AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRESIDENT-ELECT LEE MYUNG-BAK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003581 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN ECON PINR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRESIDENT-ELECT LEE MYUNG-BAK Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a December 20 call on President-elect Lee Myung-bak, the Ambassador congratulated Lee on his decisive election victory, noting that President Bush planned on calling him later in the day. The Ambassador said the USG looked forward to working with Lee and his administration to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance. In the coming weeks, the Ambassador said we hoped the President-elect would also support efforts in the National Assembly to extend the stay of the Zaytun in Iraq and ratify the KORUS FTA. ¶2. (C) A tired but delighted Lee Myung-bak warmly welcomed the Ambassador. He said that the election had been bitterly fought; now it was time to get to work. A big priority for the Lee administration was the U.S.-ROK relationship, which had suffered some loss in "trust" over the past five years. Lee said he would be very supportive of early ratification of the KORUS FTA, but cautioned that it might not be easy due to the National Assembly elections in April. Another priority for the Lee Administration was to bring about the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and he was keenly interested in the Ambassador's update on the Six Party Talks. Lee said that he looked forward to working with President Bush on all these issues. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (U) Looking quite fatigued but obviously delighted at the previous day's landslide victory, President-elect Lee Myung-bak met with the Ambassador for about 35 minutes at his office at GNP headquarters in Yeoido. The building was now surrounded by a protective detail numbering several hundred police and an equally impressive number of journalists. With many of those journalists in the room, the Ambassador congratulated Lee on his electoral victory. The election confirmed once again the strength and vibrancy of Korean democracy. President Bush would be calling Lee later in the day to offer his personal congratulations. The Ambassador said that the USG appreciated the strong statements Lee had made during the campaign supporting the U.S.-ROK alliance. The Alliance was strong, and we looked forward to working with President Lee to make it even stronger. ¶4. (U) Lee said that he appreciated the Ambassador's statement and that he looked forward to talking with President Bush. It had been a tough election, although outside observers might have found it interesting and fun. Still, such tough fights made Korean democracy stronger. Among his highest priorities, Lee said, was the need to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, which had suffered from a lack of trust over the past five years. In fact, we needed to forge a "new Alliance," Lee declared. -------------- U.S.-ROK Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) After the press departed, the Ambassador said that the U.S. and ROK needed to work together on a number of key issues. Most immediate was the need to extend the stay of the ROK troops in Iraq. Thereafter, the ROK National Assembly and U.S. Congress must ratify the FTA. If the National Assembly could ratify the FTA early in the new year, it would improve the prospects for ratification by the U.S. Congress in the spring. The Ambassador also said that Seoul and Washington must continue to consult and coordinate closely on issues related to North Korea. Certainly, Lee's statements during the campaign -- on coordinating the Six Party Talks and North-South engagement, and on calibrating economic assistance with progress on denuclearization -- were consistent with Washington's approach. The Ambassador also offered that Seoul and Washington should define a new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance. What should the alliance's purpose be in the future, both on the Peninsula and globally? -------------- KORUS FTA -------------- ¶6. (C) Lee said that he had consistently supported the KORUS FTA. The agreement must be ratified by the legislatures in Seoul and Washington. However, the Korean National Assembly elections were just around the corner. Even some GNP legislators, especially those from farming districts, were opposing the FTA. This must stop, because now the GNP was the "ruling party," not the opposition. Lee would meet with all GNP legislators and ask them to support the FTA. He would try to ratify the FTA during the current session, but if that proved impossible, it had to be ratified soon after the April election. -------------- Six Party Talks -------------- ¶7. (C) President-elect Lee was emphatic that North Korea had to denuclearize. He had been following the progress of the Six Party Talks quite carefully and he was concerned that North Korea may not make a "proper" declaration of its nuclear programs before the end of the year. The need to denuclearize North Korea was urgent. Yet it appeared Kim Jong-il would take his time to meet his commitments. Perhaps, it would not be possible for Kim Jong-il to give up nuclear weapons before the end of President Bush's term in office. Still, Lee said, the United States and South Korea must work closely together to denuclearize North Korea. China's help would also be crucial. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador said that collaboration in the Six Party Talks among the U.S., the ROK and China had been very successful, making it difficult for North Korea to drive a wedge between the parties, especially between Washington and Seoul. Many in Washington shared Lee's view that there was no certainty about whether Kim Jong-il would give up all his nuclear weapons and programs. President Bush's position was clear, however. North Korea must completely and verifiably denuclearize, in which case, the U.S. too would also uphold its commitments. On the declaration, the Ambassador explained that talks were at a delicate stage. If North Korea missed the end-of-year deadline, we would not over-dramatize the situation; but U.S. reciprocal steps depended not only on disablement, but on provision of a complete and accurate declaration. ¶9. (C) President-elect Lee closed the meeting by re-emphasizing his commitment to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and expressed an interest in continuing the dialogue with the Ambassador during the transition period. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Lee was accompanied by the foreign policy team of his campaign, including former FM Yoo Chong-ha, former Ambassadors Kwon Jong-rak and Park Dae-won, and Rep. Park Jin. Of those men, Park Jin seems to be in the running to head MOFAT (at least according to himself) and Kwon could make the shortlist for national security advisor. These are, however, early days. We'll know more about Lee's personnel choices after he makes transition team appointments in the coming weeks. VERSHBOW