FORMER UNIFICATION MINISTER JUNG SE-HYUN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002940

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: FORMER UNIFICATION MINISTER JUNG SE-HYUN ON
OCTOBER SUMMIT

Classified By: A/POL Brian Mcfeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In a September 14 meeting with poloff,
former Unification Minister (Jan. 2002-Jun. 2004) Jung
Se-hyun said that the upcoming October 2-4 North-South summit
would focus on the economy. Jung said that a commitment by
one of the major ROK chaebols (Samsung, LG, Hyundai, etc.) to
invest in North Korea could emerge from the summit, and would
amount to a significant step. The Northern Limit Line (NLL)
would only be discussed if the DPRK raised it. Any talk of
a peace declaration or peace regime at the summit should not
be taken seriously: everyone was for peace and any statement
would be just words. Jung, who will participate in the
summit as part of the 47-member non-governmental delegation,
said Roh would pressure Kim to support the Six-Party process
and that he expected a declaration by Kim Jong-il of his
commitment to denuclearization and an agreement on some
military confidence building measures. Otherwise the summit
would be attacked by the Korean press as a photo-op summit.
End Summary

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Economic Possibilities
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2. (C) Jung did not have high expectations that he and other
groups accompanying the President would have substantive
discussions since most of the DPRK counterparts would likely
not be decision makers, but simply those "face people"
responsible for meeting with foreign delegations. That
said, on the economic front, there was a possibility that if
Samsung, LG, Hyundai or SK committed to some big projects in
North Korea as a result of this summit, other ROK companies
would follow suit with investments.


3. (C) Since there would be a high-powered group of South
Korean business leaders going North for the summit from the
leading conglomerates (Samsung, Hyundai, LG, POSCO, SK and
others),there was a chance for some significant economic
deals. However, the meetings the ROK business leaders would
likely attend would lack significance because the DPRK
counterparts would not be businesspeople but rather protocol
officials. That said, some large social overhead capital
deals could be approved in principle at the summit.


4. (C) Jung, President Roh Moo-hyun's first Minister of
Unification, indicated his agreement with Roh's
forward-leaning stance on increased economic engagement,
saying that economic integration was the best guarantor for
peace on the Peninsula. A declaration of peace was just
paper, but once the South Korean conglomerates began
extensive business in North Korea, the threat of conflict
would truly evaporate. Therefore, the focus of this summit
should be entirely on how much economic cooperation can be
achieved; a focus on a peace regime should come later.

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NLL Controversy
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5. (C) Blue House Chief of Staff Moon Jae-in's controversial
comments at a September 13 National Assembly hearing that the
NLL might be discussed at the summit were taken out of
context, Jung said. Moon's statement implied that if the
DPRK brought up the subject, President Roh would be ready to
discuss the issue and nothing more. In an open letter Jung
posted August 29 on the Blue House web site, Jung stated that
the NLL issue was a structural issue that needed to be
discussed within the overall North-South military cooperation
framework.

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Power of Secrecy
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6. (C) The DPRK had the advantage in preparing for the
summit since their agenda and intentions were unknown whereas
the Korean press, experts and government officials continued
to openly debate summit strategy and priorities. Roh's
remarks on September 11 that denuclearization may not be
discussed during the summit was a bad move -- both in policy
terms and strategically. Jung said he would ask Roh to
refrain from "thinking aloud" when he next met Roh. DPRK

used this strategy of secrecy when dealing with the U.S. as
well -- developing their strategy only after analyzing open
source reporting on U.S. policy. In a 1990 Red Cross meeting
Jung attended, the DPRK delegation told him they decided on
their tactics for the next day's meetings after studying
South Korean newspapers that were faxed to them via Beijing.

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Succession Issue
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7. (C) Jung said he believed that Kim Jong-il might want to
transform North Korea into a stable constitutional monarchy
on the model of Sweden or Thailand. Rather than attempting
to pass complete power to anyone -- either a son or someone
else -- Kim's goal might be to guarantee his family could
live on as the royal family while allowing the government to
open up over time.

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Confidence Building Measures
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8. (C) Jung stated that if no military agreement comes out
of the summit, the meeting would be attacked by all South
Korean pundits and media outlets. Therefore, it was likely
that some confidence building measures or defense agreements
would come out of the summit. If nothing else, future
defense minister meetings could be held in Pyongyang and
Seoul instead of at the traditional site of Panmunjum (in the
demilitarized zone).

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Recommendation to USG
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9. (C) Jung, one of the most experienced negotiators with
North Korea, said that instead of wondering if Kim Jong-il
wanted to give up his nuclear program, the U.S. should ensure
Kim had no other choice but to denuclearize. To do this, the
U.S. should continue to take the first move to reassure the
DPRK of U.S. intentions to deliver on its promises. This
would build trust and allow the DPRK to take reciprocal
actions. If the DPRK denuclearized and the U.S. established
diplomatic ties with the DPRK, Jung said he was optimistic
Kim would open up the North Korean economy and society along
the PRC model.
STANTON