REPORT ON 14TH U.S.-ROK SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE

S E C R E T SEOUL 002556 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KS SUBJECT: REPORT ON 14TH U.S.-ROK SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE MEETING (SPI-14) Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The 14th Security Policy Initiative meeting (SPI-14) was held on July 27 in Hawaii. OSD/APSA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Shinn headed the U.S. delegation. The Korean delegation was led by Dr. Jeon Jei Guk, Deputy Minister of Defense for Policy, Ministry of National Defense (MND). The atmospherics were good and the meeting provided ample opportunities for rapport building in official and social settings. The agenda was less contentious than had been the case in previous SPI meetings. Highlights of the meeting were as follows: -- Korean Hostage Crisis: PDASD Shinn expressed concern for the 23 Koreans taken hostage by the Taliban in Afghanistan on July 20th and passed a letter to DM Jeon from the SECDEF offering all appropriate U.S. assistance. -- Wartime OPCON: The U.S. briefed the Strategic Implementation Plan (STP),signed on June 28, which lays out the tasks to be completed before the April 17, 2012 transition of wartime operational control. The exercise program was identified as "the critical path" and the ROK budget commitment "the critical input," to that effort. The ROK side promised to provide a brief on MND's budget plan at the next SPI. -- Armistice Maintenance: The ROK delegation gave a briefing on the "Draft Roadmap Outline" for resolution of the Armistice maintenance responsibilities issue. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the work of the Senior Level Working Group. They agreed to endorse the outline and instructed the working group to finalize the roadmap in time for the 2007 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on November ¶7. -- Alliance Training/Readiness: PDASD Shinn expressed appreciation for the good efforts MND had made over the summer to address U.S. alliance training and readiness concerns. Jeon acknowledged the next step was to formalize and extend the arrangement with a memorandum of understanding. PDASD Shinn agreed those details would best be worked out at the USAF-ROKAF level, but stressed that the U.S. military considered it vitally important the two air forces develop a system that would no longer compromise readiness and training. The issue need to be resolved quickly. -- USFK Realignment: The ROK delegation briefed that the Yongsan Relocation and Land Partnership plans (YRP/LPP) were moving forward -- with demolition of the old buildings on the land 99 percent completed and the first new buildings planned for construction in 2008. The U.S. side expressed overall satisfaction with the progress being made, but pointing to the summary opinion issued by the National Assembly at the end of 2006, PDASD Shinn strongly cautioned that the ROK needed to come up with a viable way around the opinion that SMA funds could no longer be used for LPP. -- U.S. Army Transformation: The U.S. delegation reiterated, from SPI-13, that transformation is a positive development, and will result in enhanced warfighting capability on the peninsula. The U.S. delegation further expressed concern over erroneous headlines in the Korean media that misled the Korean public into believing that the EUSA Headquarters would "remain on the Korean Peninsula." The U.S. side explained that EUSA transformation would result in a warfighting Operational Command Post (OCP) on the peninsula, while the Main Command Post (MCP) would be located in Hawaii. The ROK side said it understood and offered to closely coordinate on any press guidance or press talking points that it was developing on the issue of EUSA transformation. In addition the ROK offered to brief the U.S. on ROK JCS transformation at the next SPI. -- Security Cooperation: The ROK side briefed the U.S. on the status of ROK military deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, where the 350 person Dong Myung Unit had been dispatched on July 19. DM Jeon said the ROK would make a decision in September on whether it would extend the deployment of its Zaytun unit in Iraq. The ROK delegation was unsure how the kidnapping of its citizens in Ghazni would impact its role in Afghan reconstruction. -- China Military Power Report: DM Jeon responded to the DOD's 2007 China Military Power report by stating that the shift in China's military posture made it more likely that China could involve itself on the Korean Peninsula in the name of border security. MND International Defense Policy DG Kim Kyou-hyun said China was taking a more "active, aggressive, even