AMBASSADOR'S MEETS WITH BIH FOREIGN MINISTER SVEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000541 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (FOOKS/HOH) EB/ESC/ICE (GARVERICK AND LEWANDOWSKI NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PARM PGOV PINR ENRG EPET BK SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETS WITH BIH FOREIGN MINISTER SVEN ALKALAJ REF: SARAJEVO 510 Classified By: DCM JUDITH CEFKIN FOR REASON 1.4. (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador, accompanied by the DCM, called on new Bosnian Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj at the Ministry March 7. In a wide-ranging exchange, Minister Alkalaj reviewed Bosnia's efforts to fulfill itsPartnership for Peace (PfP) commitments, and disussed the current controversy over the Bosnian Ctizenship Law (Refel) and the Republika Srpska's(RS) sale of refineries to the Russian firm Transneft. The Ambassador reiterated USG support for Bosnia's NATO and EU aspriations, regretting that the recent talks over Police Reform -- a requirement for signing the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) -- had deadlocked. The Ambassador pressed the Minster to hold the line against the proposed sale of munitions from a Bosnian firm to Venezuela. Alkalaj said he would. Alkalaj also outlined his plans to improve Foreign Ministry effectiveness and said he hopes to visit Washington in April. End Summary. Venezuela Arms -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador said we had heard that a Venezuela delegation would soon be visiting Bosnia and urged Alkalaj to hold the line against approval of any arms or munitions sales to Venezuela. Explaining that as a matter of policy, where not already prohibited by law, the USG will no longer approve the sale or license of lethal defense articles and services to Venezuela, the Ambassador reviewed the basis of our concerns, including the potential for diversion to terrorist groups and the risk that weapons being replaced would contribute to the black and grey arms market in the hemisphere. Noting that the quantity and type of arms Venezuela is seeking far exceeds its defense needs, the Ambassador stressed that this issue is extremely important to the U.S. and its friends. ¶3. (S) Alkalaj promised that he would continue to hold the line against the approval of Igman Konjic's proposed sale of ammunition. The problem, he explained, is that the Venezuelan government had already paid Igman Konjic, and the company had used these funds to produce the munitions, even though no license had been approved. Still, he reiterated his commitment to keeping the deal on hold and promised to alert us if Igman Konjic renewed pressure on the government to relieve it from its predicament. Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶4. (C) Alkalaj stated the Government's intention to make quick progress in fulfilling Bosnia's PfP commitments, with the goal of becoming a NATO member by 2009. Though he admitted that this goal may be wildly optimistic, it was important, he said, to think big. Confirming that the NATO Secretary General would make a brief visit to Sarajevo on SIPDIS March 16th, Alkalaj said they would use the occasion to sign Bosnia's NATO Security Agreement, and Bosnia is making progress on its Individual Parntership Program (IPP) and Planning and Review Process (PARP). He acknowledged that the lack of agreement on transfer of entity defense property to the State is blocking full implementation of the Defense Reform. He bemoaned RS Prime Minister Dodik's obstruction on this issue. He expressed confidence that Selmo Cikotic, once he assumes office in late April, would be an effective Defense Minister. The Ambassador asked who would be named as Bosnia's new Ambassador to NATO. Alkalaj said the decision is up to the Presidency and will depend on the usual balancing of ethnic quotas, but that there is agreement that it's the "Serb's turn," former Defense Minister Radovanovic would be the obvious candidate. He said BiH planned to send a staff of around eight to its NATO Mission. ¶5. (C) Alkalaj briefly raised the Iraq mission. Noting that the Poles, who where currently providing protection for Bosnia's Explosive Ordinance Disposal unit, would be redeploying, he asked would would take over protection for the unit. The Ambassador promised to check into that and get back to Alkalaj. SARAJEVO 00000541 002 OF 003 Police Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted our disappointment over the failure of the March 6 round of Police Reform talks but promised that we would keep pressing all the parties to sign up to a deal that will pass muster with the EU. The hope is to have an agreement in time for EU Commissioner Ollie Rehn's visit on March 16, but that goal is looking increasingly illusory. Alkalaj agreed that it was important to keep pressing, but added cynically that he believed the EU's real