BOSNIA: USG MESSAGE ON KOSOVO DELIVERED TO KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000292 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE FOR HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB, NSC FOR BRAUN, JCS FOR FLORY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV BK YI SUBJECT: BOSNIA: USG MESSAGE ON KOSOVO DELIVERED TO KEY BOSNIAN LEADERS REF: A. STATE 12957 ¶B. SARAJEVO 162 ¶C. 06 STATE 196703 SARAJEVO 00000292 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with all three members of the Bosnian Tri-Presidency and the DCM with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs February 5 and 6 to discuss the Ahtisaari Kosovo plan. All of the Embassy's interlocutors expressed cautious support for the proposal, and none said they were concerned about possible knock-on effects of the plan in Bosnia over the short term. They also agreed that a UN Security Council Resolution was absolutely necessary to provide Bosnian officials with the political cover they would need to recognize Kosovo independence and ensure the success of the plan. Bosniak Tri-Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic in particular seemed more concerned about RS PM Dodik's power and moves to strengthen the RS, attracting more foreign investment to the Federation and determining a Bosnian plan of action on the status of the "Algerian Six" group of detainees in Guantanamo. END SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES AHTISAARI PROPOSAL WITH TRI-PRESIDENCY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate meetings with the three members of the Bosnian Tri-Presidency, Ambassador delivered Ref. A points on Kosovo. In their February 5 discussion, Croat Tri-Presidency Member Zeljko Komsic said he fully supported the Ahtisaari process, and agreed that moving ahead sooner rather than later with a final status resolution in the UN Security Council was the best course of action. Komsic (who once was BiH Ambassador to Serbia/Montenegro) said he had no illusions that Belgrade would ever truly accept Kosovo's status outside Serbia, but they nevertheless understood the reality that Kosovo is no longer a part of Serbia and has not been for a long time. The most important factor to ensuring the success of any Kosovo final status settlement is to make sure Kosovo Serbs stay in Kosovo, he added. Unlike in Bosnia, where the different ethnic groups lived and worked together for many years before the war, Kosovo Serbs and Albanians lived separate existences. It was now time for the Kosovo Serbs to integrate themselves into Kosovo society and engage at all levels, he said, adding, if Kosovo Serbs leave, no matter where they go, they will have a destabilizing influence. ¶3. (C) Concerned about the positions of Russia and China in the UN Security Council, Komsic said he would speak to the new Chinese ambassador to Bosnia to stress with him the importance of being constructive on Kosovo for the sake of regional stability. Komsic said the regional instability that could result from the unresolved status of Kosovo would not be of any benefit to either China or Russia. He noted that a UNSC Resolution would provide the cover Bosnia would need to recognize Kosovo independence, but absent such a resolution, it would be difficult to imagine Bosnian Serb politicians agreeing to a unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence. ¶4. (C) Bosniak Tri-Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic told the Ambassador he believed the recently-presented Ahtisaari proposal was a "psychological buffer" for the Serbs -- they already know they have lost Kosovo. He said Bosnia wishes Kosovo well, but in the end, it has nothing to do with Bosnia and he hoped the entire process could be concluded soon. He then launched into a familiar refrain -- the greatest problem Bosnia faces is the Republika Srpska (RS) trying to create its own state separate from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Silajdzic said that Serbia supports this goal, and presented "proof" of RS intentions in the form of a U.S. Department of Justice Registration Statement completed by a U.S. lobbying firm as the U.S. representative of the Government of the RS. Silajdzic said the RS was in effect setting up parallel embassies in foreign countries by establishing RS representative offices separate from Bosnian embassies. ¶5. (C) Serb Tri-Presidency Member Nebojsa Radmanovic said he believed that leaders in Serbia know that the Ahtisaari plan is the best way forward, but none has the political power or courage to say so publicly. The only real issue, he said, SARAJEVO 00000292 002.2 OF 003 was finding a way to get Serb leaders to accept the settlement "little by little." First and foremost, we had to find a way to support