BOSNIA SUPPORTIVE OF IRAQ STRATEGY, SEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000084 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL BK IZ SUBJECT: BOSNIA SUPPORTIVE OF IRAQ STRATEGY, SEEKS CLARIFICATION ON DEPLOYMENTS REF: A) STATE 3592 B) 06 SARAJEVO 3159 C) 06 SARAJEVO 2908 Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Chairman of the Tri-Presidency Nebojsha Radmanovic told CDA that Bosnia was supportive of the new Iraq strategy, and noted Bosnia's continued support for Global War on Terror (GWOT) activities. Radmanovic cited the deployment of Bosnia's explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) units to Iraq as a symbol of support to the mission, but requested further clarification on what would be requested of future Bosnian deployments. Radmanovic's query on this issue has also been echoed by senior defense leaders, who seek to manage a future Iraq deployment in a changed political environment. BOSNIA SUPPORTS STRATEGY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) CDA briefed Chairman of the Tri-Presidency Nebojsha Radmanovic on the President's new Iraq strategy per reftel A. Radmanovic thanked CDA for the briefing, saying that the personal outreach on the initiative was informative and appreciated. Radmanovic confirmed Bosnian support for bringing stability to Iraq, and stated that the new strategy was a "justified approach" to this end. Radmanovic said that the United States could always count on Bosnia's support in the GWOT. Radmanovic also raised "personal" questions as to the timetable for the new strategy and the level of support among other coalition partners. CLARIFICATION ON BOSNIAN DEPLOYMENTS -------------- ¶3. (C) Radmanovic stated that Bosnia's deployment of the EOD unit to Iraq (now in its fourth rotation) signified Bosnia's strong support for the mission. The president noted that he and his two colleagues closely followed news from the EOD unit, and attached the highest importance to this deployment. Radmanovic requested an update on plans for future deployments, and how the EOD unit "fit into the planning of the increased activities in Iraq." CDA pledged to provide the presidency with any requests for further deployments or an enhancement of the current mission as soon as they were known. ¶4. (C) Radmanovic's queries on the issue of future deployments to Iraq echo what we have heard over the past several weeks within the Bosnian political and defense establishment. Senior members of the civilian and uniformed defense leadership have sought clarification about the need for, and configuration of, a fifth EOD rotation. The current deployment, the fourth, will end in May. In discussions with Ambassador in December (reftel B),Defense Minister Radovanovic noted that he and his staff have heard conflicting reports on what would be required, and said that he understood that the EOD unit was no longer needed in Iraq. In this light, the minister suggested that it may be time to consider deploying the EOD unit(s) to ISAF operations in Afghanistan, where he understood that their services could greatly contribute to the mission. Chairman of the Joint Staff Lt. Gen. Podzic has also asked whether the U.S. would like the EOD unit to deploy for a fifth rotation as well as whether security support personnel would be required. Podzic hinted the latter may be problematic and in that context he raised the possibility of the EOD deploying to Afghanistan. COMMENT: POLITICAL CLIMATE REQUIRES EARLY, SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The requests for early consultation on the deployments are colored by the realization that the Bosnian political climate has shifted in the past year. Bosniak politics has become more nationalist and shifted to the right (reftel C). There has been a corresponding rise in opposition to U.S. policies associated with the GWOT, including Iraq. With this in mind, Presidency approval of a fifth rotation to Iraq will require sustained lobbying on our part, and the earlier we can engage on the issue with a clear request the greater our chances for success. CEFKIN