BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC CONTINUES TO PROVOKE POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000863 SIPDIS SIPDIS SKOPJE FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI; NSC FOR BRAUN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE; SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC CONTINUES TO PROVOKE POLITICAL CRISIS REF: A. SARAJEVO 753 ¶B. SARAJEVO 832 ¶C. SARAJEVO 808 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since he returned to Bosnian politics during last year's elections, Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Siladjic has actively worked toward creating a Bosniak Muslim rejectionist front that, in his words to the Ambassador, "will stand up to the Serbs and be as obstructionist as they are." In doing so, Siladjic has radicalized the political dialogue here. His election campaign was based on defeating the US brokered constitutional amendments that in his words "supported genocide because the Serb entity was not abolished in that process." His approach directly challenges Dayton, both in the case of constitutional reform, and in the case of Srebrenica. With an ICJ decision that did not directly charge Serbia with the crime, Siladjic has pedaled the story that "Republika Srpska is guilty, and the international community must now take action against it." He is behind the movement in Srebrenica to raise tensions there, peddling the line that unless the city can be extracted from the RS, returnees should pick up and leave. He has refused to compromise on a police reform that will make possible the signing of an association agreement with the EU. Recently, he pushed through a resolution in the three-person presidency, opposed by the Serb but supported by the Croat, which "demands" that Belgrade implement the ICJ decision in full. This 2-1 decision has occasioned a veto process in the Repulika Srpska assembly, which will begin April 23. In light of press stories that evidence in ICTY custody would have supported an ICJ guilty verdict against Belgrade, Siladjic is talking about taking the Bosnian case to the UN Security Council. It is increasingly clear that Siladjic's agenda, rather than to get a better deal for Bosniaks, is to raise political tensions to the point that: the international community presence will remain, thereby maintaining control over the Serbs; the Dayton constitution will be scrapped, and its authors will be "obliged" to negotiate a "fair" deal, including abolition of the odious Serb entity and creation of a unitary state (under Muslim majority control). The time has come to focus our attention on Siladjic, who unchecked, will only work to worsen the situation. END SUMMARY ICJ Verdict Prompts Standoff at the Presidency -------------- - ¶2. (C) The fallout from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict that genocide occurred in Srebrenica from about July 13, 1995 onward continues. The latest row erupted late Friday afternoon, April 13 when Serb Tri-Presidency member Nebojsa Radmanovic announced his decision to veto a Presidency decision instructing the MFA to "demand" that Serbia honor its commitments under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Radmanovic objected to the decision's undiplomatic language and the process by which is was adopted (i.e., by a 2-1 decision with Serbs in the minority; Croat Zeljko Komsic and Bosniak as well as author Haris Silajdzic supported it). He also told us privately that he believed Silajdzic's real aim in pushing for the decision was to create a pretext for FM Alkalaj to take punitive action against Serbia, if it fails to comply with the Bosnian "demand." For the past week, we have sought to build consensus within the Presidency around alternative language that was more diplomatic and more consistent with the ICJ's proposed remedy (i.e., cooperation by Serbian authorities with The Hague). Though both Radmanovic and Komsic expressed a willingness to compromise, Silajdzic flatly refused. The Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA) will meet on April 23 to consider Radmanovic's veto, and will no doubt sustain it. Silajdzic Quietly Planning Appeal to the UN -------------- ¶3. (C) Silajdzic likely sees an RSNA veto as a political win, even if it costs him the April 11 Presidency decision. A veto would undoubtedly create political problems for Bosnian SARAJEVO 00000863 002.2 OF 003 Serbs, who would have a difficult time deflecting charges that they are opposed to Serbian cooperation with The Hague, for example. A veto would also underscore Silajdzic's contention that Dayton's entity/ethnic-based structures do not work and must be eliminated. Regardless of the outcome in the RSNA, Silajdzic has said he would take Bosnia's ICJ-related grievances to the UN Security Council (UNSC). In theory, this would require yet another Presidency decision, but Silajdzic, with FM Alaklaj's help, could bypass the government's decision-making apparatus and go directly to the UN, just as former PM Terzic did in late 2006 when he addressed the UNSC without the government's approval. Either scenario presents Silajdzic with yet another opportunity to provoke a Bosniak-Serb political crisis. ¶4. (C) Separately, Silajdzic has publicly seized on media reports that the ICJ did not have access to all archived Yugoslav documents to call for new a new ICJ case. In an open letter published in the Croatian daily Jutarnji List, former ICTY Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice claimed that Carla Del Ponte's negotiations with Serbia over submitting documents to the Milosevic trial constituted "collusion" with Belgrade that, in turn, resulted in a suppression of evidence in the recent ICJ case. The letter followed a New York Times article, which received wide coverage in the Bosnian press, asserting that the ICJ verdict failed to consider key documents related to Serbia's role in the 1992-95 war. Silajdzic has argued that the alleged incomplete nature of the available evidence is grounds for reopening or refiling the ICJ case, which Serbs have already vowed to block. Silajdzic's arguments have resonated with Bosniaks, who were already angry and bitter over the initial verdict. Srebrenica (and Bratunac) - Exploiting