BOSNIA - ICJ RULING ON GENOCIDE WILL SHAKE BOSNIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000362 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),L(MANSFIELD/DOROSIN),AND EUR/SCE(HOH, FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KJUS BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - ICJ RULING ON GENOCIDE WILL SHAKE BOSNIAN POLITICAL SCENE Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 12, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced that on February 26 it would rule on the case concerning the "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)." Whatever the verdict, it is likely to shake the Bosnian political scene, and certainly will be a complicating factor in the region. Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs have already begun to pronounce on the case, each asserting that any verdict inconsistent with their own analysis of the facts would be unacceptable or a miscarriage of justice. We anticipate that Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic could use a guilty verdict to press the international community to open up the Dayton Peace Agreement and correct an injustice. An ensuing political war of words between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs could further inflame nationalist sentiment among both ethnic groups as well as make compromise on reforms more difficult. The Peace Implementation Council's (PIC) February meeting in Brussels begins the same day the verdict will be released, and we anticipate pressure for the PIC to comment even though there will be little time for it to review and digest the verdict's full implications. END SUMMARY Background: A Brief History of a Long Case -------------- ¶2. (U) On March 20, 1993, Bosnia filed a case with the ICJ asserting that Serbia and Montenegro "through its organs or entities under its control" had committed genocide by seeking to "intentionally destroy" the non-Serb population within Bosnia, particularly the country's Muslim population. Bosnia has also asked the ICJ to award damages for the losses suffered because of the genocide. In July 1995, the ICJ rejected a Belgrade motion that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Belgrade filed a counter claim in 1997 requesting the ICJ adjudge and declare that the Bosnian government had committed genocide against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though the ICJ ruled that the counter claim was admissible, Serbia and Montenegro withdrew it in April ¶2001. Belgrade has challenged the ICJ's jurisdiction, in part based on a 2004 ICJ decision rejecting a Belgrade claim against certain NATO members for genocide because Serbia and Montenegro was not a member of the United Nations at the time the claim was filed (1999). Arguments on the merits of the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case finally began in May 2006. Whatever the Outcome - A Political Backlash in Bosnia -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In terms of international human rights law and jurisprudence, Bosnia v. Serbia is a landmark case. It is the first ever heard by the ICJ based on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and if Serbia were found guilty, it would be the first state ever legally declared a sponsor of genocide. Whatever a guilty verdict's broader implications, its political impact in Bosnia would be enormous, where to date, many Bosniaks, including the Bosniak political leadership, believe that the international community has failed to acknowledge the extent and the nature of what they view as the crimes committed against Bosniaks during the 1992-1995 war. Sarajevo would likely erupt in joyous celebration of a guilty verdict. (Note: ICTY established that the 1995 massacre of Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) constituted genocide, but although former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and other senior Bosnian Serbs, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, have been indicted by ICTY for genocide, none have been convicted. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Conversely, most Bosnian Serbs have not accepted any responsibility for the onset of the 1992-1995 war or the terrible events that took place during the conflict. The "Scorpion" video's release in June 2006, which included gruesome footage of VRS soldiers executing men and boys from Srebrenica, prompted some introspection among Bosnian Serbs and acknowledgments that the Bosnian Serb Army may have engaged in criminal acts during the war. Bosnian Serbs did not embrace claims that they were collectively guilty of genocide, however. Indeed, those like current RS Prime SARAJEVO 00000362 002 OF 002 Minister Milorad Dodik, who opposed Karadzic and Mladic during the war, have fiercely resisted attempts to assign collective guilt to all Bosnian Serbs for the crimes committed by Karadzic, Mladic and their allies during the war. Dodik and others have also argued that Bosniaks (and the international community) gloss over or ignore the crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs during the conflict, such as those allegedly committed by former Bosnian Fifth Corps Commander General Dudakovic during Operation Storm in 1995. ¶5. (C) Bosniak and Bosnian Serb political leaders are so certain in their assessments about whether genocide was or was not committed by Serbia and "organs or entities under its control" that they have preemptively rejected any ICJ verdict that does not conform to their views. In a February 11 television interview, Dodik announced that the RS government would "not accept" a guilty verdict and claimed that the lawsuit against Serbia was "illegitimate." (Note: Bosnian Serb political leaders have tried several times over the last 14 years to have the suit withdrawn. End Note.) The next day, Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, responding to Dodik, said, "No one can question the act of genocide committed in BiH...Any other verdict except one that proclaims the crimes made during the war from 1992 to 1995 as genocide would not only be damaging for the institution of international justice, but for justice in general." (Note: Thus far, Croat political leaders have refrained from commenting on the ICJ case. End Note.) Opening Up Dayton -------------- ¶6. (C) The ICJ case is, like most legal matters, complicated, and whatever the verdict, its full implications will not be clear until it has been thoroughly reviewed. Few experts expect a straightforward guilty or not guilty verdict on the issue of genocide, though this is unlikely to stop politicians from painting it as such based on their political proclivities. Bosnian Serbs are mentally steeling themselves for a guilty verdict (though they will not necessarily embrace it as just). Bosniak expectations are high they will secure a verdict that provides them with their longed-for official, international legal imprimatur as "the victims" in the 1992-1995 war. Silajdzic likely will seize on a guilty verdict to demand the re-opening of the Dayton Peace Agreement, arguing that the ICJ's decision confirmed his repeated assertions that Republika Srpska was founded on genocide and is therefore illegitimate. This would probably include calls on the international community to enforce the implications of the ICJ decision. A war of words between Silajdzic and Dodik would most likely ensue. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We should expect a short-term political storm, perhaps a severe one, over the ICJ ruling, whatever it is. It would not be surprising if this translated into additional gridlock on reform, something Bosnia can ill afford. It will also certainly be a complicating factor in regional relations. It is notable that the generally restrained Serb member of the Tri-Presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic, has expressed concern that the ruling could provoke serious political confrontations within Bosnia and between Bosnia and Serbia. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) begins the day the ruling is to be announced, and we suspect the PIC will be pushed to comment on it, despite having had little time to review and digest it. The challenge will be to balance institutional support for the ICJ and respect for its decisions with political realities in Bosnia, including expectations among Bosniaks that a guilty verdict portends international community action to deliver what they failed to secure at Dayton. MCELHANEY