interest is in restarting SAA talks with Serbia, Bosnia, he said, is just an afterthought. Bosnia-Serbia Tensions Over Citizenship Law -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador suggested the GBiH invite Serb leaders for an official visit to Sarajevo, or, alternatively to plan a state-level visit there once Serbia has a new government. Alkalaj agreed it was important to break the Belgrade-Banja Luka curcuit and said he would do it. At present though, he regretted, his position on the Bosnian Citizenship law was complicating his position vis-a-vis Serbia. (Note: As reported Reftel, under Article 17 of the Bosnian Citizenship Law, Bosnia will not recognize dual citizenship for a foreign citizenship acquired after 1998, unless Bosnia has an Treaty with the country in question recognizing dual citizenship. Alkalaj recently informed the Government of Serbia that it's bilateral agreement on dual citizenship between Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro was no longer valid, since "the state of Serbia-Montenegro" no longer exists. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Alkalaj said that if the Bosnian Parliament abolished Article 17 of the Citizenship law, dual Bosnian-Serbian citizenship, would not be a problem. Bosniak members of parliament had tried several times to repeal Article 17, but Serb representatives had blocked this effort through the entity voting clause, because they wanted to bar the large Bosniak diaspora in the U.S. and Canada from the right to return and/or vote in Bosnia. Thus they were carrying out ethnic cleansing through other means. While reiterating his conviction that his position was justified under the Vienna Convention, Alkalaj acknowledged that he was hoping to put pressure on Bosnian Serbs to make a deal to support the repeal of Article 17. (Comment: Citing the recent ICJ decision on Serbia-Montenegro, the Office of the High Representative has concluded that Serbia is the successor state to Serbia-Montengro and, therefore, does not support Alkalaj's interpretation of status of the existing dual citizenship agreement. End Comment.) Council of Ministers Deadlocked -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador elicited Alkalaj's views on the growing polorization among members of the Council of Ministers (COM). Alkalaj reviewed the events leading to the current deadlock, explaining that RS representatives are furious because the two Bosniak Ministers -- Sadovic (Interior) and Halilovic (Refugees and Human Rights) had blocked approval of the sale to Russia's Transneft of oil refineries in the RS, asking to first see the contract. The real issue, Alkalaj noted, involves the timeline for phasing in the technology that will keep emissions at an acceptable standard. Alkalaj said that the Russians had compromised and had agreed to reduce the amount of grace period they were requesting for introducing the necessary technology. As a a former energy executive, Alkalaj did not think it necessary to see the actual sale contract, but he said the Russians and RS should be tranparent in sharing the "contractual timeline," outlining what the investor plans to do when, with regard to the refineries. ¶10. (C) Comment: Alkalaj is not in a position to sway the voting on this issue. In the COM, in order for a measure to pass, at least two members of each constituent peoples must support it. In a dicussion of this same issue, earlier in the week with Finance Minster Vrankic, Vrankic had said that President Silajdzic had decreed that Alkalaj's vote could not count as part of the "Bosniak quota" because Alkalaj is Jewish. This, even though Silajdzic selected Alkalaj to fill SARAJEVO 00000541 003 OF 003 one of his "Bosniak portfolios." The Ambassador pressed Alkalaj on this, asking why he accepted essentially being "disenfranchised" within the COM. A visibly uncomfortable Alkalaj, quickly changed the subject. End Comment. Plans for MFA -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether Alkalaj had any plans to reorganize MFA. Alkalaj said the Ministry is badly in need of revamping to put it on par with "modern European Embassies." The problem he faces is inadequate budget and restrictions on hiring authority. (Note: The Ministry does not have independent hiring authority. Hiring is handled by Bosnia's Civil Service Commission. End Note.) Within these constraints though, he would do what he could. In particular, he emphasized his desire to have a real Political Director and to bolster BiH's economic diplomacy. He also is in the process of hiring three young U.S.-educated assistants as part of his immediate staff. Travel to Washington -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Alkalaj said he would like to visit Washington sometime in April. The Ambassador welcomed this proposal and said he would be happy to make suggestions for the Minister's program once he decides on the timeframe. MCELHANEY