BOSNIA - WAHHABISM THREATENS TRADITIONAL BOSNIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000650 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),EUR FOR PANDITH, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL SCUL BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - WAHHABISM THREATENS TRADITIONAL BOSNIAN ISLAM REF: 06 SARAJEVO 650 Classified By: Classified by DCM Judith Cefkin for reason 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Islamic Community (IC) is on the defensive as Bosnian Islam undergoes an identity crisis. While the scope of the problem remains unclear, there is a general recognition that more extreme believers (foreigners and nationals) are deliberately disrupting Bosnian Muslim communities. Heavy media focus on the issue has sparked a public debate over what it means to be a Bosnian Muslim. Top IC leaders, particularly Reisu-l-Ulema Mustafa effendi Ceric, are under heavy criticism for past efforts to placate both extremist elements and silence their more moderate, secular critics. As public concern mounts over the potential negative impact of an increasingly radical Muslim presence on Bosnia's economic and political future, the IC now realizes it can longer avoid confronting the issue. END SUMMARY. IC REACTION TO THE CHANGING FACE OF BOSNIAN ISLAM ¶2. (C) The majority of urban Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) describe themselves as secular, tolerant, and European. Bosniaks in rural communities tend to be more observant, but practice Islam in accordance with the liberal traditions they inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Mainstream Bosniaks react to people in "Wahhabi dress" (e.g., fully veiled women and men with uncut beards and short pants) with varying degrees of discomfort and hostility. (NOTE: Bosnians in the media and common parlance tend to use the term "Wahhabi" generically to mean anyone living by or advocating a stricter, foreign-influenced interpretation of Islam, even though not all extremists in Bosnia subscribe to the Wahhabi school of religious thought. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, in keeping with the permissive nature of Hanafi Sunni Islam, which has flourished in Bosnia for 300 years, local religious leaders were generally willing to tolerate isolated individuals practicing other forms of Islam, as long as they recognized the authority and hierarchy of the IC, observed appropriate rules of conduct when on IC-'QNb.l!{Qng sought to avoid public discussion about the nature and extent of radical Islamic influences in Bosnia. While most will not say so in public, in conversations with the Embassy many members of the IC blame the silence largely on IC leader Reis Ceric. ¶5. (C) The Reis's critics complained that, in pursuit of his own ambitions, Ceric has allowed the "Wahhabi" influence to gain ground. They charged that since issuing his Declaration on European Muslims in March 2006 (REF. A),Ceric has focused more on raising his international profile than tending to his flock. To avoid threats to his leadership from the right, he has consistently failed to criticize direct attacks on traditional Bosniak practice from Abu Hamza, self-appointed spokesman for the foreign Mujahideen community (and lead opponent of the Citizenship Review Commission),or Nezim Halilovic Mureris, radical imam of the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo. Critics further complained that Ceric's open support for Bosniak nationalist hardliner Haris Silajdzic (SBiH) during the 2006 election further encouraged extreme rhetoric. ¶6. (C) Recently, however, a sense of crisis has been building within the IC and the general public that the Reis and the Rijaset can no longer ignore. The dialogue took on real urgency following the November 2006 publication of an incendiary opinion piece entitled "They Are Coming to Take Our Children." In the article, Resid Hafizovic, a professor at the prestigious Sarajevo Faculty of Islamic Science, warned that "Wahhabi" influences had infected all levels of Bosnia's public and private institutions. Hafizovic lambasted the Rijaset for remaining passive in the face of this "fatal virus" destroying traditional Bosnian Islam from the inside. ¶7. (C) The Rijaset initially reacted defensively. It issued SARAJEVO 00000650 002 OF 003 a press statement censuring Hafizovic for his "arrogance" and calling his article inappropriate, reprehensible and "not in the spirit of academic dignity." As other members of the IC came to Hafizovic's defense, deep divisions within the IC over the Reis's lack of leadership on the issue, which had long simmered sub rosa, became constant front page news. (NOTE: Hafizovic received death threats following the article's publication, and has maintained a low public profile since. END NOTE.) ¶8. (U) For reasons which are unclear, the Rijaset completely reversed course. At an extraordinary session of the Rijaset a few days after the Hafizovic article first appeared, the Rijaset produced a Resolution on the Interpretation of (Bosnian) Islam. The Resolution asserted that Bosnian Muslims would not change their traditions to suit people whose interpretation of Islam differed. Referring obliquely to foreign Muslims, the Resolution said, "Those who come to BiH should know that the rules of the Islamic Community apply in BiH....Those who cannot comprehend and accept this as a fact