LEE MYUNG-BAK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON U.S.-ROK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001670 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 1 LAST SENTENCE FIXED E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: LEE MYUNG-BAK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON U.S.-ROK RELATIONS AND NORTH KOREA REF: SEOUL 1418 Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Members of presidential contender Lee Myung-bak's foreign policy team told poloffs on May 30 that Lee would likely advocate a "pragmatic" approach to the U.S.-ROK alliance, aimed principally to preserve room to strengthen the relationship after the election without alienating progressives by mentioning the word "alliance" before the election. According to these academics, who are three of a number of Lee's foreign policy advisors, Lee would avoid making North Korea or foreign policy issues key election issues. However, as the clear front-runner in the presidential race, Lee must provide at least a minimum vision on how he would deal with North Korea. For now, Lee, more interested in not losing votes than anything else, is painting a somewhat pedestrian, middle-of-the-road picture, emphasizing investment, trade and aid to raise the DPRK living standard in order to bring about reunification in some distant future. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Poloffs on May 30 met with Kim Woo-sang, Director of Yonsei University's Institute of East & West Studies, Cha Du-hyeong, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses Research Fellow, and Cho Yun-young, Chung Ang University Professor of International Relations. Kim, Cho and Cha are three of a number of foreign policy advisors who are working to prepare Lee for the upcoming presidential campaign. ¶3. (C) In general, they said, Lee Myung-bak will attempt to focus on domestic and economic issues, which he perceives as his strengths. He will wait until challenged before addressing foreign policy concerns. That opportunity will likely come on June 19 in Daejeon, when the GNP primary candidates will engage in a televised debate on international affairs and security policy. RELATIONS WITH U.S. -------------- ¶4. (C) Kim said that Lee sees a stronger alliance relationship with the U.S. as vital for the ROK's security in the region. He assured us a Lee administration would handle U.S.-ROK relations much better than President Roh or former President Kim Dae-jung, and the ROK "would be an entirely different country." However, for public consumption, Lee would likely refer to the need for "pragmatic relations" with the U.S., staying away from referring to the "alliance." This would allow Lee to tighten the relationship after the election, without alienating those who chafe at too much American influence. ¶5. (C) In a revealing aside, Kim recounted that during a recent ROK-Japan academic seminar, a retired Japanese Ambassador had bluntly said that the ROK had to maintain its alliance with the U.S. or else Japan may no longer be able to treat the ROK as a friend, and the ROK would therefore have to seek protection from China. Kim said that he had replied that Japan's position in the event of severed ties with the U.S. would be even worse, because Japan would have to yield to China, whereas the ROK could at least choose between favoring Japan or China. NORTH KOREA AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE -------------- ¶6. (C) Kim said that he expected candidate Lee -- assuming he receives the GNP nomination, which the advisors clearly were counting on -- to try to keep North Korea from becoming a major campaign issue. People cared much more about the economy and domestic issues, and the public generally wanted engagement policy to continue. That said, Lee would change the tone of engagement policy to emphasize the reciprocity that President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" had initially envisioned. Lee's take on engagement would entail greater penetration of western values into the DPRK, which, Kim admitted, might be difficult for the DPRK to accept. President Roh Moo-hyun's version of engagement policy was "simple appeasement," Kim scoffed. If Lee had been president last October when North Korea tested nuclear weapons, he would have pushed for full enforcement of UNSCR 1718 and full ROK participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. ¶7. (C) Lee has enquired of his advisors whether he should discuss North Korean human rights during the campaign. According to Cha, Lee will likely discuss not "human rights," which is a volatile term, but rather North Koreans' "right to happiness." This phraseology would avoid a backlash from the DPRK, while putting the issue on the table in broad terms. They all noted that no one could attack the "right to happiness" as either too strong or too weak. ¶8. (C) Kim referred to recent DPRK criticism of Lee over statements Lee made during a visit to Panmunjum as counterproductive to DPRK aims because it increased Lee's credibility among GNP conservatives. Lee said, "continued concessions to North Korea led to the death of innocent civilians," and, "It is ironic that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons to make itself a powerful nation when its people are the poorest." Kim said that it was likely that the criticism would diminish later in the campaign as the DPRK accepts that they would have to build a relationship with Lee as the likely next president of the ROK. At the same time, the prospect of a North-South summit meeting, which the advisors saw as plausible in mid-August, clearly struck a nerve. A summit would hurt Lee's standing because the media would focus obsessively on it for as much as one month beforehand and afterward, Kim said. In addition, Cha said, ten million South Koreans, many of them senior citizens with relatives in the North, could have an emotional response to a summit. Although this group is generally conservative, they might vote in favor of a progressive candidate if they perceived heightened prospects for more family reunifications. NORTH KOREA DEVELOPMENT PLAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Kim said that Lee Myung-bak and his advisors were fleshing out the North Korea "3,000 Unification Plan" that would be similar to the U.S. Marshall Plan. The goal would be to raise North Korea's per capita income to USD 3,000 per year (Note: The OECD estimated the DPRK's per capita GDP as USD 797 in 2004) within ten years (reftel). The economic assumptions are heroic: USD 40 billion invested, initially in infrastructure and then in a "giant" version of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in multiple locations, aimed at achieving DPRK per capita income growth of 17 percent per year for 10 years. During this same period, the ROK's per capita income would be expected to increase from its present level (about USD 18,000/yr) to about USD 40,000 per year. Together, these changes would make unification affordable, but the Lee plan focuses on DPRK economic development rather than setting out a timeline for unification. ¶10. (C) Politically, the "3,000 Unification Plan" could only go forward if (a) North Korea were continuing to make progress on denuclearization; (b) North Korea agreed to the increased level of economic engagement; and (c) Japan contributed to the economic development package. On (a), Kim said that he hoped that the U.S. would agree that this economic development plan could begin as long as there was continued progress on denuclearization, rather than insisting on its completion, which "will take years," beforehand. On (b),Kim said that he was aware that North Korea could very likely regard an offer to invest USD 40 billion in its economy as a threat, but that the hope was that improved DPRK-U.S. relations in connection with denuclearization, along with security guarantees, would ease DPRK concerns. On (c) the three agreed that Japan would likely contribute 10 billion USD to the effort if the abductee issue was resolved. ¶11. (C) What if the DPRK did not make progress on denuclearization? Then the plan would be to work with the U.S. and the international community to enforce UNSCR 1718 and PSI. Kim said that close cooperation with all concerned nations would be vital. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) North Korea policy is not Lee Myung-bak's strong suit and he is struggling to come up with new ideas. As the clear front-runner in the presidential sweepstakes, candidate Lee recognizes that has to put some flesh behind his image as a "pragmatic conservative," but at the same time, he knows he has more to lose than gain in being adventurous. Lee's strategy, therefore, is one of muddling through, entertaining various ideas on North Korea, without firm commitments. This appears to be his plan on choosing foreign policy advisors too. Professor Kim has been close to Lee for several years, but as the campaign heats up, he faces stiff competition for Lee's ear from a cadre of Korea University professors and alumni, among them, notably, former FM Han Seung-soo and political science professor Hyun In-taek. Lee's camp is reportedly run like a company where different teams compete to have their ideas endorsed by their "CEO." Therefore, while Kim, Cha and Cho are currently key members of Lee's policy-making team, it remains to be seen how they will fare in Lee's ultra-competitive camp. VERSHBOW