Serbian President Tadic, the leader closest to accepting the Ahtisaari proposal by getting other Serb leaders to back him up (especially PM Kostunica). Serb leaders are faced with an impossible decision, he said. After years of propaganda telling Serbs that Kosovo must always remain part of Serbia, they must now explain why they would agree to let it go. Whichever Serb leader agrees to grant Kosovo independence will forever be remembered as the one who lost it -- no Serb wants to go down in history with that epitaph. Radmanovic said the Russian position on the settlement will be vitally important in the Security Council. If Russia vetoes the plan, it would make recognition of Kosovo independence virtually impossible for Serb politicians (including in Bosnia). Finally, Radmanovic said that while it was possible that at some point in the future Kosovo may be used as an example to support separatist movements, he foresaw no short term problems, either in Bosnia or elsewhere. LITTLE INTEREST FROM THE MFA ON KOSOVO -------------- ¶6. (C) DCM delivered Ref. A points to outgoing Deputy FM Anton Rill February 6. Rill, noting the meeting likely would be his last as Deputy FM, agreed that the resolution of Kosovo's status needed to take place sooner rather than later, if only for the fact that to his mind, the internal issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina were more pressing. He expressed confidence that the Kosovo matter could be resolved peacefully, but expressed dismay about the strengthened position of the RS vis-a-vis the rest of Bosnia. Rill added that while he respected the economic development RS PM Dodik was promoting, he was concerned that Dodik's power seemed to be increasing, while the situation in the Federation was worsening. SILAJDZIC ON ATTRACTING INVESTMENT... -------------- ¶7. (C) In addition to the discussion on Kosovo, Silajdzic said one of his main priorities was to attract foreign investment to improve the Bosnian economy. Although he was troubled by what he perceived as Dodik's attempts to build a parallel state in the RS, he admired the work he had done to attract additional investment. One key problem among State and Federation-level ministers in previous years was their unwillingness to take risks to improve the business climate. Instead, Silajdzic said, they just sat in their ministries and waited out their mandate. In the new State and Federation governments, Silajdzic said he wanted ministers to take a problem-solving approach to improving the economic situation -- if laws need to be changed, then change them, he said. Silajdzic added that he had been in contact with several Kuwaiti investors interested in doing business in Bosnia, remarking that one Kuwaiti firm was ready to finance the construction of the north-south Corridor 5C highway. "Just give us the papers, and we will sign them," they told him. Silajdzic said Dodik also had expressed an interest in working with Kuwaiti investors, and had asked Silajdzic to take him on a trip to Kuwait for investor meetings. (Silajdzic said no plans have been made as of yet.) ...AND GUANTANAMO DETAINEES -------------- ¶8. (C) Finally, on the issue of the so-called "Algerian Six" Guantanamo detainees, Silajdzic told the Ambassador he had met with the group's American (human rights) lawyer earlier on February 5. Silajdzic said he was seeking to clarify the status of those detainees holding Bosnian citizenship. Referring to our earlier demarche (Refs. B and C),Silajdzic seemed to be attempting to determine whether the U.S. was planning to release the men in the near future and whether the U.S. was looking for a signal that the Bosnian government would be willing to accept their repatriation. The Ambassador told Silajdzic he had no new information since the earlier demarche was delivered (Refs. B and C). ¶9. (C) COMMENT: High-level Bosnian officials do not appear concerned that Kosovo will cause political problems in Bosnia. One thing is clear, however; a UN Security Council SARAJEVO 00000292 003.2 OF 003 Resolution on Kosovo will be key to ensuring Bosnia's recognition of the final status agreement. Absent such a UN endorsement, Bosnian officials will find it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome Bosnian Serb objections to proceed with a unilateral endorsement of Kosovo independence. The accompanying rhetoric would not be constructive either. Although none have been as explicit as the Russians, many Bosnian Serb politicians have hinted that a gradual move toward acceptance, rather than an immediate push for a UNSC resolution, would make it easier to bring Serbian leaders on board. In our continuing dialogue with RS PM Dodik, our Banja Luka office shared the demarche with him, eliciting an understanding response. END COMMENT. MCELHANEY