HEU was still an active issue, but that by design, the agreement in Beijing was limited to initial actions. The Ambassador said that Assistant Secretary Hill had been very clear that North Korea has acquired centrifuges from Pakistan and aluminum tubes that could be used as centrifuges; under the Beijing agreement, the North will have to explain its capability and equipment during the declaration phase to follow the initial 60-day period. AID TO NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the potential need for humanitarian aid during the crucial late winter months, but urged a measured approach to the resumption of aid. While an initial release of aid may be appropriate once an agreement is reached, additional aid should be conditioned on demonstrated North Korean efforts. All parties should proceed gradually, with ample time to assess the adequacy of steps taken by the North Koreans, to maintain leverage. Former diplomat Chung Eui-yong agreed, and stated the Uri Party indeed viewed aid as leverage. FTA --- ¶7. (C) Chung Eui-yong said he detected a perceived softening of U.S. opposition to the inclusion of goods produced at Kaesong into the trade agreement following a visit to the KIC by former Defense Secretary William Perry, and argued for a notation of the issue in the FTA final document as an outstanding item for future resolution. Former Minister Chung cited the example of goods produced in Jordan and in Tijuana qualifying for the same preferential treatment as goods produced in the primary FTA partner countries, and noted that ROKG leaders "don't understand why the U.S. is hesitant." The Ambassador drew a sharp distinction, noting that the U.S. had normal relations with both Jordon and Mexico, and cited substantial political and labor concerns with the KIC. HIGH-LEVEL USG VISITS TO PYONGYANG? -------------- ¶8. (C) National Assembly member Chae asked the Ambassador if there was any substance to reports that former President Bush or Secretary Rice may visit Pyongyang. National Assembly member Chung stated that Secretary Rice's attendance at the 6PT meeting in Beijing following the initial 60-day period was crucial, and that a subsequent trip to Pyongyang would lead to a real breakthrough. The Ambassador said he was unaware of any discussion involving Secretary Rice traveling to North Korea. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Chung Dong-young remains stalled in the polls with around four percent support in the latest polls. His long-shot hopes rest on a breakthrough in North-South relations (as former Unification Minister, his campaign centers on his ability to deal with the North) and an increase of interest in any non-GNP candidate. His association with President Roh will likely prove a big drawback in this election cycle, but his regional, party and potential popular support leave him with some, but not much, hope. VERSHBOW