THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS (3 OF 3)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 001216 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP A/S HILL AND EAP PDAS STEPHENS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV PINS MARR MCAP KS KN CH JA SUBJECT: THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS (3 OF 3) REF: A. SEOUL 01211 ¶B. SEOUL 01215 Classified By: CDA BILL STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the third and final cable in a series reporting on the politics of U.S.-ROK Alliance relations. Reftel A explored how the Republic of Korea views its security environment. Reftel B looked at how the U.S.-ROK Alliance fits with ROK security perspectives. This final report examines how Alliance issues are likely to play out during the 2007 ROK presidential election and beyond. Based on our discussions with Korean security experts, we think that Alliance issues are unlikely to be politicized during the election because U.S.-ROK relations are currently being viewed more favorably and are expected to improve further after the election. However, much will depend on progress in the Six-Party Talks. The level of understanding between Washington and Seoul will also be more important than ever, as the U.S. military presence continues to transform and Korean society continues to change. END SUMMARY -------------- REPORT 3: CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE -------------- Domestic Economic Concerns Will Dominate Election -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Many of the South Korean security experts consulted for this series of reports have extensive experience in Korean politics. Their consensus opinion was that U.S.-ROK Alliance issues were unlikely to figure prominently in the 2007 ROK presidential campaign, despite their importance to the Republic's national security. They predicted the candidates would focus instead on domestic Korean economic issues, such as surging real estate prices in Seoul and the rise in South Korean unemployment. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and reform of the South Korean educational system were also expected to figure prominently in the election. Education is the primary vehicle for upward-mobility in South Korean society, while housing is a major status symbol, hence the importance of both to the electorate. ¶3. (C) Several experts we consulted pointed to the KORUS FTA as the issue most likely to generate controversy in the upcoming election. Soongsil University political science professor Kang Won-taek said it is an issue that tells a lot about a candidate's stance on several important fronts, including economics, nationalism and social welfare. Since the issue invites a debate on the benefits of globalization vs. the dangers of foreign influence, it also contains strong undertones of attitudes toward relations with the United States. "If I were one of the ruling camp's presidential campaign staff, I would advise my candidate to use this issue as a means to stand out from the crowd by opposing the agreement," Professor Kang said. The Alliance Is Now Viewed More Favorably SEOUL 00001216 002 OF 007 -------------- ¶4. (C) In February, the USG negotiated an agreement with South Korea on a number of important Alliance issues through the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) process. That agreement, approved by Defense Secretary Gates and ROK Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo on February 23, resolved the contentious debate over the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the Korean government. In exchange for acceding to the ROK preference to delay the transition until April 17, 2012, the South Korean government pledged to accelerate the movement of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) to a new headquarters in Pyongtaek, and to help transform the U.S. military presence on the peninsula through implementation of the Yongsan relocation and land partnership plans (YRP and LPP). The ROKG also agreed to work through the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) process to carry out the closure and return of 23 USFK camps in the ROK. ¶5. (C) These are all important elements in transforming the Alliance from its past Cold War construct into a healthier and more politically sustainable security partnership for the future. This will be accomplished by reducing our military footprint in Korea via a drawdown to 25,000 troops, moving our most visible military presence (USFK Headquarters) away from prime real estate in the center of Seoul once used by Japanese occupation forces, and constructing a new consolidated headquarters facility Southwest of Seoul, and building an improved logistical support hub in Daegu. The USG had already reached agreement with the ROKG to do all of the above several years ago. With the February 23 agreement, however, we now have a commitment to implementation and an understanding that we will proceed in a cooperative manner. If this good faith effort holds, it will represent a significant improvement in the complexion of the U.S.-ROK Alliance after four years of contentious negotiations. It should also help to depoliticize Alliance issues during the remaining months of the ROK presidential election season, thereby making it less likely that "We" will become the issue in "Their" campaign. Further Improvement Expected Next Year... -------------- ¶6. (C) Those interviewed for this report agreed that after years of strained ties the U.S.-ROK Alliance had entered a new period of reconciliation. That upswing was clearly evident on April 2 when the U.S. and ROK reached agreement on the KORUS FTA. With one voice our interlocutors predicted that a more fundamental improvement would come after the election of a new ROK president at the end of this year. They also predicted that would be the case almost regardless of who won the election. Professor Kang of Soongsil University said that the independent views expressed by President Roh and others of the so-called "386 generation" had been a rite of passage for Korea that could be likened to similar sentiments that erupted in Japan fifteen years ago with publication of "The Japan That Can Say No." Seoul National University Vice Chancellor for International Affairs Dr. Lho Kyong-soo faults two generations of "uninformed SEOUL 00001216 003 OF 007 liberals" who dominated South Korea's teachers unions. "They have done damage to the Alliance. I can understand why the United States feels disappointed and betrayed," Lho said. Dr. Kim Byung-kook, Director of the East-Asia Institute at Korea University, assessed that U.S.