SENIOR KBS CORRESPONDENTS SEE GNP'S VICTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002876

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: SENIOR KBS CORRESPONDENTS SEE GNP'S VICTORY
INEVITABLE


Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: According to two senior Korean
Broadcasting System (KBS) correspondents, Lee Myung-bak would
be victorious in December, not because of Lee's qualities or
performance, but because of three big macro trends in Korean
society: less nationalism, more suspicion of North Korea, and
more demand for economic growth. They added that a recent
Blue House scandal that had dominated the press for the last
10 days had serious negative ramifications for the
progressive cause in Korea. End Summary.

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Three Reasons Why Lee Will Win
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2. (C) Ko Dae-young, one of the most senior and respected
reporters from Korea's national network, KBS, is a frequent
Embassy contact whose insights on a wide range of topics have
proved accurate. He was KBS' first Moscow correspondent in
1991, reported on the Bosnian conflict and most recently was
responsible for KBS reporting on National Assembly affairs.
Ko was firmly convinced of a conservative victory in
December, citing three macro trends in Korean society that
would shape the electorate's response.


3. (C) First, the 2002 election, which resulted in a
progressive victory occurred at a high-point of Korean
nationalism, following the first time in history that Korean
athletes (and Korea) were receiving undivided global
attention for a pioneering World Cup performance. Koreans
had never before been so optimistic, confident, and united as
they were in the heady months after the 2002 World Cup, and
this immense psychological rush translated into unprecedented
political optimism and idealism, that "anything was possible"
if Koreans just tried. The emergence of nationalism favored
Roh Moo-hyun, who pledged that Korea could stand up to the
U.S. and other powers. This year, Koreans see a continuing
need for the U.S., both economically and politically.


4. (C) Second, the 2002 election was preceded by constant,
symbolic improvements in North-South dialogue. Now, however,
Korean voters are more concerned with the DPRK's recent
erratic behavior and lack of reciprocal actions to "pay" for
all the aid the South has extended; most Koreans want a more
pragmatic approach to the North. Ko noticed that many young
voters who supported Roh in 2002 were now more hard-nosed,
asking why South Koreans had to economically support North
Korea for nothing in return.


5. (C) The third trend was that while Koreans were
statistically wealthier than five years ago, they perceived
themselves as being poorer than they were in 2002. Ko
attributed perceived sense of wealth in 2002, to the post-IMF
credit bounce. Ko stated that this cognitive dissonance
worked strongly in favor of Lee Myung-back, since his
business background lent credibility to his promise to focus
on the economy in a way that ordinary politicians cannot.

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Lee Myung-bak: Powerless without Park?
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6. (C) Poloff asked Ko what he thought might happen to the
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye relationship in the future,
observing that some Lee Myung-bak staffers had mentioned
offering key positions in a future administration to
moderates and progressives. Ko said that all of Park's
supporters had already moved firmly to support Lee. There
was no possibility that Lee could forge an independent
political faction and forsake Park, since his background was
in business and not politics, and he therefore had no real
supporters and power base within conservative circles. Ko
said that Lee's current support levels came from the fact
that his profile best matches up with the three trends cited,
but that Lee was powerless to lead and govern as a
conservative president without the full support of Park
Geun-hye and her base of traditional, conservative support.

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Shin Jeong-ah Scandal: Death Knell for Progressives?
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7. (C) Ko said that the Shin Jeong-ah scandal would damage
significantly the liberal UNDP. People were appalled not
just by the tawdriness of the alleged extramarital affair and
Shin's fake academic credentials, but that a senior Blue
House officer was behind all of this, pressuring a university
to hire his purported mistress and using public funds to
purchase art through his art-dealer lover. Ko said that
regardless of how the public finally interpreted this latest
scandal, the public's impression of President Roh as a
clueless president, betrayed by his closest aides, was the
last thing that the progressives needed with less than 100
days left before the presidential election.
VERSHBOW