should never have come to BiH and they certainly do not have to stay." ¶9. (U) At the same session, the Rijaset formed three commissions to examine the degree to which different aspects of Islam in Bosnia conformed to Hanafi tradition or have been impacted by Wahhabi or other more radical Islamic influences. The commissions now underway focus on Islamic doctrine in text books used at medressas and universities; Islamic law governing the administration of the IC, including elections, Rijaset sessions, jemat (parish) boundaries, what times of day mosques will be open, etc.; and Islamic rituals associated with birth, death, prayer, etc. The commissions must report to the Rijaset within one year. ¶10. (C) Meanwhile, the Reis has become the focal point for increasingly outspoken public criticism whenever a story on the "Wahhabi" problem in Bosnia appears in the media. Fellow Rijaset members, such as Mustafa ef. Spahic, also from the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, complain about his lack of leadership. They claim the Reis, rather than risk his power or image, still refuses to confront the issue and has not taken a strong and unequivocal stand against extremism. They further criticize his failure to issue clear instructions to local imams on how to deal with extremist elements in their communities. By creating the committees, valuable as they may intrinsically be, he has turned what many perceive as a looming crisis into an academic exercise. Regarding the actions he has taken, the press and public continue to criticize his efforts as "too little, too late." SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM ¶11. (C) Speculation on the Reis's personal motives aside, the IC's previous reluctance to acknowledge growing "Wahhabi" influence in Bosnia stemmed partly from inertia and partly from the difficulty in accurately gauging the scope or severity of the problem. ¶12. (C) Much of the information has been anecdotal. The Bosnian media tends to play up any perceived extremist element, with varying degrees of accuracy. Hyperbole aside, incidents of intra-Muslim conflicts between native-born Bosniaks do appear to be increasing. Below are some recent examples. ¶13. (U) In January, secular and religious authorities in Tuzla Canton (northeastern Bosnia) enjoined a local religious school in Gornja Maoca from teaching in Arabic and using a Jordanian curriculum. Cantonal authorities instructed the school to adopt a Rijaset-approved curriculum (which incorporates standard Bosnian secular curricula) and teach in one of the nation's official languages, as per Bosnian law. ¶14. (U) In late February, police removed a group of "Wahhabis" from Sarajevo's Careva Mosque, after they contradicted Bosniak tradition and disobeyed the local imam by refusing to leave the building after religious ceremonies were over. This incident followed months of low-level tension over the group's insistence that the mosque, as a house of God, should be open 24-hours and they should be allowed to hold post-service lectures there. Commenting on the disturbance, Sarajevo Mufti Husein Smajic told the media SARAJEVO 00000650 003 OF 003 the "Wahhabis" were violating peace and order within the IC. ¶15. (U) On March 4, local residents in a village outside Kalesija (Tuzla Canton) confronted a group of six Bisniak extremists who had been living in the local mezdzid (mosque without a minaret) and harassing inhabitants for months. Following a failed effort by the local mufti to mediate a solution, villagers burned the extremists' belongings (e.g., clothes, books, a computer) in front of the building and installed a security door to keep them out. ¶16. (C) The Kalesija incident received wide media coverage, which portrayed the extremist group's leader Jusuf Barcic as a charismatic and dangerous fanatic. Barcic is a native of that village, although his followers come from other parts of Bosnia. Barcic apparently became radicalized during his studies at Medina University in Saudi Arabia. ¶17. (C) However, in discussions with the Embassy, Kalesija's religious and secular authorities dismissed Barcic as a mentally unstable individual from a troubled family, who previously served jail time for abusing his wife. The local mufti and imam said he had no credibility with and no followers in the local community, and would have been driven out long ago were he not a village native. They noted that even Barcic's father, a devout traditional Bosniak, openly disagrees with Barcic's interpretation of Islam. They were quick to point out that many Bosniak men received religious education abroad (e.g., in Saudi Arabia or Egypt) and returned to Bosnia "perfectly normal." ¶18. (C) COMMENT: The debate sparked by the Hafizovic article and other incidents is a positive and overdue development. All ethnic groups are aware that a negative image of Bosnia as being full of radical Muslims would scare off foreign investment and alienate international allies. By reaching consensus on exactly what it means to be a Bosnian Muslim, the IC will be better equipped to counter more extreme influences that are clearly seeking to disrupt it. However, there appears to be growing doubt within the IC that Reis Ceric is willing or able to take the bold action it perceives as necessary, and it is possible mounting criticism of his performance may precipitate a leadership crisis within the Rijaset. MCELHANEY