-ROK relations had survived a bad phase, but that Koreans from across the political spectrum believed President Roh had mishandled the Alliance. Because of this, politicians on both the left and the right want to be seen as preserving the Alliance, and so would not seek to politicize it in the election, Kim predicted. ¶7. (C) Post also sees favorable prospects for improved relations with the next ROK administration. It is, however, a long way to election day in December. Furthermore, the degree to which Alliance issues may be politicized during the ROK presidential campaign will largely depend on which candidates emerge as the front runners. For example, the U.S. military presence in Korea is more likely to be used as a target by the left if the candidate on the right is Park Geun-hye. That is because they are likely to campaign against the record of her father, former strong man Park Chung-hee, who enjoyed close ties with the United States during his military rule. The success of such attacks will depend on various factors, and could even backfire as there is significant nostalgia in Korea for the rapid economic development that occurred during Park's rule. On the other hand, economic rather than security issues will be more likely to dominate the campaign if Lee Myung-bok remains the leading Grand National Party (GNP) candidate. Lee, a former mayor of the city of Seoul, is best known for the notable accomplishments of his economic and administrative leadership. Both Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bok have voiced strong support for the U.S.-ROK Alliance. ¶8. (C) In addition to predicting that Alliance relations will improve if either GNP candidate should win the presidency, many observers also believe that even the candidates from the left would take steps to improve Seoul's relations with Washington, aware as they are that the United States is the ROK's key political, economic and security partner. Or as Kookmin University professor Andrei Lankov put it: "Even South Korean liberals don't want a repeat of Roh." ...But Not As Much As Hoped -------------- ¶9. (C) That said, Professor Lankov and others we consulted have warned that the anticipated post-election improvement in U.S.-ROK relations may end up being somewhat less than many might hope or expect. Lankov noted that the "Old Right" was dying off in Korea. And while a "New Right" was emerging, its members were less likely than their predecessors to align squarely with U.S. policies. A recent indication of this was seen in attempts by some in the GNP to soften its hard-line policy approach toward North Korea. Dr. Choi Kang of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) pointed out that while old guard GNP members still held the view that the Alliance should not change, the younger SEOUL 00001216 004 OF 007 generation of conservative politicians currently gaining influence in the party tended to support the changes that were occurring. Several said the U.S. Government underestimated the political power of the left-wing "386 generation" and warned against similar underestimation of changes on the right since today over 50% of the South Korean population is under 30 years of age. One expert advised that Washington would better understand the changing political landscape in Korea if it thought of newer generation Koreans as nationalists, rather than as being on the left or the right, because they largely derived their support from calls for greater Korean strength and independence, rather than from the pursuit of outdated and largely discredited socialist or isolationist ideals. Much Depends On Progress in the Six-Party Talks -------------- -- ¶10. (C) According to Professor Moon Chung-in, a key advisor to President Roh on Alliance issues, it wasn't the Hwy 56 accident that gave rise to anti-American sentiments in 2002. "That was only the match to the fuel," he said. According to Moon and several other prominent Korean political experts, the "Axis of Evil" line in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address caused widespread concern among a large segment of the Korean public. Anti-Americanism has never been prevalent in South Korean society, and is not now, Dr. Moon asserted. Nonetheless, strong reactions to certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy and specific policy-makers had occasionally given rise to "anti-USG" feelings. The opposite was now the case, he said. President Bush's stated desire to establish a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, and U.S. decisions to resolve the BDA issue and negotiate directly with the DPRK have been greeted with widespread approval in Korea. As long as Koreans saw the United States as playing a constructive role in resolving the DPRK nuclear issue, he predicted that anti-U.S. sentiments would not be a factor in the ROK presidential campaign. ¶11. (C) Hyun In-taek, Director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute and a foreign policy advisor to GNP presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak, agreed. He said the USG was "handling itself well in this election year, keeping alliance issues low-key and being supportive and understanding of Korea's situation." Kim Byung-kook of Korea University said the United States was currently doing "a very good job" of managing the Alliance, but emphasized that U.S. influence in the region could best be sustained by adopting "a softer power approach" in the region. Insight Is Key -------------- ¶12. (C) Soberingly, many of the Korean experts we consulted felt that the number of U.S. officials who truly understand Korean society today are far too few and too set in their ways. Professor Kim Tae-hyo, a political scientist from Sungkyunkwan University, called on both countries to intensify their understanding of one another. Many of the Korea experts in the United States he claimed were actually SEOUL 00001216 005 OF 007 more focused on Japan or China, with Korea as their "side job." At the same time, "Korea too lacks true U.S. expertise and suffers for it," Professor Kim opined. Others said American experts tended to rely too heavily on the views of largely U.S.