BOSNIA: FOREIGN MINISTER ALKALAJ SHOULD HEAR A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000935 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017 TAGS: BK PGOV PREL SUBJECT: BOSNIA: FOREIGN MINISTER ALKALAJ SHOULD HEAR A STRONG MESSAGE IN WASHINGTON REF: A. SARAJEVO 863 ¶B. SARAJEVO 791 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Bosnian Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj arrives in Washington April 30 for a week-long visit. Having served as the Bosnian Ambassador to the U.S (1994- 2000), Alkalaj is no stranger to Washington, but this will be his first U.S. visit as Foreign Minister. Although he assumed his current post with a great ambition to reform the Ministry, it remains largely ineffective and compartmentalized among competing ethnic interests. Unfortunately, Alkalaj himself has served more as a defender of Tri-Presidency member Haris Silajdzic,s positions. It will be critical that he hear from his USG interlocutors a strong message on the need to exercise responsible national leadership and to start becoming part of the solution in countering Haris Silajdzic,s destructive radicalization of the national POLITICAL discourse. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Alkalaj, who, in his role as NATO Ambassador (2004-2007) played a genuinely constructive role in Bosnia,s defense reform process, will be well-prepared to discuss status of this reform and Bosnia,s Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) program. We expect he will also be eager to discuss Kosovo status. Although he has generally expressed confidence that a Kosovo settlement will not adversely affect BiH, he more recently evinced to us some concern that Serbian government officials had started to suggest that imposition of the Ahtisaari plan would spark regional instability. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) FM Sven Alkalaj is scheduled to visit Washington April 30-May 4. At State, in addition to his meeting with A/S Fried, he has asked to meet with Undersecretary Burns and has expressed the hope for a brief drop-by with the Secretary. Outside State, he is seeking meetings at the NSC, SIPDIS DOD and with several members of Congress, including the SFRC majority and minority leaders. He will also attend a dinner hosted by the American Jewish Council and meet with representatives of the Bosnia diaspora. -------------- Foreign Ministry as Agent of Silajdzic -------------- ¶4. (C) Alkalaj is a member of Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and a close confidant of the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency. (Note: It was Silajdzic who initially persuaded Alkalaj to leave his successful business career to serve as Ambassador to the U.S. in 1994). Alkalaj,s appointment as FM this past January was initially hailed by the international community. Through his service as Bosnian ambassador to the U.S. and later NATO, Alkalaj had burnished a reputation as an intelligent, effective diplomatic professional. It was also hoped that Alkalaj,s status as a minority (Alkalaj is Jewish) -- and therefore not a member of any of Bosnia,s three constituent peoples -- would enhance his ability to bridge parochial ethnic interests. However, in his role as Foreign Minister, Alkalaj has served less as the executor of Bosnian foreign policy than as a defender of Silajdzic's interests. Specifically, Alkalaj has been active in explaining SBiH opposition to the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional reforms and Silajdzic's recent efforts to block a police reform agreement (Ref A). That said, Alkalaj is aware that Silajdzic's policies are beginning to strain Bosnia's bilateral RELATIONS with third countries. He often attempts to downplay Silajdzic's rhetoric by asserting that Silajdzic is at heart a Western-oriented reformer with a strong affinity for the United States. Alkalaj has the necessary confidence of, and access to, Silajdzic to be able accurately convey messages, including negative ones. In that context should be used as a conduit to express USG concern over Silajdzic and SBiH positions. Nonetheless, Alkalaj appears to have little ability to moderate Silajdzic's actions. ¶5. (C) Silajdzic has repeatedly tried to use Alkalaj to attempt to marginalize Serb Tri-Presidency member Nebojsa Radmanovic and engineer confrontations with the Republika Srpska. In January, at the instruction of Silajdzic, Alkalaj nullified an existing bilateral agreement with Serbia on dual citizenship citing the breakup of Serbia and