ROH ANNOUNCES AUGUST 28-30 NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002383 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2027 TAGS: KN KS PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: ROH ANNOUNCES AUGUST 28-30 NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT Classified By: CDA Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With the ROK presidential election only four months away and his favored candidates registering only single-digit support, President Roh Moo-hyun has played his ace in the hole, the North Korea card. The announcement today, August 8 that Roh would go to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il August 28-30 was a surprise only in timing, because most pundits had expected the second North-South summit would materialize sooner or later, but certainly before the end of Roh's term in the Blue House. The summit negotiation was conducted exclusively by the South Korean intelligence chief, Kim Man-bok, who went to Pyongyang on two occasions earlier this month. By all accounts, everyone, including security-related ministers, was kept in the dark. ¶2. (C) The stakes are enormously high for Roh. He wants his signature pro-engagement North Korea policy to survive his term in the office. He particularly wants to see progress in the Six Party Talks through concrete commitments from KJI. Roh will also press KJI on North-South reconciliation issues, including military tension reduction, accounting for POWs and abductees, family reunion, and broader economic cooperation. The feather-in-the-cap would be an agreement to kick-off a peace regime negotiation to replace the Armistice Agreement. For all this, Roh is prepared to pay, probably not the kind of sub rosa cash payment delivered by the Kim Dae-jung government for the 2000 summit, but in official economic assistance, such as rice, fertilizer, energy, and perhaps one or two grand projects. ¶3. (C) Initial South Korean public reaction is predictably divided. Conservatives see a Roh-KJI conspiracy to place another progressive in the Blue House. Yet, they will mostly avoid a shrill response for fear of alienating the many South Korean voters who believe that talking with KJI is not such a bad thing. Among Roh's support base -- the NGOs, labor unions, and liberal politicians -- the summit is an occasion to energize the progressive forces in preparation for the December presidential election. Much will depend on KJI's reaction. Past experience tells us that KJI is likely to adopt his magnanimous persona, generous and understanding. If KJI goes a step further and delivers concrete commitments on denuclearization and tension reduction measures, many Koreans will be persuaded, and Roh will have furthered his domestic political goals. End Summary. -------------- SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) At a Blue House press conference on August 8, NSA Baek Jong-chun, NIS Chief Kim Man-bok and MOU Minister Lee Jae-jeong announced that President Roh Moo-hyun would travel to Pyongyang August 28-30 for a summit with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. North Korea concurrently announced the summit through its Central News Agency. According to an August 5 agreement signed by NIS Chief Kim and the DPRK Unification Minister, Roh committed to visit Pyongyang to bring the inter-Korean relationship to a "higher level based on the historic June 15 North-South Joint Statement." During the joint press conference NIS Chief Kim explained how he arranged the summit through several secret contacts with the DPRK and MOU Minister Lee explained how his ministry would lead preparations for the summit. NSA Baek stated the summit would contribute to reconciliation, peace, and prosperity and also help resolve the North Korea nuclear problem. No specific agenda for the summit was announced. Baek said he was confident the summit would hold great significance in opening up a new era of peace on the Peninsula, co-prosperity for the nation, and national unification. Responding to a reporter's question why the summit would be in Pyongyang and not in Seoul, Kim said that the Roh government's consistent position was the summit could be anywhere, anytime, and that the North Koreans wanted it in Pyongyang. (NOTE: The last summit, in 2000, was held in Pyongyang and normal diplomatic reciprocity required the next summit to be held in Seoul. END NOTE) -------------- POLITICAL REACTIONS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Former President Kim Dae-jung, who participated in the first N-S summit in 2000, said he welcomed the agreement to hold a summit and hoped there would be great progress in promoting peace and advancing inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation as a result of the proposed summit. The opposition GNP party issued a statement suggesting conditions under which