EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN'S CONSULTATIONS ON CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000382 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC PREF KS KN CH SUBJECT: EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN'S CONSULTATIONS ON CHINA REF: 04 SEOUL 3997 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Christensen met with ROKG officials and academics January 26-27 to discuss North Korean asylum seekers, Six Party Talks (6PT),and China. The DAS told his ROKG interlocutors that the USG appreciated Seoul's cooperation with efforts to resettle North Korean refugees to the United States and that should progress be made at the 6PT, tight U.S.-ROK coordination would be even more important. MOFAT officials said China should play a greater role in protecting North Korean refugees and in pressing the DPRK to denuclearize. ROKG officials and academics also speculated about how China might respond to a sudden collapse of North Korea. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas J. Christensen held consultations on January 26 and 27, meeting separately with Cho Byung-jae, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (strictly protect); Cho Yong-chun, Deputy Director-General of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau (strictly protect); and Park Yoon-june, Senior Coordinator for Policy Planning in the Policy Planning Bureau (strictly protect). Christensen also met with ROK academics specializing on China, including Lee Tai-hwan, Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute and Chairman of the China Study Committee (strictly protect),Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security Policy at MOFAT's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (strictly protect),and Kim Tae-ho, Director of the Center for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the Hallym Institute of Advanced International Studies (strictly protect). -------------- KOREANS IN CHINA -------------- ¶3. (C) In meetings at MOFAT, DAS Christensen expressed appreciation for ROKG cooperation with efforts to resettle North Korean refugees to the United States and reiterated gratitude for Seoul's acceptance last year of a North Korean deemed ineligible for USG resettlement. While we would not publicly emphasize ROKG assistance, it was a strong example of cooperation. The USG also understood the critical importance of improving PRC cooperation with UNHCR. Our diplomatic missions were not designed for processing refugees, and Washington and Seoul needed UNHCR involvement, regardless of whether individuals sought ROKG or USG resettlement. Washington would continue to urge Beijing to adhere to its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, to cease the refouling of North Korean refugees, and to allow UNHCR to exercises its functions. The USG was open to the possibility of jointly demarching the PRC to seek greater cooperation on this issue. ¶4. (C) Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau Deputy Director-General Cho Yung-chun said that the ROKG shared difficulties in helping North Koreans in China, but the PRC's attitude had improved. In the early 1990s, Beijing would not even discuss North Koreans with the ROK saying that it was "not a matter of PRC-ROK" concern. Starting in 2000, however, China allowed seven North Koreans who entered the UNHCR office in Beijing to go "abroad," via a third country, to South Korea. Cho said Seoul hoped UNHCR could do more in China, but some PRC authorities seemed more concerned about maintaining stability, especially ahead of the 2008 Olympics, than protecting North Koreans. Cho emphasized that Seoul was also concerned about protecting South Koreans in China who had escaped from the DPRK. At the end of the Korean War, the DPRK failed to release 500 South Koreans prisoners-of-war who still were thought to be alive in the DPRK. In the 1970s and 1980s, the DPRK kidnapped hundreds of South Korean high school children in the South and ROK fishermen at sea. Periodically, POWs, abductees, or their relatives would contact ROK missions in China for assistance. Unlike their responses to North Korean cases in the early 1990s, the PRC generally recognized their special connection to the ROK and allowed them to leave China. ¶5. (C) Senior Coordinator for Policy Planning Park Yoon-june said that Seoul's policy was to receive all North Koreans who wanted to resettle in South Korea, unless they were criminals or terrorists. The ROKG resettled over 2,000 North Koreans in 2006, and by April 2007 expected to have resettled a total of 10,000 North Koreans. Most of the North Koreans in 2006 came from Thailand (37 percent),Mongolia (28 percent),China (20 percent),and Cambodia (11 percent). The PRC, however, was lengthening waiting times for North Koreans to leave ROKG missions (now around 18 months) and increasing crackdowns on North Koreans and activists assisting them. Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, who was in China at the time, would focus on the DPRK nuclear issue with his PRC interlocutors, but he also planned to seek greater cooperation on North Korean refugees. Asked about jointly demarching the PRC, Park said parallel demarches would be more effective than joint demarches. The ROKG preferred quiet diplomacy but was willing to keep the USG informed of its discussions with UNHCR regarding operations in China and Mongolia. -------------- SIX PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶6. (C) DAS Christensen expressed hope that Assistant Secretary Hill's discussions in Berlin with DPRK Vice Foreign SIPDIS Minister Kim Kye-gwan (KKG) and in Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing with his counterparts would lead to a productive resumption of Six Party Talks (6PT). Should the DPRK agree to some progress, however, tight Washington-Seoul coordination would be even more important to maintain as the DPRK would surely try to find differences among the other five parties. We should ensure that we do not send the message to the DPRK that minor progress on Pyongyang's part might lead to the elimination of all pressure on the DPRK. ¶7. (C) North American Affairs Bureau Director-General Cho Byung-jae agreed and noted that Minister Song and Secretary Rice in a January 24 phone call had affirmed that they were on the same page. Song emphasized that Seoul could review its suspension of humanitarian aid to North Korea only when there was progress at the 6PT. Cho also said that following the A/S Hill's Berlin talks, ROKG 6PT lead negotiator Chun Yung-woo had told KKG in Beijing that the DPRK needed to seize this chance to make progress. Cho hoped the DPRK had learned from its lost opportunity to reach an accord at the end of the Clinton Administration. The ROKG had also asked the PRC to get tougher with the DPRK, but Seoul doubted Beijing was doing enough. -------------- POTENTIAL DPRK COLLAPSE? -------------- ¶8. (C) Park assessed that the DPRK economy would worsen without 6PT progress. The DPRK economy grew by one percent in 2006, mainly from PRC, ROK, and WFP aid, and the economy would grow even less in 2007. The DPRK's annual demand for food was 6 million metric tons, but it only produced 4 million metric tons. Before 2006, the ROK and the World Food Program had generally given about one million metric tons a year, but scarcity still existed. The ROK also usually gave 300,000 tons of fertilizer, but if the DPRK did not receive fertilizer before the planting season, production yields would fall further; the DPRK only produced about 50,000 tons of fertilizer a year. Once the DPRK nuclear issue was resolved, however, the ROK hoped to resume plans for the expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and employ greater numbers of North Koreans. Park and his staff speculated that PRC food assistance was generally less than the ROK's food aid. Park's staff thought the PRC gave around 500,000 tons of oil on an annual basis and that this constituted a significant amount of assistance to the DPRK. (NOTE: Kim Tae-ho at the Hallym Institute of Advanced International Studies thought that PRC exports of food dropped 50 percent in 2006 to 200,000 metric tons. He thought the PRC delivered 500,000 tons of oil annually to the DPRK. END NOTE.) ¶9. (C) Asia Bureau DDG Cho asserted that Beijing had come to value the ROK's economic potential while the DPRK was increasingly a burden. PRC officials, however, claimed that too much pressure on the DPRK would be counterproductive and perhaps destabilizing. Should the DPRK collapse, Cho speculated that China would not intervene too much. If it did it might face international opposition. Another limiting factor was that too much PRC intervention could become a precedent for international intervention in the Taiwan issue. North American Affairs Division I Director Hahn agreed that the PRC's one-China policy might prevent it from interfering in Korean unification. Park offered an even rosier view that without the threat on its border, China might welcome a Seoul-based unification as less threatening that the threat of DPRK instability on its border, such a unification might lead China to reduce its military spending. ¶10. (C) In separate meetings with academics, Lee Tai-hwan, Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute and Chairman of the China Study Committee, said that a PRC role in Korean unification would depend on U.S.