offensive" stance militarily. All agreed it was important to encourage Beijing to be more transparent regarding its plans for military build-up. -- The meeting concluded with both sides agreeing that many of the alliance issues discussed were inter-related and therefore needed to be worked in concert with one another. Both delegations agreed to hold the next SPI (SPI-15) on Cheju Island in October before the 39th SCM meeting. END SUMMARY -------------- KOREAN HOSTAGES IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶2. (U) On July 27, 2007, U.S. and Korean interagency delegations led by Dr. Jeon Jei Guk, Deputy Minister of Defense for Policy, Ministry of National Defense (MND) and OSD/APSA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jim Shinn met at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu for the 14th U.S.-ROK Security Policy Initiative meeting (SPI-14). PDASD Shinn opened the meeting by expressing U.S. concern for the 23 Koreans taken hostage by the Taliban in Afghanistan on July 20th and condolences for the death of the leader of the group, Pastor Bae Hyung-kyu. (Note: Another member of the group was shot by the Taliban a few days later). PDASD Shinn then passed a letter to DM Jeon from Secretary of Defense Gates expressing sadness at the loss of life and offering all possible U.S. assistance in securing the release of the remaining hostages. DM Jeon replied that the South Korean Government greatly appreciated the assistance and concern of the U.S. Government. -------------- WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE -------------- ¶3. (U) DM Jeon and Rear Admiral Kim Joong-ryun, Director of Strategy and Plans for the ROK JCS, both referred to the 54 anniversary of the end of the Korean War as reason to pay tribute to the strong bond between the U.S. and the ROK. DM Jeon said he had visited the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl Cemetery) the day before, where he had seen for himself how the United States honors those who have made the ultimate sacrifice. RADM Kim said he had bowed his head in remembrance of the U.S. allies who had given their lives in the Korean War. "We are allies bonded by blood and with mutual trust in our hearts," Admiral Kim said. Dr. Kim Kyou-hyun, Director General of MND's International Policy Bureau, who was making his last appearance at SPI before being reassigned to the Korean Embassy in Washington, stated that he had witnessed a recent strengthening of ROK-U.S. alliance relations, commenting metaphorically that there had been very cloudy skies during the last SPI session held in Honolulu, but that the state of alliance relations had improved so much that SPI-14 was blessed by sunny skies. PDASD Shinn thanked the Korean delegation for its strong support for the alliance, noting that their comments were firm reminders that maintenance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance is a serious business, and that we must continue to keep the alliance strong so that other young men and women will never have to make the same terrible sacrifice. -------------- TRANSITION OF WARTIME OPCON -------------- ¶4. (C) After formally welcoming PDASD Shinn and DASD Sedney to their first SPI, DM Jeon expressed his concurrence with the agenda and invited the U.S. delegation to begin its presentation on the status of planning for the April 17, 2012 transition of wartime operational control. Colonel Robert Gardner, Deputy Chief of C5 Policy from the Combined Forces Command (CFC),described the Strategic Implementation Plan (STP),signed on June 28, as a comprehensive plan that lays out the strategic tasks that need to be undertaken to ensure that the alliance will remain fully capable and ready to deter aggression after OPCON transition has occurred. He pointed to the training and exercise program as the key element in that effort and informed the group that both sides were now working to stand up the implementation secretariat. MajGen Frank Panter, the USFK J5, also stressed that the exercise program was the "critical path" to a successful transition because it was the mechanism that would test the new concepts, structures and procedures being put in place. DM Jeon complimented the team of military experts who wrote the STP for creating a well-developed concept and planning document. Jeon noted STP implementation began a week after STP signature with emphasis on MND support for budget and other requirements. Jeon said the ROK Armed Forces are working towards matching STP tasks to requirements for ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC) establishment. He said it was now important to work closely together to implement it. DASD Sedney pointed out that an appropriate commitment to implementation