ROH SURPRISED BY DPRK ATTITUDE, BUT NO SURPRISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003006 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: ROH SURPRISED BY DPRK ATTITUDE, BUT NO SURPRISES IN SUMMIT DECLARATION Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) While the joint declaration from the North-South Summit contained no major surprises, President Roh was reported as being surprised by the level of suspicion in his meetings with the DPRK. The joint declaration included a DPRK commitment to denuclearization but made no overt mention of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). U.S. interests in the Six Party Talks and for the U.S.-ROK alliance, therefore, were not undercut by the Summit. The joint statement mentioned that peace regime discussions would be held between the "3 or 4" relevant parties, indicating the possibility of PRC exclusion from the discussions. The declaration included concrete follow-up steps with specific deadlines on a number of different types of exchanges, from the Prime Minister-level down to family reunions. The ROK achieved the inclusion of a number of its economic cooperation proposals in the declaration, while the DPRK gained a number of security and sovereignty guarantees, as well as promises by the ROK to develop the DPRK's infrastructure. For now, it appears the summit has not significantly affected the ROK presidential election, nor elevated Roh's stature. Widely reported in the media, and by Roh's own confession, Roh received a somewhat chilly reception while in the DPRK; the actual face time between Roh and Kim Jong-il was far less than that between Kim Jong-il and then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung in 2000. The offer to extend the summit by a day, raised by Kim Jong-il, and the subsequent embarrassing decline by Roh indicated tensions in the personal relationship between the two leaders. END SUMMARY. -------------- DPRK GAINS -------------- ¶2. (C) The major gains achieved by the DPRK appear to be two-fold: security assurances and economic development packages from the ROK. The ROK agreed to both nonaggression measures against the DPRK and non-interference in the DPRK's internal affairs. The declaration stated that the issue of unification would be resolved by the two Koreas and according to "the spirit of by-the-Korean-people themselves," which is likely DPRK-inserted language aimed at excluding the U.S. The Defense Ministers would meet in Pyongyang in November to discuss military confidence-building measures. ¶3. (C) The DPRK received guarantees of several infrastructure projects to be built by the ROK. These include: railways between Kaesong-Pyongyang and Kaesong-Sinuiju, shipyards at Ahnbyun and Nampo, expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),the opening of a tourism site at Mt. Paektu, direct air service between Seoul and Mt. Paektu, a Special Economic Zone in Haeju, and the establishment of a cargo rail service between Munsan and Bongdong. The two sides also promised to actively cooperate in case of emergencies, and in particular natural disasters. The statement also specified cooperative projects in agriculture, health and medical services, and environmental protection. -------------- ROK GAINS -------------- ¶4. (C) By and large, the ROK received the great bulk of what it had hoped for in a joint statement. First, and possibly most important, the ROK received assurances of concrete follow-on steps (discussed below in "What Comes Next"). Second, the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment to denuclearization, committed to peace regime, and accepted the ROK's West Sea Peace and Cooperation Special Zone proposal among other items. Third, the two sides agreed to hold further such summits in the future. -------------- EFFECT ON 6PT -------------- ¶5. (C) The summit declaration included a commitment by the DPRK to the 9.19 and 2.13 Six Party agreements. It did not include any energy assistance. According to a Blue House spokesman, Prime Minister Han Duk-soo stated that the recent Six Party agreement helped improve the atmosphere of the Summit. -------------- THE ROK PUBLIC YAWNS -------------- ¶6. (U) TV viewing rates also showed that South Korean citizens were less interested than in 2000 on what was happening at the inter-Korean summit. According to a survey conducted by TNS Media Korea -- a TV viewing rate research company -- the average viewing rate on Oct. 2 for summit-related updates by KBS, MBC and SBS (the three major TV broadcasting companies in South Korea) added up to only 14.5 percent, a 5.8 percentage-point decrease from the 20.3 percent viewing rate on the first day of former President Kim Dae-jung,s trip to Pyongyang back in 2000. On the other hand, the Oct. 2 TNS viewing rates also indicate that more people were interested in watching Roh,s overland crossing of the MDL (27.7 percent viewing rate at 9:05 a.m.) than watching Kim Jong-il,s surprise appearance later in the day at the welcoming ceremony for President Roh at the April 25 House of Culture (15.1 percent viewing rate at 12:00 p.m.). -------------- GNP CRITICAL -------------- ¶7. (U) The Grand National Party (GNP) -- the conservative opposition -- in an emergency supreme council meeting after the announcement of the Joint Declaration expressed its regret on the lack of substance or non-mention of key, issues including denuclearization, the POW/abductee issue, and military confidence-building in the Joint Declaration. GNP Chairman Kang Jae-sup expressed his reluctance on the fact that Chairman Kim Jong Il,s will to denuclearize was not reflected more clearly in the declaration. Other members including GNP Floor Leader Ahn Sang-soo pointed out that the economic cooperation-related measures also lacked clarity and seemed like the South was giving a lot to the North in terms of economic cooperation, but it remains doubtful whether if the South will receive anything in return. ¶8. (U) At the same time, Rep. Chung Hyung-keun -- the architect of the GNP,s new, North Korea policy -- while criticizing the government,s lack of achievement on the denuclearization and POW/abductee issues, complimented the ROKG,s effort to work towards inter-Korean peace and to make the summit serve as a bridge to efforts toward peace by future administrations. -------------- WHAT COMES NEXT -------------- ¶9. The DPRK promised to hold Defense Minister and Prime Minister discussions in November to discuss the implementation of the statement. The DPRK also agreed to exchanges between its legislatures, cultural representatives, and deputy Prime Minister-level officials. Family reunions would also be increased, and a