-PRC relations. If bilateral relations were good, if U.S. troops remained south of the Demilitarized Zone, and if a sudden unification were seen as a fait accompli, Lee did not expect China to prevent unification. The PRC and ROK would have reasons to cooperate with each other because both had concerns about being flooded with DPRK refugees. The most important thing for China was time to concentrate on domestic economic and political challenges. ¶11. (C) Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security Policy at MOFAT's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS),ranked China's preferences as regional stability, survival of Kim Jong-il's regime, and DPRK denuclearization. The desire for stability prevented the PRC from doing all it could to press the DPRK to abandon its nuclear programs. His contacts at the Academy of Military Sciences in China claimed that the PRC military would not intervene alone in a DPRK collapse, but it could work with other countries. Asked whether PRC preferences might have changed after the DPRK nuclear test, Kim said that PRC leaders were upset with the DPRK and this might lead the next generation of Chinese officials to downgrade their relationship with the DPRK to "regular" rather than "blood-brother" ties. The PRC's focus on stability for economic development would still trump concerns over nuclear weapons. ¶12. (C) Kim Tae-ho, Director of the Center for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the Hallym Institute of Advanced International Studies, agreed that China's core concern was regional stability, followed by maintaining the DPRK regime, and denuclearization. Kim speculated that the PRC might prefer to manage rather than resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. A resolution might lower China's international profile compared to its hosting of the 6PT. -------------- VIEWS OF CHINA -------------- ¶13. (C) Asia Bureau DDG Cho characterized the PRC as an important economic partner for the ROKG. China historically, however, was also a dominant regional power, which complicated the relationship. The ROKG wanted to retain a strong U.S. alliance but also promote improved relations with China. China's lack of transparency contributed to a level of unpredictability that was unsettling. The ROKG was skeptical about PRC "academic studies" in 2004 that asserted that the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryeo was a Chinese provincial government (reftel). Although PRC officials said the works were "just a study," the South Koreans thought Beijing might be trying to create a central historical link. Perhaps the PRC was concerned about territorial disputes following a future Korean unification and hoped to consolidate incorporation of the two million ethnic Koreans in China's northeast region. ¶14. (C) Park opined that the "rise of China" should be viewed more as an opportunity than as a threat. The Cold War ended and the ROK was one of few advanced economies that had a trade surplus with China, so the ROK economy would benefit from closer ties. ROK-PRC trade was around USD 100 billion, but by 2012 the ROKG expected that to double. The PRC also had a key role in the DPRK nuclear issue. China was a big country with a low per capita income, so Beijing was focused on stability in Northeast Asia. The PRC probably had also learned from the U.S.-USSR confrontation, so it probably knew it could not compete with the United States around the world. Two-thirds of the world's poverty came from China and India, so PRC leaders needed stability to focus on economic development. Although China lacked the transparency that could reassure its neighbors, Park opined that its leadership was stable. China might have a financial crisis at some point, like South Korea experienced in 1997, but Park expected that Beijing would recover from that as well. The one thing that Beijing probably hoped to avoid was economic or political liberalization that was too fast to handle. ¶15. (C) Christensen said that from a historical perspective the PRC was playing a more constructive role in international issues than in the past. Years ago he would not have expected much PRC cooperation with the international community on North Korea, Iran, or Darfur. But, Beijing was being more helpful than it had been in the past and the USG was pleased by the general trend lines. On North Korea, the PRC had supported UNSCR 1695 and 1718 and continued to host the 6PT. On Darfur, UN Permanent Representative Wang Guangya had urged Khartoum to accept a hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping force. Even on Burma, although the PRC vetoed a UN resolution, the PRC statement that noted that Burma had internal problems was better than China's general line about non-interference in internal issues. China was not near where the USG wanted it to be on issues like Darfur and Burma, but if you looked at China's policy as a motion picture rather than a snapshot Beijing was on a positive trajectory. The USG needed to retain a strong presence in Asia and it needed strong engagement with China. These things were not contradictory. Both gave Beijing incentives to choose a proper strategy. U.S. strength would encourage China not to think it could bully the region, and U.S. engagement demonstrated the benefits Beijing could gain from cooperation with the USG. ¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Christensen. VERSHBOW