in the MND budget was a "critical input" to that process. In response, DM Jeon pledged that MND would brief its budget plan (the same plan it will submit to the National Assembly) to the U.S. delegation at the next SPI. PDASD Shinn concluded the OPCON discussion by saying the U.S. team looked forward to proceeding toward implementation with their ROK counterparts. Jeon replied that the tasks were numerous but that he believed the work would be concluded on time for the 2012 transition date. -------------- ARMISTICE MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES -------------- ¶5. (C) MOFAT North America III Division Director Lee Jeong-kyu gave a briefing on the "Draft Roadmap Outline" for resolution of the Armistice maintenance responsibilities issue. DM Jeon said he was very satisfied with the work to date of the Senior Level Working Group on Armistice Maintenance Responsibilities and agreed to endorse to the outline for the roadmap. He asked that the group continue developing the roadmap with two things in mind: 1) The eventual roadmap should be as concise and flexible as possible, and; 2) It should be completed in time to report it to the 2007 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on November 7 in Seoul. DM Jeon, MOFAT Senior Coordinator for Security Cooperation Hwang Seung-hyun, and MND DG Kim all voiced objections to the U.S. proposal for including a specific implementation deadline in the roadmap, saying there was not enough time before the SCM to establish such a firm deadline. The ROK side also resisted the suggestion that at a minimum a study deadline be set to demonstrate to the U.S. and ROK defense leadership at the SCM that progress was being made. ¶6. (C) NOTE: During the break that followed the morning session, MOFAT Senior Coordinator Hwang explained to the Embassy POL-MIL Chief that progress in the Six-Party Talks had raised hopes and political rhetoric over the possibility of establishing a peace mechanism to replace the Armistice. Given that political climate, the Blue House wanted to avoid generating complicating headlines about changes being made in the maintenance of the Armistice, Hwang explained. He stressed that the ROKG still fully intended to work out an acceptable solution on Armistice maintenance, and assured that it had no problem continuing that discussion through the Senior Level Working Group. Upon returning to Seoul, MND officials contacted the J5 to say the ROK had further come around to accepting the U.S. proposal that the Senior Level Working Group discuss the setting of a study deadline. END NOTE. -------------- ALLIANCE TRAINING AND READINESS -------------- ¶7. (C) PDASD Shinn expressed appreciation to DM Jeon for the good efforts MND had made during the summer to address the alliance training and readiness concerns (focused primarily on air space management and air to ground training ranges) the U.S. and ROK militaries had been grappling with for nearly three years. DM Jeon reported that the Jik-do scoring equipment installation began 2 days prior to the SPI (July 25th) and he expected completion by the end of August. He stressed the need for a Memorandum of Understanding for Jik-do and that it should be dealt with at the ROKAF and 7AF level. Regarding air space management, Jeon acknowledged the next step was to formalize and extend the arrangement beyond the initial 90 day agreement by preparing a memorandum of understanding. He stated that the ROK requested more information on 7AF training requirements at SPI-13 and the U.S. has not provided the information. He continued by adding that it is important for the ROK to have this information to assess the U.S. airspace requests. Jeon was eager, however, to suggest that the task be handed back to air force experts, as it largely involved working out the technical details. He said that maintenance costs and responsibilities at Pilsung Range remained to be resolved, but stated that these issues should never come up to the level of the SPI. The ROK side raised the Electronic Warfare (EW) issue and asked for a U.S. plan to solve the EW training shortfall. Maj Gen Panter stated U.S. EW equipment had been removed from Pilsung and will not be replaced. DG Kim added the concern that "in many cases the U.S. had failed to notify the ROK in a timely manner when bringing U.S. planes in from off the Korean Peninsula for training." He said the ROK wanted to support the training of those off-Peninsula assets, but that better coordination was needed. The U.S. delegation responded by explaining that unexpected changes in training needs sometimes prevented timely notice, but pledged to continue working with ROKAF counterparts to further improve coordination and joint use of training