Bosniak Victims -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The latest controversies over the ICJ verdict come against the backdrop of a general radicalization among Bosniaks, particularly in the Eastern RS, where the Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing campaign was most vicious and genocide took place. Silajdzic continues to claim that the ICJ concluded the RS was responsible for the genocide in and around Srebrenica (though the Court did not) and that as a consequence of this the RS must be abolished. Silajdzic's vigorous campaign for Srebrenica's secession is an effort to provoke a political crisis over the Dayton territorial settlement; his accusations that Srebrenica's Bosniaks had "once again been abandoned" is an attempt to drive a wedge between Bosniaks and the international community and further radicalize Bosniaks. Our response (i.e., shifting focus to practical steps Bosnia's political leaders could take to improve the lives of all Srebrenica's citizens),has finally begun to defuse some of the political heat over Srebrenica, but Silajdzic continues to search for opportunities to provoke political crisis that would further radicalize Bosniaks. ¶6. (C) The planned May 12 burial of 98 of the 603 Bonsiak victims from the 1992 Bratunac massacre at a mosque in the municipality may provide Silajdzic with just such an opportunity. The burial is strongly opposed by Bratunac Serbs, most of whom are members of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) or other Serb radical parties, and municipal officials have sought to place one road block after another in front of the victims' families. On April 18, Bosnian Islamic leader Reis Ceric visited Bratunac and publicly asserted that Bosniaks, although traditionally a peaceful and tolerant people, are rapidly losing patience, adding that events in Bratunac explained why Bosniaks wanted to abolish the RS. We are working closely with OHR and officials in Banja Luka to resolve the looming crisis and allow the families to bury their loved ones, but radical Serb bigotry and some Sarajevo-based Bosniaks' interest in provoking a crisis could produce some ugly scenes on May 12. Kosovo: What is Good for the Goose... -------------- ¶7. (C) Undersecretary Burns' April 17 testimony on Kosovo SARAJEVO 00000863 003 OF 003 status before the House Foreign Affairs Committee received prominent coverage here and has returned the issue of Kosovo independence to the forefront of public debate in Bosnia. Local commentators have begun to speculate that the U.S. might unilaterally recognize Kosovo's independence and the resulting impact on Bosnian stability. The day before the Undersecretary's testimony, Milorad Zivkovic (SNSD),Serb Deputy Speaker of the State House of Representatives was quoted in an uncharacteristically abrasive statement as saying "over the past fifteen years it is the Serbs who have lived through the worst and most ruthless ethnic cleansing. It is great cynicism to mention ethnic cleansing in the moment when Kosovo is happening." We anticipate that unhelpful speculation over the direction of U.S. Kosovo policy will prove a tempting outlet for Serb politicians to counter calls for Srebrenica secession. ¶8. (C) But Bosnian Serb politicians are not the only concern. Several Bosniaks, including some of Silajdzic's advisors, have privately raised a much different parallel between Kosovo and Bosnia. They ask how the U.S. can justify responding so forcefully to Serbia's ethnic cleansing/genocidal campaign in Kosovo, but allow the results of a similar (and far more deadly) ethnic cleansing/genocidal campaign in Bosnia to remain enshrined in the Dayton constitution. These Bosniaks argue that the U.S. and the international community have a moral obligation to reverse the results of the 1992-1995 war and eliminate the RS. To the best of our knowledge, Silajdzic and his allies have not made such arguments publicly, but this is very much their line. We are also wary that Silajdzic may use the "Kosovo recognition" issue as a club with which to provoke Bosnian Serbs, who have repeatedly warned us not to press the recognition question. OHR and EU Absent -------------- ¶9. (C) Since the ICJ verdict OHR, with the exception of PDHR Gregorian, have remained largely silent on the developing controversies. Although High Representative Schwarz-Schilling has attempted to intervene in both the Srebrenica secession initiative and the Presidency veto, he been either ignored or publicly ridiculed. Schwarz-Schilling is aware of the dangers posed by Silajdzic, but Schwarz-Schilling's past performance has so discreditted him that he is no longer capable of positively shaping the Bosnian political environment. The European performance has been little better. Though privately concerned about developments in Bosnia, the EU and EU Ambassadors are reluctant to express these concerns forcefully in private or even allude to them publicly. They have also been prone to get bogged down in process issues and/or legal questions rather than focus on the core policy challenge Silajdzic now poses. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Silajdzic's insistence on provoking political crises has sucked what little post-election momentum existed for reform out of Bosnian politics. It is becoming increasingly clear to us that crisis, rather than "a better political deal," is his real agenda. The Ambassador, reiterating A/S Fried's strong message to Siljadzic on April 4, has told him privately that this must stop, and he has also warned other Bosniak political leaders that Silajdzic's agenda, which they have signed on to (more out of fear than conviction),will lead Bosniaks nowhere. We are now talking with OHR and our European colleagues about ratcheting up the pressure on Silajdzic and actively seeking to draw other Bosniak leaders away from him. This will also require our working to resolve political disputes Silajdzic seeks to exploit as well as keeping the Bosnian Serbs in line, some of whom would be eager to aggravate any tension between the international community and the Bosniaks. By separate message, we are sending proposals for U.S./European joint initiatives to convince Silajdzic to change course. MCELHANEY