Montenegro. Silajdzic has also plunged the Presidency into crisis by tabling a proposal to instruct Alkalaj to convey a bilateral message to Serbia demanding action on the International Court SARAJEVO 00000935 002 OF 003 of Justice Verdict (Ref A),forcing Radmanovic to veto the instruction. Most recently, we have learned that n Silajdzic will ask Alkalaj to instruct Bosnia's UN Mission in New York to convene a May 21 ceremony, to be attended by all three Presidency members, commemorating the anniversary of U.S. recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision and preparations were made without informing Serb Presidency member Radmanovic and appears to be an additional attempt by Silajdzic to put him off balance and precipitate an open conflict. -------------- Alkalaj Expecting Stern Message -------------- ¶6. (C) On April 24 DCM previewed Alkalaj's visit to Washington and underscored that his USG interlocutors will expect to discuss concrete options for resuming the reform process in Bosnia. Alkalaj is aware of USG concerns over the growing nationalism paralyzing Bosnian politics having received a stern message from A/S Fried on April 4. (Ref B) However, Alkalaj offered no new ideas on ways forward and returned to familiar Silajdzic formulations such as opening the March package to a review by constitutional experts and opposition to entity voting. On police reform, he stated flatly that Silajdzic "will not budge" on his demand to bar any reference to "the RS police" in a Police Reform agreement. Post suggests that Department officials reiterate to Alkalaj that the current policies of his party and party President are not serving the interest of Bosnian citizens and will only further complicate U.S.-Bosnian relations. -------------- Kosovo and Regional Security -------------- ¶7. (C) Alkalaj will be prepared to discuss regional issues, particularly Kosovo. On April 24 Alkalaj briefed the DCM on his recent bilateral visit to Serbia noting President Boris Tadic's public statement that Serbia respects the territorial integrity of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Alkalaj highlighted the statement as an illustration that no one in the region expects Kosovo status to impact the domestic political situation of Bosnia. He stated that all parties in Bosnia are prepared for, and expect Kosovo independence and believed that the public reaction would be minimal. Nonetheless, it will be difficult for Bosnia to immediately recognize an independent Kosovo due to public pressure on Serb parties. Alkalaj said that further delay in settling Kosovo status, rather than independence, is a greater threat to internal stability in Bosnia and that a resolution would contribute to normalizing the POLITICAL dialogue here. (Note: On April 26 Alkalaj shared with us a Serbian government non-paper opposing the Ahtisaari plan. He told us that the paper had been provided to him by a "friendly Middle Eastern diplomat," who had reported that when the paper was delivered in his capital the Serbian Ambassador had stressed that imposition of the Ahtisaari plan had the potential to disrupt regional stability. Therefore, Washington interlocutors may find Alkalaj somewhat less sanguine about the proposed Kosovo settlement. End Note.) ¶8. (C) As former NATO Ambassador, Alkalaj is well-versed in political-military and regional security issues and was a staunch advocate for Bosnia's membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Alkalaj is a strong supporter of defense reform and has good RELATIONS with former Defense Minister and incoming NATO ambassador Nikola Radovanovic. In this context he will be well briefed on, and supportive of Bosnia's continued integration into trans-Atlantic security architecture. -------------- MFA Remains Dysfunctional -------------- ¶9. (C) Prior to assuming the role of Foreign Minister, Alkalaj, articulated a compelling vision of his intention to transform Bosnia's dysfunctional Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a cohesive and modern agency. Since taking office, however, he has been stymied by budget shortfalls, rigid hiring systems coupled with the continued requirements for ethnic quotas, and the persistent tendency of Ministry staff, including Alkalaj himself, to use their diplomatic perches to guard the POLITICAL interests of the constituent group they represents. As a result, the Ministry remains severely handicapped in its efforts to articulate and implement a SARAJEVO 00000935 003 OF 003 cohesive foreign policy vision for Bosnia. MCELHANEY