facilities. PDASD Shinn stated that these issues when identified should be resolved quickly so that they do not need to be addressed at the SPI. He stressed, that it was a vitally important that the two air forces develop a system that would no longer compromise readiness and training. -------------- USFK REALIGNMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to USFK realignment and the Yongsan Relocation and Land Partnership plans (YRP/LPP),the ROK delegation provided the following progress report. -- 1 household out of 222 remains on the land. The owner is seeking compensation way over the market price, the ROKG is therefore preparing for criminal prosecution. -- Demolition of the old buildings on the land is 99 percent completed. Disposal of the waste 60 percent completed. -- Cultural excavation is 40 percent completed. Will be completed by end of August. -- Landfill of Parcel 1 is 11 percent completed. -- The contract for development of Parcel K will be awarded in August/September. -- The first new buildings to be constructed include the HQ and four critical facilities (hospital, commo, etc.) -- Work continues on the critical task of building a construction access road with a June 2008 target date for completion. -- The Project Management Consortium (PMC) is up and running. ¶9. (SBU) USFK Engineer and Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Dan Russell summarized the situation by saying "The earth is now moving and the buildings will soon be going up." Both DM Jeon and PDASD Shinn thanked Colonel Russell and his Korean counterpart, Colonel Park Sang-ryool, Director of the USFK Base Relocation Team at MND, for their efforts in bringing realignment into the implementation stage. -------------- SMA-LPP -------------- ¶10. (C) During the discussion of USFK realignment, DASD Sedney raised U.S. concerns over the summary opinion issued by the National Assembly at the end of 2006 which directs that the ROK Special Measures Agreement (SMA) burdensharing contribution not be used for funding construction under the LPP. DASD Sedney stated that the USG had been clear all along that the funding for LPP would come from the USFK budget which was composed of two funding streams. SMA would constitute one of the two funding streams for the completion of the LPP (the other being U.S. MILCON). He said this serious problem had arisen because the ROKG had failed to adequately explain that understanding to the National Assembly. DM Jeon replied that he recognized the U.S. concerns and hoped an appropriate solution would be worked out via diplomatic channels. He firmly argued, however, that the ROKG did provide adequate explanations to the National Assembly, the media and the ROK public. He said that did not, however, prevent the National Assembly from exercising its will in this matter. MOFAT Senior Coordinator Hwang stated that it was the ROKG position that a more stable and transparent SMA process was needed to address the problem because the summary opinion of the National Assembly could not be withdrawn. He added that the U.S. and ROK negotiators must agree on a way forward by the end of this year. PDASD Shinn thanked the ROK delegation for its comments, but warned that unless the ROKG found a way to reverse or work around the instructions of the National Assembly, the alliance was headed for a big problem over the SMA for LPP issue. He pointed out that if the U.S. and ROK accepted the summary opinion, implementation of the USFK realignment plans that are now underway could grind to a halt. -------------- U.S. ARMY TRANSFORMATION -------------- ¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation reiterated, from SPI-13, that transformation is a positive development, and will result in enhanced warfighting capability on the peninsula. The ROK side expressed satisfaction and understanding of U.S. Army transformation objectives. MajGen Panter expressed concern over erroneous headlines in the Korean media that were misleading the Korean public into believing that the EUSA headquarters would "remain on the Korean Peninsula." That is only half true, Panter warned, explaining once again that while the warfighting Operational Command Post (OCP),a 2-star billet would remain in Korea, the EUSA Main Command Post (MCP),would be headed by a 3-star general most likely in Honolulu. Thus in time of crisis the 3-star general could come to Korea to fight the war. Panter added that the OCP will be a true warfighting headquarters on peninsula that will have more capability than the current EUSA headquarters. These changes are aligned with the U.S. Army's global transformation objectives and plans, Panter concluded. Indicating that the ROKG understood what had been briefed to them, RADM