NSC DIRECTOR CHA'S 4/12 MEETING WITH PARK SUN-WON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001126 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC KS KN SUBJECT: NSC DIRECTOR CHA'S 4/12 MEETING WITH PARK SUN-WON Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 12, NSC Director for Asian Affairs Victor Cha met with Park Sun-won, Secretary to the President for National Security Strategy, to provide a readout of the April 8-11 visit to North Korea by New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Former Secretary of Veteran's Affairs Anthony Principi. Cha said that he used several meetings with Vice Foreign Minister and DPRK lead 6PT negotiator Kim Gye-gwan to urge the DPRK to take steps to meet its February 13 obligations by the April 14 deadline now that the BDA issue was resolved. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During an April 12 meeting with Park Sun-won, Secretary to the President for National Security Strategy, SIPDIS NSC Asian Affairs Director Victor Cha provided impressions from his April 8-11 visit to North Korea as part of the bipartisan delegation led by New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Former Secretary of Veteran's Affairs Anthony Principi. While the primary objective of the delegation's visit was to facilitate the return of remains of missing American servicemen, Director Cha was invited to meet separately with high-level DPRK interlocutors to discuss the Six-Party Talks. -------------- RETURN OF REMAINS -------------- ¶3. (C) Cha explained that the delegation's April 8-11 visit to the DPRK was to facilitate the return of remains of missing American servicemen. The DPRK returned what it said was six sets of U.S. remains, did not charge anything for their return, and the handover proceeded well. In this regard, the visit was successful. -------------- SIX-PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶4. (C) Cha said to Park that he was asked to meet separately with Kim Gye-gwan on several occasions during the delegation's stay. He used these meetings to explain the U.S. Treasury's statement on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) that essentially unblocked the BDA funds and reset the clock to August 2005. Cha had insisted that the issue was now resolved, the USG had met the DPRK's position, and now all sides should move onto other things. Kim had responded that once the DPRK could confirm that the BDA issue had been resolved, then the DPRK would send a fax inviting the IAEA to send its inspectors to the DPRK, per the shutdown agreement. ¶5. (C) Cha suggested to VFM Kim that the DPRK send someone to the bank in Macao to confirm that the DPRK had access to its financial accounts. Cha made clear that Saturday, April 14, was the 60-day deadline of the February 13 agreement and insisted that the DPRK needed to act in some fashion, perhaps by faxing the IAEA, meeting with A/S Hill, or returning to the Six-Party Talks. However, if there were no action, that would be bad. Asked by Park if the DPRK mentioned to where it might want to transfer its funds, Cha said that the DPRK at this point should just focus on getting access to its accounts. This was the DPRK demand that had held up the Six-Party Talks. ¶6. (C) Park interjected that he understood why Kim Gye-gwan was being so cautious and that Kim must be under severe pressure to confirm and reconfirm before taking any action that might embarrass the DPRK government. For example, if the Foreign Ministry sent someone to Macao, but if for some unknown technical reason the DPRK were unable to secure its funds, then perhaps heads would roll in the Foreign Ministry. Park suggested that the USG consider pursuing the MMA to contact the DPRK. As in North-South channels, the DPRK generally did not provide new ideas. Instead, it generally was up to the ROK to make suggestions, to provide a menu of options for the DPRK to choose from. Simply waiting on the DPRK was less productive, he said. -------------- NEXT DPRK FOREIGN MINISTER? -------------- ¶7. (C) Cha asked whom Park thought might replaced the late Paek Nam-sun as DPRK Foreign Minister. Park said that the front runner was First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu, who was doing the work as Acting Foreign Minister. Kang had the diplomatic experience to do the job, but Park said that he thought Kang lacked the political power, especially in connection to the National Defense Commission (NDC),to finally secure the job as Foreign Minister. Park said that he had heard that a new name might be put forward at the Special People's Assembly, perhaps someone like Kim Yong-gun who was a counselor at the NDC. Up until now the NDC had not focused on foreign affairs, but someone outside of MOFA might become Foreign Minister, Park speculated. -------------- ATMOSPHERICS -------------- ¶8. (C) Cha noted that the delegation stayed at the Presidential Guest House and was generally well-treated. ¶9. (C) One aspect of the delegation's trip that was less than welcomed, however, was the DPRK decision to take Governor Richardson and Former Secretary Pricipi on a tour of the U.S.S. Pueblo. Cha and other USG officials declined the invitation to avoid possible propaganda opportunities, Cha said. ¶10. (C) Cha observed that while the city of Pyongyang seemed busy, once the delegation left the capital to drive to the Demilitarized Zone there was little to see. In the capital, people some eight-deep were waiting to use public payphones on the main city street and even more people were in line waiting, some 30-50 deep, to use public transportation. This stood in stark contrast to what the delegation saw as it traveled two hours, mainly by highway, to the DMZ. Cha said that during two hours of highway driving, he saw only four other cars on the trip. Once the delegation was south of Pyongyang, there was only a poor and barren places, even the hills were denuded of trees, presumably for energy resources. STANTON