NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON ROK-DPRK SUMMIT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002696

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AMCONGEN SYDNEY FOR A/S HILL, CHRISTOPHER KLEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON ROK-DPRK SUMMIT AND
DENUCLEARIZATION


Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) During a September 3 meeting with the Ambassador,
National Security Advisor Baek Jong-chun, who will accompany
President Roh Moo-hyun to the APEC meetings, said that the
October 2-4 North-South summit would support the Six-Party
Talks and denuclearization, but he was not confident that Kim
Jong-il could be persuaded to voice explicit support for
denuclearization or include a reference to it in a joint
statement. Aware of U.S. concerns about undercutting the
Six-Party Talks, the ROKG would not consider promising
competing energy assistance to the North. Referring to the
planned September 7 meeting between POTUS and President Roh
Moo-hyun, Baek said that Roh would be looking for a positive
message on U.S. readiness to normalize relations with the
DPRK in the context of denuclearization, and would pass on
that kind of message directly to Kim Jong-il. Roh would also
appreciate a word of support for the ROK-DPRK summit. End
Summary.

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ROKG-DPRK SUMMIT
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2. (C) NSA Baek assured the Ambassador that the ROKG
understood Washington's concerns about the planned October
2-4 ROK-DPRK summit and would keep in mind the principle that
North-South relations must move in parallel with progress in
the Six-Party Talks. The summit would bring "no negative
impact on the Six-Party Talks or U.S.-ROK relations." Nor was
the ROKG considering offering energy aid to the North that
would interfere with Six-Party Talks plans. The Ambassador
thanked Baek for those assurances and said that the world
would be watching the summit with great interest.


3. (C) As for what President Roh hoped to accomplish in
meeting with Kim Jong-il, Baek said that the ROKG saw the
DPRK as having a "changed attitude" toward readiness to
denuclearize. The nuclear issue would not be resolved
overnight, but the ROKG wanted to try for progress in
inter-Korean relations at the same time. It would likely take
30-40 years to develop the inter-Korean economic community
that Roh had mentioned in his August 15 speech, but the
summit would be a chance for the two leaders to discuss a
vision for such joint development.


4. (C) The ROKG was trying to craft a package that would
include denuclearization, economic cooperation, and military
tension reduction, Baek said. Currently, there were legal and
structural obstacles on both sides limiting the ability of
ROK businesses to invest in North Korea, or to make money if
they did. The leaders could talk about removing such
obstacles. In addition, the South was interested in making
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, now home to labor-intensive
factories, more technology intensive; Baek noted that this
change would require USG export approval of more advanced
computers. Railroad connections were another area for
potential discussion, but the North would have to be willing
to offer a security guarantee. Asked whether the summit could
lead to increased exchanges, such as between South and North
Korean students and/or faculty, Baek said that the ROKG
favored such exchanges, but that he would be surprised if Kim
Jong-il were to agree. "We have to teach and push them," Baek
said in English (otherwise speaking Korean).

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DENUCLEARIZATION PROSPECTS
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5. (C) Baek underlined the value of President Bush's August
30 statement that the USG was prepared to normalize relations
with a denuclearized North Korea, saying that many years of
watching the DPRK had persuaded him that the DPRK was willing
to change if the U.S. changed what the DPRK regarded as its
hostile policy. The ROKG saw a "change in attitude" in the
DPRK toward acceptance of denuclearization. However, full

resolution of the issue, especially persuading the North to
give up its nuclear weapons, would take time. The Ambassador
said that the DPRK needed to understand that the USG would
insist on full denuclearization if normalization of relations
were to occur; there was no "Indian" option whereby the DPRK
could achieve normalization and a peace regime while keeping
even a small number of nuclear weapons. We hope President Roh
can get through to Kim Jong-Il that he has a window of
opportunity for a fundamental change in relations with the
United States, but full denuclearization was the key.

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ROKG IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked Baek about the prospects for ROK
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan in the wake of the hostage
crisis. On ROK troops in Iraq, Baek said that the ROKG was
supposed to report to the National Assembly by the end of
September on progress, and was supposed to withdraw all of
its troops by the end of 2007. However, the ROKG was still
"thinking about various ways to continue" its presence in
Iraq into 2008. The Ambassador stressed that ROKG efforts in
Irbil had been very productive and were a success story worth
continuing.


7. (C) On Afghanistan, Baek noted that troops would be
withdrawn by the end of the year (he did not mention any
accelerated schedule of withdrawals) but that the ROKG was
still seeking ways to cooperate with the U.S., and was
continuing to talk about a Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT). Secretary to the President for National Security Park
Sun-won said that, in the wake of the hostage crisis, the
ROKG believed that an ROKG PRT presence would require ROKG
troops for protection, implying that this would be difficult.

VERSHBOW