ROK DEFENSE REFORM AND THE 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000023 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL KS KN SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE REFORM AND THE 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET REF: SEOUL 4328 Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The ROK National Assembly (NA) has approved the Bill on Defense Reform designed to modernize the ROK military by the year 2020 at the cost of Won 621 trillion (USD 667.7 billion). Motivating factors behind the military modernization plan include deterring the North Korean threat, countering regional military threats (particularly from Japan),and preparing the ROK military to assume wartime operational control on the Peninsula. The planned reforms include a 38 percent reduction in troop levels and an ambitious acquisition and procurement program to strengthen command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision-guided strike capabilities. The FY 2007 defense budget, approved by the NA on December 27, includes a 8.8 percent increase, falling slightly short of the 9.9 percent increase proposed by the Ministry of National Defense (MND), and indicating that continued funding through 2020 will be a challenge. ¶2. (C) In other military related spending, funding for Yongsan relocation was cut by Won 123.1 billion (USD 133 million) in FY 2007, after it was decided that the bulk of the funds would not be needed until later years due to delays in the project completion date. The 2007-2008 Special Measures Agreement (SMA),signed by the U.S. and ROK in December 2006 and expected to pass the National Assembly when it reconvenes in February, will increase the ROKG burdensharing contribution by Won 45.1 billion (USD 48.5 million) this year. The National Assembly also approved Won 37 billion (USD 39.9 million) for the ROK's troop dispatch to UNIFIL. End Summary. The 2020 Defense Reform Plan -------------- ¶3. (U) On December 1, the NA approved the Bill on Defense Reform that outlines the comprehensive modernization of the ROK military by the year 2020. The Bill was submitted to the NA in late 2005 to provide legislative force for the MND,s 2020 Defense Reform Plan (DRP). The impetus for the DRP was President Roh Moo-hyun,s directive to the MND to achieve a self-reliant defense., This means that the ROK military maintains its own deterrence and defense capabilities against a range of security threats, and is supported by a robust domestic defense industry. In April 2005, Roh ordered the MND to conduct a thorough examination of France's defense reform as a basis for an overhaul of the ROK military. The ROK DRP is also heavily influenced by U.S. defense reforms. ¶4. (U) Highlights of the DRP include: - Reduction in troop levels from the current 680,000 to 500,000 by 2020. The army will be reduced by a third, from 548,000 to 371,000, the navy will decrease from 68,000 to 64,000, and the air force will remain steady at 65,000. The reduction in manpower will be offset by the acquisition of high-technology weapons systems and improvement in intelligence, surveillance, real-time command and control, and mobility and precision strike capabilities. Reserve forces will also be reduced by half to 1.5 million by 2020. - "Democratization" of the defense policymaking process by raising the ratio of civil servants in MND from 52 percent to 71 percent by 2009. The DRP also calls for the introduction of National Assembly hearings of key military appointees and the JCS Chairman. - Establishing a strengthened Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-centric operational execution system to improve joint fighting capabilities and strengthen the decisionmaking role and resource allocation for the Navy and Air Force vis-a-vis the Army. Service representation in the JCS will be at a ratio of 2(Army):1(Navy):1(Air Force) at the division director level and above. - Increasing defense budgets to achieve a technology-centered force. The DRP includes ambitious acquisition and procurement programs in order to strengthen command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision-guided strike capabilities across the services. ¶5. (U) The DRP is divided into three five-year phases, with the bulk of initiatives slated to begin in the first phase. In July 2006, the MND unveiled the first phase of the DRP, the 2007-2011 Mid-term Defense Plan, which calls for military expenditures of Won 151 trillion (USD 162.1 billion). Force Improvement Programs (FIP),designed to enhance defense capabilities, are set to increase from 25.8 percent to 35.9 percent of the defense budget by 2011. R&D will increase from 5.5 to 6.7 percent of the defense budget to improve technology and facilitate the development of the domestic defense industry. Specifically, the Mid-term Defense Plan calls for the completion by 2011 of the C4I digital warfare network system to allow real-time information sharing among reconnaissance units, headquarters located remotely, and battalion-class units on the battlefield. The ROK also plans to acquire a variety of aircraft (F-15K, T-50, TA-50) and other equipment, including K1A1 tanks, K-9 self-propelled artillery, MLRS systems, Aegis-equipped