AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 27 MEETING WITH HARIS SILAJDZIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000946 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017 TAGS: BK PGOV PREL SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 27 MEETING WITH HARIS SILAJDZIC Classified By: CDA Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador met with Bosniak Presidency member Haris Silajdzic on April 27. Silajdzic who had recently returned from a visit to Doha briefed on a USD 100 million Qatari fund for investment in Bosnia and asserted he was attempting to refocus the Presidency on economic development issues. Silajdzic said the Srebrenica controversy remained emotional and could "get ugly" if not resolved soon with a meaningful measures such as granting the municipality special legal status. Silajdzic raised, for the first time, a proposal to address the "history of genocide in Bosnia" by changing the name of the Republika Srpska (RS) claiming that the name of the entity legitimized ethnic cleansing. On police reform Silajdzic suggested that the parties could keep the SAA process alive by agreeing to accept the national-level portion of the draft police structure and return to the issue of local policing at a later date. The Ambassador replied that such an agreement would still not put Bosnia in compliance with EU SAA requirements. In a discussion of constitutional reform Silajdzic stated outright that he remained opposed to the March package adding that Serb support for entity voting shows that the RS seeks to preserve "isolation and ghettoization" in Bosnia. The Ambassador pointed out that Silajdzic's divisive, maximalist position threatened to consign Bosnia to permanent political deadlock. Silajdzic replied that his bottom line was "a better deal," asserted he would pursue it as long as it took but refused to be drawn out on his political vision. End Summary. Qatari Investment: New Economic Focus? -------------- ¶2. (C) Silajdzic opened the meeting with a briefing on his recent visit to Qatar where he met with the Qatari Prime Minister and also briefly with visiting UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Silajdzic confirmed press reports on the establishment of a USD 100 million Qatari investment fund for both public and private projects in Bosnia. Silajdzic asserted that during a recent Tri-Presidency meeting to discuss the Qatari fund the Presidency members agreed to put political disagreements "on hold" to focus on economic issues. Bosnia has obvious political problems but they should not be allowed to block critical economic development, Silajdzic said. However, Bosnia will need the help of the United States to bypass the current political deadlock and turn national attention to economic issues. He acknowledged that there are currently very few potential projects for the Qatari investment fund but raised Corridor 5-C as a possibility. The Ambassador reminded Silajdzic that Corridor 5-C would very likely require World Bank and IMF financing and would therefore involve a lengthy tender process. Bosnia should be prepared for this by preparing the necessary feasibility studies and political consensus. Srebrenica -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed with Silajdzic USG assistance projects in Srebrenica and mission outreach with political leaders in the wake of ICJ-related tensions. The Ambassador noted he had recently spoken to Milorad Dodik who had tabled concrete proposals for the municipality and had made some helpful statements on the Britannic burial controversy. Silajdzic thanked the Ambassador and the USG for the measures but said the issue remained emotional one which could "get ugly" if not resolved soon. The Federation and State governments had appropriated a small sum of about USD one million for Srebrenica projects but economic and humanitarian steps alone will not resolve the problem. A comprehensive solution will also require a symbolic component as well, Silajdzic said. For example, a Bosniak police chief in Srebrenica and Serbia's delivery of war crimes suspects to The Hague would be important steps towards reconciliation. Silajdzic pointed out that he had attempted to address the latter by proposing a diplomatic note to Serbia that had had resulted in a Radmanovic veto. The most important symbolic element, however, would be granting special legal status to Srebrenica. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Silajdzic to explain his concept of special status for Srebrenica. Silajdzic evaded the question replying only that "genocide victims deserve special administrative status." Silajdzic said he would be unwavering in his support for state-level legislation creating a special status for Srebrenica but promised not to "throw oil on the fire." The Ambassador pointed out that pressing forward on Srebrenica legislation at this sensitive SARAJEVO 00000946 002 OF 003 time was precisely the sort of political issue that could jeopardize the new economic focus that Silajdzic had proposed. Silajdzic: Change the Name of the Republika Srpska -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In an unusual departure from his previous position on the abolishing RS, Silajdzic stated that the legacy of Srebrenica, which had been returned to international attention by the ICJ verdict, could be conclusively resolved by changing the name of the Republika Srpska. Renaming the RS, and therefore addressing the ethnic cleansing implicit in its name, would also obviate the need to grant Srebrenica special status. Silajdzic claimed he had already floated this idea with Milorad Dodik, who had promised to "consider it." Silajdzic said a name change would be cosmetic, and not result any significant change in the in the ethnic makeup or political structure of the RS but would be an effective means to acknowledge the history of genocide in Bosnia. Silajdzic said that, like the Federation, the name of the Republika Srpska should not refer to only one of the constituent peoples but should be inclusive. He suggested that a name such as "the Republic of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats" would be acceptable. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador remarked that this was the kind of divisive, maximalist position that A/S Fried had warned against during his April 4 visit. The Ambassador pointed out that unless Silajdzic was willing to adopt a politically realistic strategy on constitutional, police reforms, Srebrenica, the name of the RS, and entity voting he would consign Bosnia to permanent political deadlock. The Ambassador asked Silajdzic if he could articulate a timeline for his political goals or would hold out indefinitely. Silajdzic replied that his bottom line was "a better deal," asserted he would pursue it as long as it took but refused to be drawn out on his political vision. In response to questions from the Ambassador Silajdzic said he would not support a third entity but would support a Bosnia of regions "very similar to the plan put forward by the Catholic Church." Silajdzic acknowledged that the elimination of entity voting was a key component of his strategy. He stated that if this was a maximalist position "then I am sorry" but the "very existence of the Republika Srpska is a maximalist position." Police Reform -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that Milorad Dodik had made significant concessions on police reform but could not be expected compromise alone. He urged Silajdzic to accept the March 14 proposal pointing out that the term "RS Police" in the text would quickly cease to have any operational meaning in the new police structure. Silajdzic reiterated his resolve to eliminate the term from any agreement on police reform. He suggested, however, that the parties could accept the national-level, portion of the draft organigram and return to the contentious issue of local policing at a later date. Such an agreement would allow the EC to save face and keep the SAA process alive for the moment, Silajdzic said. The Ambassador replied that the issue of local policing was a key element of the three EC principles and an interim agreement on the national structure alone would not put Bosnia in compliance with EU SAA requirements. New York Ceremony -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked about plans to convene a commemoration of the UN recognition of Bosnian independence on May 21 at the Bosnian mission in New York. Silajdzic acknowledged that the event was in the planning stages and asserted that the Presidency reached a formal consensus approving the proposal. The event would involve a reception at the Bosnian mission, a press conference and speeches by each of the three Presidency members. Silajdzic promised to "be reserved and nice in my remarks" and not "cause problems for Radmanovic." Silajdzic said he hoped the Presidency would also meet with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Silajdzic also intimated he planned to visit Washington from May 22-24 for meetings with Congress and an address at a Council on Foreign Relations event and said he would also be requesting appointments with USG officials. Constitutional Reform -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the High Representative is eager to begin implementing plans for a constitutional reform secretariat. The USG is willing to take part in the project SIPDIS SARAJEVO 00000946 003 OF 003 but it will be up to Bosnians to negotiate the substance of the reforms. Silajdzic stated flatly that he remained firmly opposed to the March package. Silajdzic embarked on a lengthy digression cataloging complaints about the constitutional reform process including the international community's failure to explain "democratic standards." Silajdzic stated that Serb parties' insistence on preserving entity voting demonstrated that while Bosniaks want integration and moderation, the RS is seeking isolation and ghettoization. Silajdzic also returned to the recommendations of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe as a justification for his opposition to the March package. The Ambassador pointed out that in comparison with the endorsement of EU member state governments, objections of the Council of Europe and the EP were not substantive. CEFKIN