permanent delegation of both North and South Korean officials would remain at the Family Reunion Center at the Mt. Kumgang site once the construction on the center was completed. -------------- FROSTY ATMOSPHERICS -------------- ¶10. (C) The most bizarre incident on the summit's key middle day was when Kim Jong-il asked Roh, in front of the press and with cameras rolling, whether he would like to prolong the summit by another day. Roh, clearly surprised, and still on camera, delayed by saying that he would have to check with his staff. Kim Jong-il then chided him for not making the decision on the spot, but later, perhaps feeling slighted, withdrew the invitation as unnecessary. This sequence was shown repeatedly during that evening's news broadcasts, with commentators offering different interpretations. The media speculated that the invitation reflected concerns that the Arirang Festival, which Roh was slated to see that evening, might get rained out. An alternative possibility was that Kim Jong-il was probing to see if Roh was ready to have more of a relationship; perhaps the extra day would have included a one-on-one meeting or a "walk in the woods." In the end, the summit was not prolonged, and Roh attended the Arirang show (modified to remove the paean to Kim Il-sung and combat with South Korea) but Kim Jong-il did not. ¶11. (C) There were also questions about Roh's reaction. One of the reasons he may have hesitated is that Kim appeared to be suggesting delaying the substantive discussions for a day, and Roh felt pressure to show his domestic audience results. The conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper editorialized that the abrupt Kim invitation was another example (along with moving the dates of the summit, not telling the ROKG that he would meet Roh on arrival until the last minute, and not attending either of the summit's dinners, including the one Roh hosted on October 3) of Kim jerking Roh around. Dean of conservative columnists Kim Dae-joong, critical of Roh's overall performance in Pyongyang, said Roh's handling of the invitation was the one thing he got right. ¶12. (C) Roh also signaled that the private meetings on October 3 were frosty on a substantive basis. In front of reporters, he told his entourage that the North (presumably Kim Jong-il himself) had shown a deep-rooted mistrust of the South, particularly when the words 'reform' or 'opening' were used. Roh said the North was disappointed with KIC's slow progress, but was not comfortable with the South referring to it as an example of reform and opening, and therefore the South would have to work at showing more respect for the North Korean system. The Summit Declaration calls for further expansion of KIC, but it is not clear how Roh would respond to critics who say the North only allows KIC for the money it brings in. ¶13. (C) Besides the awkardness between the two leaders, another issue was how South Koreans interpreted Roh's comments during the summit. The liberal Hankyoreh newspaper, quite supportive of Roh's approach to North Korea, cited what it called "Roh's eyebrow-raising remarks" at the October 2 dinner. About an hour after his initial innocuous toast to host Kim Yong-nam, which called for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula, Roh reportedly went to the microphone again to say that Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-nam needed to live long and happy lives to ensure inter-Korean peace and development. This addition was apparently in response to Kim Yong-nam toasting Roh's health, but why bother, the Hankyoreh wondered. ¶14. (C) As seen on television, the summit showed Pyongyang treating Roh's visit as important (streets lined with onlookers, red carpet at the House of Culture, Kim Jong-il waiting to greet Roh and his entourage) but, as the media emphasized, lacking warmth (Kim Jong-il appeared to be going through the motions at the greeting ceremony, and then skipped several of Roh's events). Roh cannot plausibly claim that he developed a rapport with Kim after only a few hours of meetings (not approaching Kim Dae-jung's ten hours in 2000),nor did Kim Jong-il offer a special gesture such as a one-on-one meeting, car ride or a joint visit to the KIC. More important, however, is the substance of the Summit Declaration, if the Roh administration can effectively use its remaining time in office to implement its concrete steps. -------------- COMPARING SUMMITS -------------- ¶15. (SBU) How does this Summit Declaration compare with that from the first inter-Korean summit (June 15, 2000)? The June 2000 Joint Declaration focused on reunification, mentioned four times in one short page, compared to only once in the 2007 Declaration's two-and-a-half pages. The 2000 Declaration was conceptual (the only action items were agreement to hold more dialogue between authorities and Kim Jong-il's agreement to visit Seoul "at an appropriate time"), befitting a first meeting, whereas the current Declaration is a detailed action plan, raising the question of whether the Roh administration will have time to implement it. Lee Myung-bak advisor on North Korea policy Nam Sung-wook, a professor at Korea University, reacted to the Declaration by calling it a "department-store arrangement with such a variety of things, it makes me wonder whether they will all be carried out." Still, the outlines of the current Declaration's details can be seen in the 2000 Declaration, which called for, and resulted in, family reunions, economic cooperation, and further dialogue. The current Declaration, significantly, calls for increased exchanges in several areas, which was a provision of the 2000 Declaration that was never energetically implemented. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The ROK received everything it had hoped for in a summit declaration. Yet, because all of the agenda items had been extensively discussed in the South Korean press, the South Korean public's initial response lacked enthusiasm. If the measures described within the statement were to be carried out, however, the measures would constitute some of the most substantive achievements in the North-South relationship. That the meetings between Prime Ministers and Defense Ministers will occur in November, one month before the ROK presidential elections, was not likely to have been coincidence. Yet, the lingering impression that the two leaders did not get along well together continues to cast a shadow on the summit declaration. Thus, while the ROK received everything it had hoped for in the summit declaration, overall North-South relations were not improved because of Roh's inability to connect personally with Kim Jong-il. VERSHBOW