THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS (2 OF 3)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 001215

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV PINS MARR MCAP KS KN CH JA
SUBJECT: THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS (2 OF 3)

REF: SEOUL 01211

Classified By: CDA BILL STANTON. REASONS 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the second in a series of cables on
the politics of U.S.-ROK Alliance relations. Reftel A
explored how the ROK perceives its security environment,
concluding that the Korean public and their policy makers are
heavily conflicted when it comes to relations with their
neighboring countries. For most Koreans, however, the
U.S.-ROK Alliance remains central to South Korean security.
But what exactly do the South Koreans want from their
alliance with the United States? According to more than a
dozen Korean security experts interviewed for this report,
the ROK seeks a sense of security from the United States, but
with the caveat that care be taken not to offend Korean pride
in the process. They also revealed great interest in, and
voiced significant doubts about, the "true intentions" of the
United States. In addition, our interlocutors noted the
primacy of economic concerns in Korean security planning.
END SUMMARY

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REPORT 2: THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
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A Sense of Security
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2. (C) The No. 1 answer to the question -- What do South
Koreans want from their Alliance with the United States? --
is that they seeks a "sense of security." Former ROK Foreign
Minister Yoon Young-kwan said that with all due respect to
the other members in the Six-Party Talks, it was the U.S.-ROK
Alliance that remained the key to solving the North Korean
nuclear problem, whether the DPRK ended up having a soft
landing or a hard one. Others with whom we met similarly
took the view that South Korea's sense of security, or
insecurity, largely centered upon its alliance with the
United States. While that response was not surprising in
itself, when they were pressed to define what that "sense of
security" meant to the Korean people, experts' answers
highlighted three main points:

-- Although South Koreans want the security provided by a
continued U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula, it comes
with the powerful caveat that care be taken not to offend
Korean pride in the process.

-- Economic stability decidedly trumped military deterrence,
far more than most Americans realize.

-- Many Koreans question whether U.S. intentions today are
truly aligned with Korean interests. It is thus important to
South Koreans to divine the "true intentions" of the U.S.
Government.

These three elements of what the Korean people want from the
Alliance are elaborated on in more detail below. Taken as a
whole, they indicate the paramount role the U.S. military

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presence continues to play in South Korean national security
planning, and the primacy the Korean public places on the
avoidance of conflict on their land.

Without Sacrificing Pride
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3. (C) If alliance with the United States is so important to
South Korea, why is the ROKG so hard-nosed in negotiations
over the amount of burdensharing it provides to support the
stationing of U.S. Forces in Korea? Why hasn't the ROKG
allowed the United States to build a new Chancery to replace
the current dilapidated building, first constructed in 1958?
Why did they allow the Ministry of Environment to supersede
the SOFA process on camp returns over relatively minor and
disputed incidents of pollution? The answer to these and
other aggravating issues in our relations with South Korea is
that it is precisely because the ROKG must rely upon the USG
as a security guarantor that it is so prickly about
acquiescing to "U.S. demands" until a face-saving way can be
found to accommodate our needs, while preserving their pride.
In the words of Park Se-il, President of the conservative
Hansun Foundation, "The United States is usually seen as
right, but too often as arrogant."


4. (C) With that kind of sentiment shared by many Koreans,
how the ROKG responds to what the USG requests often depends
on how that request is delivered or negotiated. Lee
Hong-koo, a former ROK Ambassador to the United States,
complained that while the ROK's GDP has grown by over 100
percent in just the last generation, Washington too often
treats South Korea as if it were a dependent country. Former
Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, who is now a professor of
international relations at Ewha University, said the United
States still treated South Korea like a small child. These
are exaggerated statements, but the rapid changes that have
occurred in Korean society and politics in recent years have
created a new lense through which the U.S.-ROK relationshp is
viewed. For example, while the Alliance succeeded in
containing the spread of communism on the peninsula, today's
generation of politicians, including President Roh himself,
are highly critical of past ROK authoritarian rulers, and by
extension of U.S. support for those military governments.
For many Koreans, the mere perception of a demanding tone
emanating from Washington harkens back to a time in modern
Korean history that is now very fashionable to discredit.

