SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003214 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY GATES FROM AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES TO THE ROK FOR THE 39TH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (C) Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo, your host for the 39th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) November 6-7, has done a tremendous job in stabilizing the ROK-U.S. Alliance in his 12 months as Defense Minister. By helping to resolve the most contentious issues (OPCON transfer, camp returns),he has helped us keep the U.S. and our military relationship from becoming a political football in the ongoing ROK Presidential election campaign. Thanks to Minister Kim's cooperative work with USFK, DOD and the Embassy, there are no major issues to resolve at this SCM, and we suggest that your priority be to prepare the ground for a smooth transition to the next Korean Administration, which will take office in late February after the election on December 19. In your meetings with Minister Kim and President Roh, and especially in your public remarks, we recommend that you highlight the continued importance that the U.S. attaches to the ROK-U.S. Alliance and our long-term commitment to maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. ¶2. (C) Minister Kim was previously ROK Army Chief of Staff, and his strong military credentials have enabled him to promote a more conservative, pragmatic, pro-Alliance approach -- even though this has sometimes put him at odds with the Blue House. Minister Kim's positive influence was evidenced at the recent North-South Summit in Pyongyang, especially his principled stance on preserving the status of the Northern Limit Line (NLL),the de facto maritime boundary established by the UN Commander after the Korean War, in the context of proposals for a joint North-South fishing zone. We believe Minister Kim will continue to be the voice of reason and caution during the remaining months of the Roh Administration, helping to keep up the momentum on Alliance transformation as we transition to a new government. Right now, he is working hard to overcome parliamentary opposition to a one-year extension of the ROK troop presence in Northern Iraq. He also has opposed Foreign Ministry proposals for a major change in the burdensharing formula (SMA) that could jeopardize funding for the relocation of U.S. forces to Pyongtaek. In short, Minister Kim has stood up for the Alliance in every instance and deserves your heartfelt appreciation. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. -------------- POLITICAL OUTLOOK -------------- ¶3. (C) The Republic of Korea is a new and a very lively democracy. The outgoing government of President Roh Moo-hyun, which has less than four months left in office, reflects the larger tug-of-war going on within South Korean society over many fundamental issues, including how to view the country's own history, policy toward North Korea, and relations with the U.S. and neighboring countries in the region. Domestically, the country is split along regional lines affiliated with traditional conservative and newer progressive political perspectives. Roh's administration has been led by a group of liberals who are products of the democracy struggle of the 1980s and have largely followed the policies of Kim Dae-jung, Roh's predecessor. After nearly ten years of center-left policies, however, the Korean public appears to be ready to see the country move back to the center-right. This reflects a desire for more competent and pragmatic leadership on the economy, and a more cautious approach to North Korea based on reciprocity rather than one-sided assistance. -------------- - ROK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE OPCON ISSUE -------------- - ¶4. (C) Current polls show the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) candidate, former Seoul mayor and Hyundai CEO Lee Myung-bak, maintaining a significant lead over the main liberal candidate of the ruling United New Democratic Party (UNDP),Chung Dong-young, a former Unification Minister and TV anchorman. While both candidates declare themselves to be pro-Alliance, Chung in recent days has broken with President Roh in opposing the Iraq troop extension (with some of his aides admitting that the aim is to win votes by fanning anti-American sentiments). Ironically, opposition candidate Lee is backing the Blue House. As noted, Defense Minister Kim is working to persuade moderate UNDP members to support the extension. In public remarks, we suggest that you welcome the ROK government's readiness to extend the deployment, note the important role their Zaytun unit plays, while acknowledging the National Assembly's constitutional right to make the final decision. ¶5. (C) On other issues of concern to the U.S., the conservatives advocate delaying OPCON transfer until after the DPRK denuclearization issue has been resolved at the Six Party Talks (6PT). When the OPCON debate first began, the conservatives were against the whole idea, seeing it as a lessening of the U.S. commitment to the ROK as a result of years of Alliance mismanagement by successive liberal administrations. To President Roh and the progressive UNDP, OPCON transfer represents a culmination of years of effort to regain ROK sovereignty and establish an equal footing in the Alliance. Of course, the reality is that OPCON transfer should proceed because it serves both ROK and U.S. interests: it is healthy for Korea to assume primary responsibility for its own defense; but continued combined planning and exercises will ensure that our two militaries are collectively able to deter or defeat any North Korean aggression. ¶6. (C) We expect the conservatives, if elected, can be persuaded not to reverse the OPCON decision. Positive statements on your part that OPCON transfer reflects the increased strength and quality of the ROK military, but does not in any way diminish the U.S. readiness to support its Korean allies in any contingency, can help ensure that we realize these important changes to the ROK-U.S. Alliance. -------------- ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION -------------- ¶7. (C) The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains strong and relevant because it has been evolving since the Korean War and continues to evolve today. Fundamental steps in this transformational process occurred with the deployment of ROK combat forces to Vietnam in 1965, the activation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 1978, and the return of peacetime OPCON of ROK forces to the Koreans in 1994. The Alliance is not only evolving, but growing stronger with the current effort to realign U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) into two less intrusive hubs on the Korean peninsula, the continued modernization of ROK and U.S. forces in the region, the transfer of key missions and tasks from U.S. to ROK forces, and the planned transfer of wartime OPCON. The Security Policy Initiative (SPI) process has been a valuable and effective instrument for shaping and implementing decisions on Alliance transformation. ¶8. (C) The Korean public, skeptical