the summit should be held and notably avoided blanket criticism of the announcement, even while describing the decision as an election-year ploy. The GNP also issued summit guidelines such as, "cooperate closely with the U.S. and other allies to make sure the summit does not weaken the effort toward dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program." In contrast, the liberals welcomed the announcement, saying it was "a significant turning point for peace on the Peninsula," and "an auspicious event for the whole nation. "Uri Party Chairman Chung Sye-kyun said, "It is a good thing the summit is finally realized, since the Uri Party has consistently advocated it." ¶6. (SBU) GNP contender Park Geun-hye said she accepted the summit on the condition that the summit contributes to denuclearization and the agenda for the summit was presented to the public in advance. Front-runner Lee Myung-bak's spokesman, lawmaker Park Hyung-joon, echoed the GNP stance and added several other criticisms in a statement including, "the summit was apparently pursued hastily, without agreeing on an agenda." The statement continued that, "the timing and venue for the summit are inappropriate. It should have been a return visit by Kim Jong-il." Lee also took a swipe at the announcement as a distraction from the hostages in Afghanistan with the following, "It is hard to understand that the NIS Chief has been preparing for a summit when the government should have focused all its energy on the Afghanistan hostage crisis." -------------- EXPERTS SPEAK OUT -------------- ¶7. (C) Over the next several days, pundits will engage in a winner-loser debate over the summit. In terms of timing, Roh gets good marks, because the GNP primary will be held on August 19. Hong Hyeong-sik, president of Hangil Research, a liberal polling firm, said, "It is possible that the summit might overshadow the GNP's primary." Kim Heon-tae, the Korea Society Opinion Institute president echoed Hong's assessment, "The GNP primary might be overshadowed by the summit, but it is hard to predict there would be any substantive difference in who would benefit more in this context." ¶8. (C) For now pundits see a net gain for Roh. Experts like Prof. Kim Yong-hyun at Dongguk University and Dr. Baek Hak-soon at Sejong Institute agreed that the decision to hold the summit might help the ROKG engage more proactively with its neighbors on various issues particularly related to denuclearization. Many attributed the summit announcement to the smooth progress of the Six-Party Talks. Some singled out President Bush's comment at the U.S.-ROK summit in Hanoi, when he declared that he hoped to see an end to the Korean War, as having been the real driving force making the summit possible. There are plenty of nay-sayers, however. Many analysts are concerned that that South Korea will pay dearly for the summit, noting that in 2000, the Kim Dae-jung administration made a secret payment of USD 500 million to hold the meeting. Others express serious reservations about Pyongyang once again serving as the venue for the summit. They note that a reciprocal visit to Seoul was promised by KJI in 2000 and that the ROK President going to Pyongyang again only underscores the desperation of the ROKG. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) President Roh, as unpopular as he is, does not have much to lose from going to Pyongyang to see KJI. His favored candidates for the December presidential election, former Prime Ministers Lee Hae-chan and Han Myung-sook, are stuck in low single-digit approval ratings. A man of conviction and strong beliefs, Roh remains baffled by his low approval ratings and harbors the hope of correcting this "misperception." He would certainly like to leave a legacy, especially in making his pro-engagement policy toward North Korea irreversible. To do this, Roh believes that his successor must be like-minded in dealing with North Korea. Of course, nobody in the ROKG would ever admit domestic political motives for the summit -- and they were flatly denied by NSA Baek in Wednesday's press conference. ¶10. (C) Roh's desire for a legacy in North Korea policy also presents the USG with a substantive opportunity to forward the goal of denuclearizing North Korea. Throughout the summit announcement press conference, all three ROKG principals -- including NIS Kim, MOU Lee and NSA Baek -- stressed the importance of making progress in denuclearizing North Korea. In fact, whenever the three mentioned the goals of the summit, denuclearization topped the list, even before North-South relations. ROKG officials, including Foreign Minister Song and NSA Baek, want to consult with Washington in preparation for the summit. These will be excellent opportunities to forward our own goals for denuclearization and peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. STANTON