AFGHANISTAN: HOSTAGE CRISIS DOES NOT AFFECT ROKG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002842 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER PGOV MASS KS AF IZ SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: HOSTAGE CRISIS DOES NOT AFFECT ROKG PLAN TO FIELD PRT REF: SEOUL 2157 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 7. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 17, Cho Byung-Jae, Director General for North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),told Pol M/C that the ROKG had decided to move forward with its pre-ROK hostage crisis plans to field a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan province, Afghanistan. While the hostage situation required more vigilance about the safety of civilians, the ROKG was resolute in its commitment to establishing a PRT in Afghanistan, Cho stressed. The only condition on the ROK PRT remained the need for the U.S. to provide security. However, Cho argued that a Bagram-based ROK PRT would require only minimal U.S. security assistance. Cho requested that the U.S. provide a quick response to its proposal, as the ROKG hoped to dispatch a survey team to finalize PRT plans in time to replace its military units withdrawing by the end of the year. HOSTAGE CRISIS DOES NOT CHANGE ROKG POSITION ON PRT -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Cho explained that the bulk of ROKG discussion on options for a PRT presence in Afghanistan had occurred in June and July. At that time, the ROKG determined that it wanted to lead a PRT in the Parwan province with security provided by the U.S. The ROKG planned to field a civilian PRT in place of its current military engineering and medical units, set to withdraw by the end of 2007 in accordance with the National Assembly's requirement to do so. Cho explained that the ROKG had delayed its final decision while handling the ROK hostage crisis, but that the ROKG had now returned to its initial plan to field the PRT in Parwan province. Cho noted that the interagency-cleared decision had been made at the ministerial level. ¶4. (C) Cho said that the one condition on the ROK's offer was that the U.S. agree to provide security for the ROK PRT, noting that the ROKG had made this condition clear to the U.S. previously. Cho argued that the need to demonstrate to the National Assembly and the public that adequate security would be provided was a paramount concern before the hostage crisis, as well as since the final hostages had returned home. Cho said that a Bagram-based PRT would alleviate ROK concerns that the U.S. provide needed security. It would also minimize the need for "additional" U.S. security for the ROK-led PRT, since the U.S. already provides security at Bagram for its own PRT. Cho argued that the U.S. would only need to increase its security activities slightly, limited to providing convoy security for ROK PRT projects outside Bagram. ROKG PROPOSES ROK-LED PRT BASED AT BAGRAM AIR BASE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Cho said the interagency-cleared ROKG decision was to establish a ROK-led PRT consisting of 20 to 40 civilians in Parwan province based at Bagram Air Base. The ROK-led and U.S.-led Parwan PRTs would be complementary efforts, with the ROK supporting a range of reconstruction and medical assistance efforts and the U.S. continuing its civil-military focus. The final scale of the ROK PRT, the number and composition of ROK civilians, and the function and exact mission of the PRT would depend on the results of a ROKG survey team to be dispatched after U.S. acceptance of the proposal. Cho and U.S.-ROK Security Cooperation Division Director Lee Jyeong-kyu speculated that the PRT might include ROK military liaison officers and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) personnel. Cho said that the funding for the ROK-led PRT would be in addition to the approximately USD 8 million the ROKG had already committed to Afghan reconstruction for FY 2006-2008, since those funds were already largely earmarked for other projects in Kabul. Lee said the ROKG had not yet determined where the funds would come from, but mentioned KOICA as a possible funding stream. IRAQ EXTENSION OR A ROBUST AFGHANISTAN PRESENCE? -------------- --- ¶6. (C) As in previous discussions reported reftel, Cho said the ROK deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan were related, especially if the ROK wanted a robust presence in both countries. Explaining that the ROKG was in the final stage of deliberations about whether to pursue the Zaytun extension, Cho indicated that the ROKG proposal of a PRT with 20-40 civilians would be possible in addition to the Iraq extension. A more significant presence in Afghanistan would place the ROKG in a very difficult position and force them to choose one or the other. Cho also said that the ROKG-proposed PRT would NOT require National Assembly approval since it would involve only ROK civilians, making the 20-40 member civilian PRT an achievable proposal. ACTION REQUEST: U.S. RESPONSE TO ROK PROPOSAL -------------- ¶7. (C) Cho requested the U.S. respond to the ROKG proposal as quickly as possible, stressing the need to dispatch a survey team to determine final PRT scale and mission in order to replace ROK military units slated to withdraw by December. Cho asked that the U.S. address three points in the ROKG proposal: 1) Would the U.S. support a ROK civilian-led PRT in Parwan Province; 2) Could the ROK base the PRT out of Bagram Air Base where the U.S. already provide security for its own PRT; and 3) Would the U.S. provide security for the ROK-led PRT at Bagram, with the understanding that only limited additional convoy security would be required? VERSHBOW