of the Alliance five years ago and unnerved when some of the changes were first proposed, has responded positively to Alliance transformation efforts. Recent polls show that a solid majority (60 percent) of South Koreans have an overall favorable opinion of the United States, with an increased majority (65 percent, up from 56 percent in 2006) also saying that the ROK-U.S. security Alliance is in good shape. Even larger majorities (75 percent) support the maintenance of U.S. troops on the peninsula, with 68 percent also saying that South Korea should maintain the security alliance with the U.S. even after unification. This reflects renewed appreciation on the part of the Korean public of the role the U.S. plays in balancing the rise of China (and Japan),greater skepticism about North Korean intentions after last year's nuclear and missile tests, as well as the positive impact of Alliance transformation initiatives themselves. More and more Koreans see the U.S. as a reliable ally, but one that is prepared to treat the Republic of Korea as an equal rather than junior partner in the 21st century. Maintaining these high ratings, of course, will require continued progress on issues like OPCON transfer and USFK realignment, which symbolize both the strength and adaptability of our Alliance. -------------- NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT FALLOUT -------------- ¶9. (C) The October 2-4 Inter-Korean Summit, the second summit meeting between the North and South, was a much-anticipated and watched event in the ROK. Although the results of the summit were more symbolic than substantive, there are several summit initiatives that could affect the Alliance in the near and long term. NLL: -------------- ¶10. (C) The near-term issue will be the upcoming discussions between the North and South on the status of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as the sides seek to set up a "Peace Zone," including a joint fishing area, in the Yellow Sea (what Koreans call the West Sea). While Defense Minister Kim has repeatedly stated that the NLL is essential for ROK security and cannot be negotiated away except as part of a final peace settlement, the North Koreans have signaled that changing the NLL is the precondition to implementation of the "Peace Zone." The Blue House and Unification Ministry may be tempted to cave in to this demand in the hope of achieving an early breakthrough that could help the liberal Presidential candidate. ¶11. (C) The North-South Prime Ministerial Meetings to discuss the "Peace Zone" are scheduled for November 14-16 in Seoul, following the SCM. These meetings will be followed by Defense Ministerial Meetings in late November in Pyongyang to coordinate the security aspects of the joint fishing area (i.e., the NLL). Defense Minister Kim is our ally on this issue, and he has pledged that he will block any steps that would alter the NLL without proper coordination with United Nations Command (UNC),the entity that established it. You might, however, underscore the necessity of coordination with UNC when you meet President Roh. Until this coordination has been conducted and a consensus ROK internal policy is formulated, we recommend not commenting publicly on the NLL to the extent possible. PEACE REGIME: -------------- ¶12. (C) The long-term initiative from the summit is to continue a dialogue on establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The end product would be a peace treaty signed by the directly related parties, the ROK, DPRK, United States and China, to replace the Armistice of 1953. The U.S. position, as expressed by the President in Sydney, is that a Peace Treaty will only be possible when Kim Jong-Il verifiably gives up his nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. This is also the approach envisaged in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. We have also said that the commencement of negotiations should await the completion of the disablement of DPRK nuclear facilities and issuance of a complete declaration of the North's nuclear holdings (both goals for the end of this year). ¶13. (C) The Blue House -- again in the hopes of making an early splash that could influence the election -- has been promoting the idea of an early four-way summit meeting that would issue a "Declaration of the End of the Korean War" as part of the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. We have argued that the war can only end with the peace treaty itself, that signature of the peace treaty can only happen when there is denuclearization, and that a four-party summit is inconceivable as long as Kim Jong-Il retains his nuclear weapons. You may be called upon to reiterate this in plain language to President Roh. (Again, Defense Minister Kim is very much an ally on this subject, but he does not exercise much influence on issues relating to the Six Party Talks.) In public statements, since this is a volatile ROK domestic political issue, we suggest you simply express support for lasting peace on the Peninsula, which we have kept for over half a century, but reaffirm the President's position that peace will not be possible as long as nuclear weapons threaten the Peninsula. -------------- SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING -------------- ¶14. (C) Last year's SCM brought a strong message: that OPCON transfer can and should be accomplished in a manner that strengthens the Alliance. With the contentious date for transfer to the ROK of wartime OPCON now set for April 17, 2012, the primary focus at this year's SCM will be your concurrence, along with Defense Minister Kim's, on the implementation steps taken to date. Based on preliminary discussions with ROK MND, Defense Minister Kim looks forward to a very positive SCM and stated that he was very satisfied with the progress being made on OPCON transfer. Minister Kim agreed that it would be advantageous to highlight that joint success at the SCM. ¶15. (C) This year's SCM will ensure that our Alliance and our continued relationship remain viable and relevant for years to come. Continued frank discussions on such topics as North Korea security issues, the ROK-U.S.'s Alliance role in future security environments, and our mutual cooperation in fighting the Global War on Terror, will ensure that our Alliance is prepared to face any emerging challenges. ¶16. (U) The public message from this SCM should be that, while this is a dynamic time on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia, our Alliance and our steadfast relationship are the foundations that enable success in the political, economic, social and cultural realms. The SCM is another demonstration of how the ROK-U.S. Alliance has withstood the test of time, even through periods of crisis such as last year's DPRK nuclear test. Evolution of the security arrangements within the Alliance is natural and strengthens our security on the peninsula and in the region. Together, we have ensured peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula for over 50 years. And together, we will ensure that this peace and prosperity will be enjoyed by future generations. ¶17. (U) We look forward to seeing you in Seoul on November 6. VERSHBOW