-educated, English-speaking, pro-American interlocutors, and pointed out that such people are no longer calling the shots in Seoul. ¶13. (C) Many urged USG officials not to "over-react" to the changes that have occurred in Korean society, pointing out that change is a part of the normal evolution of a new democracy. That should not be surprising, they said, because the United States has itself experienced similar phases in its evolution, including a period when "revisionism" became popular in American academic circles. They assured us that ROK political views are gradually maturing. The clear consensus was that Koreans still greatly value their security relationship, strong economic ties and close friendship with the United States. What they seek now is to develop a more broadly defined Alliance with the United States that not only provides for continued peace and stability in Northeast Asia, but also helps further integrate the ROK into international peace-keeping and disaster relief efforts that enhance Korea's image in the world. All those we spoke with were supportive of South Korea playing a more global role, although many Koreans they said worry about being dragged into conflicts not of their choosing. ¶14. (C) Dr. Kim Kyung-won, a former ROK Ambassador to the United States who is now a senior editorial writer for JoongAng-ilbo, believes the Alliance must transform as NATO transformed following the end of the Cold War. He said a centrist consensus was emerging in Korea that the U.S.-ROK Alliance needed to change and was strong enough to endure such change without damaging the security posture vis--vis the North Korean threat. He cautioned, however, that such changes needed to be done very carefully - "brick-by-brick" - so the Korean people did not feel the United States was forcing them into a new set of duties and responsibilities, or reducing its commitment to Korea. -------------- SERIES CONCLUSION -------------- ¶15. (C) More than fifteen Korean political and security experts were interviewed for this cable series. Post agrees with their consensus view that the outlook for the U.S.-ROK Alliance is positive, and that rumors of its imminent demise were greatly exaggerated. On the contrary, two million Koreans currently live and work in the United States. A large percentage of Korean households (and an even larger percentage of Korean government officials) have immediate family members and/or relatives visiting, studying or living in the States. U.S. ICE has recently reported that the ROK now has the more students than any other country in the world studying at American schools. American ways are a part of Korean life, and the average Korean likes Americans and fully understands the need for a continuing Alliance with the United States. SEOUL 00001216 006 OF 007 ¶16. (C) Nonetheless, South Korea is a country undergoing significant change. Like all democracies, it has a political pendulum that swings right and left. We believe it is currently poised to swing back toward the center, perhaps even the center-right, by 2008. While that will make Alliance maintenance easier, it is important to visualize that pendulum as sitting atop a railroad car that is moving down the tracks toward the Korean future, and not necessarily going all the way in our direction. In short, Koreans want a close continuing relationship with the United States, but now prefer it be a partnership in which they too more often get their way. ¶17. (C) The ROK military is also undergoing a significant period of modernization, but politically-speaking is not equipped to single-handedly counter the North Korean military threat, especially now that Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons. Even if the National Assembly chooses to fund the approximately 9 percent annual increases in ROK defense spending called for in the DR 2020 plan, the South Korean military will be smallest in Northeast Asia. The ROK will thus continue to need its alliance with the United States for many years, perhaps even decades, to come. Most Koreans understand this and are comfortable with that state of affairs. ¶18. (C) So what will the Alliance look like in 2020? The composite view of those we consulted is that there will be a new U.S. Embassy facility in Seoul. More American business people will be working throughout the Korean economy as a result of more open markets and an expansion in free trade under the KORUS FTA. A robust American air and naval presence will remain in and around the peninsula, but there will be fewer American soldiers stationed on Korean soil. This will be possible because by working with other powerful partners on the right side of history, the Alliance will have succeeded in preventing a dying North Korean regime from spoiling the hard fought peace and prosperity that are so deeply valued by the peoples of the region. In such a bright future, the United States would be seen by the South Korean people less as a convenient punching bag, and more as a partner in peace. END CONCLUSION. List of Experts -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The following political and security policy experts participated in interviews for this series of reports: ¶1. Dr. Lee Hong-koo, Former Prime Minister and ROK Ambassador to the U.S. Current Chair Seoul Forum for International Affairs and advisor to JoongAng-Ilbo. ¶2. Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, Former Foreign Minister. Current professor at Seoul National University. ¶3. Dr. Moon Chung-in, Former Chair of Presidential Committee on East Asia Regional Issues. Current professor at Yonsei University and Ambassador-at-large for International Security Affairs. ¶4. Dr. Kim Sung-han, Professor and Director General for SEOUL 00001216 007 OF 007 American Studies at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). ¶5. Dr. Kim Byung-kook, Professor of Political Science at Korea University and Director of the East-Asia Institute. ¶6. Dr. Kim Kyung-won, Former Ambassador to the U.S. Current JoongAng-Ilbo senior editorial writer. ¶7. Dr. Park Se-il, Former GNP lawmaker. Current professor at Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies. ¶8. Dr. Lho Kyong-soo, Professor of International Politics and Dean of the Office of International Affairs at Seoul National University. ¶9. Dr. Kim Tae-hyo, Professor of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University. ¶10. Dr. Kim Geun-sik, Professor of Political Science at Kyungnam University. ¶11. Dr. Andrei Lankov, Professor of History at Kookmin University. ¶12. Dr. Jeong Se-hyun, Former Unification Minister. Current professor at Ewha University and Chair of the Korean Council of Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC). ¶13. Dr. Kim Yeon-chul, Research professor, Institute for Asian Issues, Korea University. ¶14. Dr. Jeon Bong-keun, Professor at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). ¶15. Dr. Kang Won-taek, Professor of political science at Soongsil University. ¶16. Dr. Hyun In-taek, Director Ilmin International Relations Institute and Professor of Political Science at Korea University. STANTON