BOSNIA - BOSNIAK LEADERSHIP DISMISSES WARNINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000706 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK LEADERSHIP DISMISSES WARNINGS OVER SREBRENICA REF: A. SARAJEVO 686 ¶B. SARAJEVO 677 ¶C. SARAJEVO 606 ¶D. SARAJEVO 579 ¶E. SARAJEVO 556 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 29, the Ambassador and High Representative Schwarz Schilling met with the Bosniak political leadership to express their concern about growing political tensions over Srebrenica. They stressed the international community's commitment to helping Srebrenica residents and urged the Bosniaks to focus on practical steps they might take to improve their lives as well. The Bosniaks criticized the HighRep and chastised the international community for neglecting Srebrenica for 12 years. They claimed that they had no choice but to respond to the will of their constituents. They informed the Ambassador and the HighRep that they planned to table a constitutional amendment in parliament that would ultimately allow Srebrenica to secede from Republika Srpska. The Ambassador warned that risked provoking a serious political crisis that threatened the stability of Bosnia and the Dayton territorial settlement, but the Bosniaks replied that they would "rather fight in parliament than in the streets." END SUMMARY U.S./OHR Warn Bosniaks Over Srebrenica -------------- ¶2. (C) At a meeting with Bosniak political leaders (Haris Silajdzic, Sulejman Tihic and Zlatko Lagumdzija),the Ambassador and High Representative Schwarz-Schilling warned that the Srebrenica Municipal Council's March 24 resolution threatening to secede from the RS if conditions for special status are not met by July 11 had dangerously raised the political temperature in Bosnia. Schwarz-Schilling repeated his March 27 warning that if the municipal assembly were to act on this, then he would have no choice but to take robust action (Ref A). Threats of secession are not acceptable, no matter who issues them, he added. Bosniak political leaders needed to take steps to calm the situation over Srebrenica and address the issues that will make a difference for people there, the Ambassador stressed. ¶3. (C) We all want the same things for Srebrenica, a sustainable return process, economic development, and robust judicial proceedings that lead to justice for the victims, the Ambassador and Schwarz-Schilling continued. Schwarz-Schilling informed the Bosniaks that the PIC Steering Board Ambassadors (SBA) had agreed to form a working group, chaired by OHR, to address these issues. At the same time, Federation politicians needed examine steps they might take, such as amending entity and cantonal health, pension, and veterans benefit laws, in order to make life easier for returnees. The Ambassador and Schwarz-Schilling also encouraged Bosniak leaders to support proposals by RS PM Dodik to assist Srebrenica as Srebrenica Mayor Malkic has done, including Srebrenica's designation as a special economic zone. Bosniaks United in Defiance -------------- ¶4. (C) Bosniak leaders responded in turn, but the points they made were virtually identical. They claimed that the international community's failure over the last 12 years to address the situation in Srebrenica, rather than their actions or those of their councilors in Srebrenica, was responsible for the current crisis there. The Bosniaks challenged the HighRep's assertion that the Municipal Council's resolution was unconstitutional or ant-Dayton and chastised him for threatening to use his Bonn Powers. You are threatening the victims instead of punishing the perpetrators of genocide, they said. In any case, the threat was meaningless, since the Bosniaks of Srebrenica had already endured far more punishment than the OHR could deliver. They dismissed Dodik's promised as empty rhetoric, characterized the special economic zone as a "ghetto," and argued that Srebrenica's residents wanted justice and freedom, not "new homes with gold roofs." SARAJEVO 00000706 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The citizens of Srebrenica were angry, could not be placated, and they could not control them, the Bosniaks asserted. Srebrenica residents now expected their leadership to deliver on the commitments made to them at the initial special status meeting on March 12 (Ref D). The Bosniak leadership had promised "progress" by April 12, and they had a political obligation to act. With that in mind, they told the Ambassador and HighRep that they planned to introduce a constitutional amendment into parliament that would allow parliament to create a special district anywhere in Bosnia. Over the longer term, they would demand any deal on police reform include creation of a special police district for Srebrenica, the appointment of a Bosniak Chief of Police for Srebrenica, removal of all "war criminals" working for the RS (Ref B),and improved employment opportunities in municipal government for Bosniaks in Srebrenica. Better to Fight in Parliament than Fight in the Streets -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The HighRep and Ambassador noted that constitutional changes required consensus and that the way to build consensus was to engage in constructive political dialogue with political opponents. Putting a special status amendment before parliament would provoke ugly political exchanges between the Bosniaks and Serbs, likely encourage calls for special status from elsewhere in the country, including in the Federation, and probably lead to a political crisis. Practical proposals to aid Srebrenica's residents would be among the first victims of this crisis, the Ambassador and HighRep stressed. The Bosniaks claimed they had no choice, adding, "Better to fight in parliament than to fight in the streets." The International Court of Justice's verdict that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica had to have consequences, the Bosniaks concluded. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Bosniak political leadership seems determined to provoke a more serious political crisis over Srebrenica special status. Their claim that Bosniaks writ large are upset by the ICJ verdict and are angry that many Serb war criminals have escaped justice is fair. Their claim that Srebrenica's residents are demanding to secede from the RS is inaccurate (Ref A). Srebrenica residents are interested in improving their lives, not in the political theater the Bosniak political leadership is so intent on providing. We continue to stress our commitment to helping Srebrenica and returnee communities throughout Bosnia and to try and focus the political discussion on practical steps political leaders of all ethnic groups could take to improve people's lives. The Bosniaks keep turning up the volume on their nationalist rhetoric, however. Eventually, this is likely to provoke the Serbs and make matters worse. MCELHANEY