Kim thanked the U.S. delegation for providing further clarification on the issue and offered that in the future the ROK would closely consult with the U.S. on any press guidance or talking points regarding EUSA transformation. He proposed that the ROK side in turn provide a briefing on ROK JCS transformation at the next SPI. -------------- -------------- SECURITY COOPERATION IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, LEBANON -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Colonel Song Seung-jong, Director of the U.S. Policy Division at MND, briefed the U.S. delegation on the status of ROK military deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Col Song focused his briefing on the recent dispatch of ROK forces to UNIFIL. He explained that the Dong Myung (Light From The East) Unit was a 350 person infantry battalion with its own medical and engineering capabilities that had been dispatched on July 19 to an area just north of Tyre. DM Jeon addressed the issue of the ROK Zaytun troop dispatch to Iraq, stating that the ROKG would make a decision in September on whether it would extend that deployment for another year. He assured the U.S. delegation that the ROK was fully aware of the importance of the ROK presence in Iraq and would "be very careful" when making its decision on extension. He also stated that the ROKG would give the USG prior notification before going to the National Assembly. ¶13. (C) During a brief follow-on discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, the ROK delegation gave no indication how the kidnapping of 23 of its citizens by the Taliban would impact its future role in that country, but off-line their consensus view was that the ROK would recall all of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, as that had been the decision of the ROK government even before the hostage crisis occurred. No one was sure how the crisis would impact the ROK plan to replace its medical and engineering troops in Afghanistan with a civilian equivalent, but all expressed concern that the killing of more hostages would make it far more difficult for the ROKG to convince the public, in an election year, that it was safe to send civilians there. At the close of the session on security cooperation, DASD Sedney commented to the ROK delegation that the debate in Korea over that issue closely mirrored the domestic political debate over the future U.S. role in Iraq taking place in the United States. So we know that this is not easy, he said. -------------- CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT -------------- ¶14. (S) When PDASD Shinn asked the ROK delegation for its views after OSD/APSA David Helvey provided a briefing on the Pentagon's 2007 China Military Power report, DM Jeon replied that the ROK was watching the modernization of the Chinese military with keen interest. He said the ROK had noticed a shift in China's military posture from a passive defensive strategy to a more active one. As a result, it was MND's view that there was now an increased chance that China could involve itself on the Korean Peninsula in the name of border security. He went on to say that the ROKG was very concerned by what it saw because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was clearly pursuing forward and long-range precision strike capabilities that would put the entire region within range of its new weaponry. It is important that we actively encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international community, Jeon urged, and that we remind China that greater transparency will actually help to improve China's image. ¶15. (S) DG Kim said that China was taking a more "active, aggressive, even offensive" stance militarily, and that this greatly concerned the ROK. He informed the U.S. side that Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo had stressed the need for PLA transparency to his Chinese counterpart during their most recent ministerial-level meeting. At the same time, DG Kim warned that China would react badly if countries friendly to the United States were to spur on the arms race. For that reason the news that Japan would not be acquiring the F-22 fighter was welcome news, Kim said. Pointing to difficulties in Sino-Russian relations, he further advised that the U.S. and its allies take care not to take actions that would have the effect of pushing Russia and China closer together. ¶16. (S) Picking up on the point that China's military buildup could encourage Japan and Russia to do the same, Jeon asked what effect such changes would have on the U.S. strategy in Asia and what countermeasures the U.S. would be likely to take in such a scenario. PDASD Shinn replied that what the U.S. was doing today