destroyers, mid-sized submarines, and convey vessels, to enhance long-range strike and force capabilities. Funding Reform: The 2007 National Defense Budget -------------- --- ¶6. (U) The estimated total defense budget during the reform period of 2006 to 2020 is Won 621 trillion (USD 667.7 billion). In order to achieve this, the ROK defense budget must increase over 9 percent annually in the first phase, 7.8 percent from 2011 to 2015, and one percent from 2016 to 2020. The Defense Budget as a percentage of GDP will be 2.76 percent through 2011, 3 percent in 2015, and 2.3 percent in ¶2020. ¶7. (U) The ROKG,s FY 2007 defense budget proposal supported the DRP goals. MND's proposed budget called for an overall increase of 9.9 percent to Won 24.7 trillion (USD 26.6 billion). Under the proposed budget, funding for FIP would rise 17.5 percent overall and would focus on acquiring new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs and C4I capabilities. It also included plans to acquire warships, aircraft, and cruise missiles. R&D expenditures would rise by 34.5 percent in 2007. Operation and management costs would increase by 7 percent, focusing on improvements in soldier morale and working conditions. ¶8. (U) Weeks after the December 2 deadline, the National Assembly approved the 2007 National Budget on December 27. The approved budget is Won 24.5 trillion (USD 26.4 billion), an increase of 8.8 percent over 2006, but less than the 9.9 percent requested. Over Won 345 billion (USD 371 million) of MND's proposed budget was cut by the National Assembly. The largest cuts were in funds for the Yongsan Relocation Program (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP),cut by Won 83.1 billion (USD 89.8 million) and Won 40 billion (USD 43.2 million),respectively. The YRP and LPP funds were cut after it was decided that the bulk of the money would not be needed until later years, due to a five year delay in the project completion date (from 2008 to 2013). In the end, YRP was funded at Won 303 billion (USD 327.4 million) and LPP at Won 176.5 billion (USD 190.7 million) for FY 2007. ¶9. (U) The NA also added projects worth Won 146.3 billion (USD 157.3 million) to the 2007 defense budget. Won 39.2 billion (USD 42.1 million) was earmarked for acquisition of 'bunker buster' bombs and ballistic-missile early warning system following the North's October nuclear test. The expected increase of Won 45.1 billion (USD 48.5 million) for the ROKG's 2007 contribution to non-personnel stationing costs under the SMA was also included. (Note: The SMA is expected to be approved in February 2007 when the NA reconvenes. End Note.) Won 37 billion (USD 39.9 million) was also added for the ROK's 2007 UNIFIL dispatch. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) In response to strong opposition in the National Assembly, MND has revised downward its estimates for annual budgetary increase requirements to carry out the DRP. While the DRP called for annual increases of 9.9 percent, MND reform planners have told PolOff that increases of even 7.1 percent, on par with the expected GDP growth over the reform period, would be sufficient. However, it is unclear whether even that lower level of increases in defense spending is attainable in the current political climate. In 2006, the first year the DRP was to be implemented, the NA approved only a 6.7 percent increase, falling far short of the 10.5 percent increase proposed by MND. The 2007 budget proposal fared better, but politically motivated spending decisions will likely continue to impact the ability to fully fund the implementation of the DRP. ¶11. (C) MND has made clear that deterrence of the North Korean threat is not the only motivating factor behind the DRP. In his National Assembly confirmation testimony, the new Defense Minister, Kim, Jang-soo, stated that the purpose of the DRP is to "strengthen independent defense planning and independent warfighting capabilities to secure war deterrence on the Peninsula, and establish a firm defense posture capable of countering any military threats." In explaining the DRP to the public and National Assembly, the force capabilities of all its neighbors, including North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia, figure prominently. In particular, the DRP notes that Japan spends nearly twice the amount the ROK does every year on its defense budget, as well as the fact that Japan maintains significantly more high-tech force capabilities. The DRP outlines Japan's force modernization efforts, including its acquisition of specific reconnaissance satellites, AEGIS warships, and airborne tankers. The ROK planned acquisitions under the DRP track with those of Japan. ¶12. (U) The prospect of transfer of wartime operational command authority is also clearly a motivating factor in MND's reform plan. The DRP states that the reform plan will be carried out within the context of a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance, but also acknowledges that OPCON transfer is one of the key issues involved in attaining a 'self-reliant defense.' Many of the planned reforms, such as strengthening the JCS, will help better prepare the ROK military to assume wartime operational command. STANTON