It's the Economy
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5. (C) Despite heightened emphasis in Korean society on
addressing historical wrongs, it is the present and future
that most Koreans worry about. Like people everywhere, they
seek a brighter economic future for themselves and for their
families. Experts consulted for this report all agreed that
security concerns for the majority of South Korean citizens
are deeply rooted in their economic interests. It is falling
stocks and not falling bombs about which they are most
concerned. In that light, the ROK's engagement policy toward
the North has more to do with preventing economic disaster

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than opening up the DPRK, although many of them hope the
latter will occur as a by-product of South Korean economic
assistance. Like the "Sunshine Policy" before it, President
Roh's "Peace and Prosperity Policy" toward the North is an
insurance policy taken out to protect against hostility.
Many Koreans join him in believing the DPRK is less likely to
engage in hostile actions against the South so long as it is
hearing kind words and receiving significant amounts of aid
from Seoul. One analyst pointed out that the presence of
hundreds of South Korean workers in the North also serves as
an insurance policy against unilateral military action by the
United States.

Divining U.S. Intentions
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6. (C) Directly related to preserving stable South Korean
economic growth is the question of what the U.S. intentions
truly are in the region. Put self-evidently by one of our
interlocutors, as long as U.S. interests are in alignment
with the needs of South Korea, the Alliance will remain
strong. Many voiced concerns, however, that the United
States may be more interested in fighting the global war on
terror. They cautioned that Koreans needed continued
assurances that the United States remains fully committed to
the ROK. Answers to our question -- What does South Korea
want from the Alliance? -- included frequent calls for the
United States to reveal its true intentions (bonshim) and
demonstrate greater consistency in its policy toward North
Korea. For example, former Unification Minister Jeong
challenged the validity of Washington's "zero tolerance"
policy on a nuclear North Korea. He pointed out that before
India and Pakistan became nuclear weapons states, the ROK
believed the United States shared its desire for a
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but that many now question the
true U.S. position.


7. (C) Dr. Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University noted that
differences between Washington and Seoul are not just
differences of perspective, but real differences of interest.
What the ROK wants above all is peace, meaning no conflict
with North Korea, and prosperity, meaning no collapse of the
North either. According to Lankov, the United States wants
peace too, but would welcome a collapse of the North Korean
regime. Similarly, preventing the proliferation of WMD is a
top national security concern for the United States, but is
not really South Korea's primary concern, Lankov added.
Interestingly, other interlocutors argued the opposite --
that the United States could decide to "manage" a
nuclear-armed North Korea, but that this was completely
contrary to South Korea's strategic interests. Others saw a
closer security policy alignment between Washington and
Seoul, but nonetheless pointed out that the order of priority
assigned to those national security interests differed.


8. (C) Many of the experts consulted noted that even when
U.S. intentions were fully in-line with South Korean
interests, it was still important for the United States to
make sure its policies were clearly understood in the ROK.
Transparency in U.S. foreign policy thinking about North

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Korea, China and Japan remain critically important pieces of
information to the ROK. In addition to wanting no surprises
from Washington, the ROKG prefers that the tempo of U.S.
relations with other countries in the region not exceed, or
lag behind its own pace. For example, while welcoming recent
U.S. policy decisions regarding North Korea, Seoul worries
about being left behind. That is why the ROKG has been
stating publicly that its policy toward North Korea will move
forward "one half-step behind" progress in the Six-Party
Talks. Such statements carry the double meaning that Seoul
expects Washington will similarly calibrate the pace of its
policy decisions with those of its allies.


9. (C) In the end, South Koreans are less concerned over the
number of U.S. troops in Korea, or the structure of those
forces, than having a strong sense of U.S. support.
According to Dr. Kim Byung-kook of Korea University, "the
greatest threat to Korea and the Alliance is from fatigue and
frustration in Washington." Dr. Kim, former Foreign Minister
Yoon, and others urged the U.S. Government to develop a more
effective public diplomacy approach toward South Korea,
packaging its message to the Korean people in ways that would
reassure them, while at the same time preventing them from
feeling bullied or put upon.
STANTON