was the only prudent strategy to have towards China. He pointed out that in the past, the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances had been necessitated by the Soviet military buildup in the region. Whether there is a way to prevent a similar another Asian arms race is more a question for diplomacy than for military strategy, Shinn suggested. He predicted that discussion of a possible peace mechanism to eventually replace the Armistice would likely be an important topic on the agenda for the SCM in November. -------------- SPI-15 -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The U.S. and ROK delegations agreed to hold the next SPI (SPI-15) before the 39th SCM meeting and agreed, in principle, that SPI-15 would be held on the South Korean island of Cheju on or around October 8. -------------- CLOSING REMARKS -------------- ¶18. (SBU) In his closing remarks, PDASD Shinn thanked the members of the Korean delegation for dedicating their careers to the defense of Korea and the maintenance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. You have kept Korea strong and safe, he said. He noted that all of the key alliance issues they had discussed -- OPCON, AMR, YRP, the SMA for LPP issue, and U.S. and ROK military transformation -- were closely integrated, and that the two sides needed to work these issues together. He pointed to the other batch of issues discussed -- Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the discussion of Chinese military power -- as also being related in the sense that the U.S.-ROK Alliance was truly a global partnership that addressed threats and potential threats around the world from terrorism to rising Chinese military ambitions. Recalling a visit he had made to the Punchbowl Cemetery with his 7-year old son, PDASD Shinn said he had been further reminded on that day that management of the alliance is a very serious business. We must work together to avoid having to ask our young men and women to make those same kinds of horrible sacrifices in the future, Shinn said, adding: It is that which sustains our efforts. ¶19. (SBU) In his closing remarks, DM Jeon stated that he was very satisfied with the results of the meeting. He acknowledged that alliance issues were indeed very much inter-related, and suggested the U.S. and ROK alliance teams should therefore continue to work those issues as if they were "conducting an orchestra." He concluded by saying the biggest thing he would take away from the meeting was the realization that he would be able to have very candid discussions with PDASD Shinn in the future. -------------- PARTICIPANT LIST -------------- ¶20. (U) U.S. Attendee List: Mr. James Shin, Prin Dep Asst Secretary of Defense, APSA, OSD Mr. David Sedney, Dep Asst Secretary of Defense, APSA, OSD MajGen Frank A. Panter, Jr., CJ5, USFK MajGen Thomas Conant, PACOM J5 Ms. Mary Beth Morgan, Senior Korea Country Director, APSA, OSD LTC Michael Finnegan, Special Assistant, APSA, OSD Mr. David Helvey, APSA, OSD Mr. Brendan Kelly, APSA, OSD MAJ Dave Gigliotti, Korea Desk Officer, U.S. JCS Col Robert Gardner, Deputy Chief C5 Policy, CFC Mr. David Wolff, Pol-Mil Chief, DOS/AMEMB Seoul COL Richard Parker, Chief Future Operations G35, EU.S.A Col Chris "C-DIN" DiNenna, Chief, Strategy & Policy Division, J5-J, USFK COL Kevin Madden, Chief Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group-Korea LTC Ernest C. Lee, PACOM J51 Col Eugene Yim, Air Attach American Embassy, Seoul COL Daniel J. Russell, Assistant Chief of Staff, Engineer, USFK Mr. David Rathgeber, Special Advisor to Judge Advocate, USFK Mr. Robert Mounts, Special Assistant to Deputy CDR for SOFA, USFK LTC Steve Gransback, Deputy Chief Policy Branch, J5-J, USFK Maj Rich "Psycho" McGlamory, Chief Int'l Relations, J5-J, USFK Mr. Kim, Jang Wook, Command Interpreter ROK Attendee List: Dr. Jeon Jei Guk, Deptuy Minister of Defense for Policy, MND Dr. Kim, Kyou-hyun, Dir General, Int'l Defese Policy Bureau, MND Mr. Hwang Seung Hyun, Senior Coord., Security Cooperation, MOFAT RADM Kim Joong Ryun, Director Strategy & Plans, ROK JCS COL Song Seung Jong, Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND COL Park Sang Ryool, Director USFK Base Relocation Team, MND LTC Kim Kyong Ok, Action Officer, U.S. Policy Division, MND LTC Kong Pyong Won, Deputy Director, U.S. Policy Team, MND COL Park Chan Joo, Chief CIWG, MND Mr. Lee Hong Yup, First Secretary, NA Division III, MOFAT CAPT Choo Hyong Kyu, ROKN 1LT Yoo Jae In, Interpreter, MND Mr. Lee Jeong Kyu, Director 3rd Div, NA Bureau, MOFAT MR. Chun Young Hee, First Secretary, ROK Embassy, Washington D.C. 2LT Min Jong Ki, Incoming Interpreter, MND ¶21. (U) PDASD Shinn, DASD Sedney and USFK J-5 have cleared this message. VERSHBOW