ROK EMPHASIZES AFGHANISTAN HOSTAGE CRISIS DURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002368 SIPDIS SIPDIS COMM CENTER PLEASE PASS TO COMUSKOREA SCJS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2017 TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS KS AF SUBJECT: ROK EMPHASIZES AFGHANISTAN HOSTAGE CRISIS DURING DASD SEDNEY MEETINGS REF: SEOUL 02336 Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The current hostage crisis in Afghanistan dominated the agenda at meetings Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) David Sedney had with several ROK officials on August 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Ministry of National Defense (MND),and Blue House's National Security Council (NSC) officials urged the USG to continue discouraging the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) from taking any military action to resolve the crisis without the consent of the ROKG. While MOFAT and MND officials expressed some concern that the hostage crisis could adversely affect the bilateral U.S.-ROK relationship, they stressed that they were working to counter such sentiment in the press and the National Assembly. The NSC official stressed his view that the U.S. controlled events in Afghanistan. DASD Sedney pointed out that was not the case. The NSC official agreed with DASD Sedney that the ROK and the U.S. have shared interests in keeping our alliance strong. DASD Sedney expressed sympathy to the hostages and their families, reiterated the USG's commitment to provide assistance, and assured the ROKG officials that the U.S. was fully committed to supporting the ROKG throughout this difficult situation. END SUMMARY. -------------- No Military Action -------------- ¶2. (C) MOFAT Director General (DG) Cho Byung-jae, MND Director General Kim Kyou-hyun, and NSC Assistant Secretary for National Security Policy Cho Tae-young all requested USG assistance to urge the Afghan Government to not take unilateral military action. MOFAT DG Cho Byung-jae told DASD Sedney that the GoA has been cooperating with the ROKG, but that he "sensed" that the GoA would prefer to resolve the hostage crisis through military action, a move which the ROKG strongly opposed. The ROKG was trying to exhaust all other possible options before resorting to military action, Cho said. DASD Sedney reaffirmed that the USG had passed the ROK message to the GoA. In response to Cho on MOFAT's comment that the ROK was "depending" on the USG to convince the Afghans, DASD Sedney emphasized that Afghanistan is a sovereign state and that the USG "does not control the Afghan Government." During the meeting at MOFAT, Cho received a phone call from his Minister's office telling him of a planned call from the Minister to the Afghan National Security Advisor. In response to DASD Sedney's question, Cho said the ROKG was likely in touch with the Pakistani government. ¶3. (C) The NSC's Cho Tae-young stated that the ROKG "demanded" that the United States "aggressively control" the Afghan Government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Countering Cho's repeated statements that NATO-led ISAF and U.S. forces controlled the Afghanistan Military, DASD Sedney again pointed out that the GoA was a sovereign state and that President Karzai and the Afghan Minister of Defense had decision-making authority over the Afhan Military. The NSC official said the Blue House had not been in touch with the Afghan Ambassador to Seoul. Cho stated he did not know who the Ambassador was. DASD Sedney suggested that contact with the Afghan Ambassador might be useful. ¶4. (C) During his meeting with DASD Sedney, MND DG Kim Kyou-hyun received an urgent phone call reporting that the Afghan Military might be mounting a military operation to rescue the hostages. Kim told DASD Sedney that ROK Minister of Defense Kim Jang-soo planned to call Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to emphasize that the ROKG did not want a military rescue attempt to move forward. -------------- -------------- WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) MND DG Kim said that he was concerned that the way the hostage situation is handled and resolved could present a challenge for the bilateral relationship. Kim explained that he and other ROKG officials had spent the morning at the National Assembly (NA),where they had stressed that the hostage situation in Afghanistan was in no way related to the U.S. and cautioned against blaming the U.S. or inflaming anti-American sentiment over the issue. He said that he emphasized that the U.S. was providing critical logistics and intelligence-sharing assistance. Kim noted that a few NA members were very critical of the U.S. for not getting the hostages back already, but that other NA members strongly criticized that attitude, arguing instead that the U.S. was not to blame for the crisis. Kim said that in his view, the majority of NA members and ROK society were appreciative of everything the U.S. has done and would not support attempts to use the hostage situation to ignite anti-American sentiment, but admitted that a "very small" number of anti-American NGOs were aggressively pursuing that agenda. DASD Sedney thanked Kim for his, and the ROKG's, efforts to correctly portray the U.S. role to the ROK media, NA, and public, and assured him the USG remained committed to supporting and assisting the ROKG throughout the hostage crisis. ¶6. (C) The NSC's Cho claimed that the potential for the hostage issue to foment anti-American sentiment and damage the U.S.-ROK Alliance was significant, but noted that it could be mitigated by managing the hostage crisis well. Cho stated that the ROK wanted the U.S./ISAF to control the Afghan military operations and that the ROK expected the USG to keep their promise to not pursue military action without ROKG consent. (NOTE: The tone of this comment suggested this was a veiled threat, in contrast to the concerns expressed by MOFAT and MND. END NOTE.) ¶7. (C) MOFAT DG Cho said he was concerned about the recent media focus on the USG's role in the situation and the possible spillover effect it would have on the U.S.-ROK Alliance. He emphasized the ROKG's efforts to get out the message that "the USG is a wrong place to look for blame." He mentioned that Deputy Foreign Minister Shim Yoon-je had met with over 20 reporters during lunch to discuss the hostage situation and had used that opportunity to point out that the Taliban, not the U.S., held the key to resolution of the crisis, and that the USG had done, and was doing, everything in its power to assist the ROK and Afghan governments in their efforts to free the hostages. Acknowledging that there was only so much the USG could do to help, DG Cho nonetheless concluded the meeting by requesting all the continued support and cooperation that Washington could offer (reftel). ¶8. (U) DASD Sedney has cleared this message. STANTON