Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO288
2007-02-08 09:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER - AMBASSADOR ROONEY'S FEBRUARY 13

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PHUM BK 
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VZCZCXRO1546
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHVJ #0288/01 0390907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080907Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN IMMEDIATE 0096
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0336
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0308
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5404
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000288 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR ROONEY FROM AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM BK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - AMBASSADOR ROONEY'S FEBRUARY 13
VISIT TO SARAJEVO

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000288 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR AMBASSADOR ROONEY FROM AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM BK SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - AMBASSADOR ROONEY'S FEBRUARY 13 VISIT TO SARAJEVO Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: We are pleased to welcome you and your delegation to Sarajevo on February 13. Your visit, which includes a roundtable at the Inter-Religious Council (IRC),a lunch hosted by Cardinal Puljic (the head of the Catholic Church in Bosnia),and a tour of major religious sites in Sarajevo, is an opportunity to advance our agenda of promoting religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue. The later has not, unfortunately, been as robustly supported within Bosnia or by co-religionists outside the country as we would like, and we hope your colleagues from the Vatican might leave Sarajevo persuaded that the IRC deserves greater financial support from Rome. We need to encourage the Bosnian Catholic Church to play a constructed role in fostering reconciliation here. On issues such as constitutional reform, the Bosnian Catholic Church has sided with Bosnian Croat nationalist views, and often accuses the U.S. and the international community of ignoring the "plight" of Bosnian Croats. We constantly seek to reassure the Croats and to put them together with their counterparts to work out compromise solutions. We will provide you and your mission team with additional background material via e-mail. END SUMMARY Religion in Bosnia: Groping Towards Respect and Tolerance -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ethnic and religious identity are inextricably linked in Bosnia (i.e., Bosniak/Muslim, Serb/Orthodox, Croat/Catholic, and Jewish). Though the majority of Bosnians do not regularly attend church, mosque or synagogue, 95 percent characterize themselves as "believers." Although the legal mechanisms are in place to ensure respect for religious freedom and tolerance, public attitudes lag behind legal structures. The past year has seen an increase in attacks on religious sites, particularly during the 2006 general election campaign when nationalist rhetoric employed by certain political parties heightened ethnic/religious tensions. The most notable incident was a rocket attak on Jasenica Mosque outside of Mostar in Octobe, 2006. ¶3. (C) The U.S. has worked to promote rligious tolerance, particularly through inter-relgious dialogue. The U.S. was heavily involved
wth the 1997 formation of the Inter-Religious Council (IRC) by the country's four religious leaders (Reis-ul-Ulema, Metropolitan of Dabar-Bosna Nikolaj, Vinko Cardinal Puljic, and President of the Jewish Community Jakob Finci),which will host a roundtable with you and your delegation. The IRC has not enjoyed the sustained political support from religious leaders the U.S. had hoped, however; nor has it received sufficient financial support from the Bosnian government and domestic religious communities or their co-religionists outside Bosnia (i.e., other Patriarchates, the Vatican). Your roundtable is an opportunity to highlight the IRC and the importance of its work in promoting religious tolerance and reconciliation. We also hope it may generate greater support from the Vatican for the IRC. Religion/Politics: Religious Leaders Doth Protest Too Much -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Bosnian religious leaders claim they are politically neutral and do not get involved in politics. In fact, they frequently engage in behind-the-scenes attempts to influence political developments. During the 2006 general election campaign, the Reis sought to undermine the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) candidate for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, Sulejman Tihic. Cardinal Puljic all but endorsed the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union-1990 (HDZ-1990) during the same campaign, sending a letter of goodwill to HDZ-1990's leadership immediately prior to their September 2006 convention. Traditionally the Serb Orthodox Church has supported the nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS),but it maintained a lower political profile in 2006 and its ties with the SDS are weakening. The Catholic Church and Constitutional Reform -------------- ¶5. (C) Cardinal Puljic and the local Catholic Church's SARAJEVO 00000288 002 OF 003 intervention on behalf of HDZ-1990 in the October 2006 elections was driven by their opposition to the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments. (Note: HDZ-1990 split with HDZ-BiH over the latter's support for the U.S.-brokered package. End Note.) Instead, the Cardinal and the Catholic's Bishop's Conference pushed for an alternative constitutional framework for Bosnia, which would divide the country into four regions centered around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka and Mostar. The regions would, according to the proposal, "follow current criteria of economic...historical, geographic and (above all) national divisions." While avoiding the politically-charged phrase "Third Entity," the proposal nonetheless resurrects the post-war nationalist aspirations of Bosnian Croats to carve out their own Croat-majority territory in Bosnia. ¶6. (C) If constitutional reform is raised, you will want to underscore that the U.S.-brokered package continues to receive strong support from the international community, including the Peace Implementation Council, and note that its passage by parliament would be an important first step towards creating a better institutional framework for Bosnia. The all-or-nothing approach advocated by HDZ-1990 (and de facto by the Catholic Church here) is a counterproductive negotiating position that makes compromise with others all but impossible. There is no consensus to create a new administrative and territorial organization for Bosnia at this time, particularly one that furthers divides among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. You might also note that passage of the U.S.-brokered package in April 2006 would have prevented the scenario that occurred in the October election when Croat parties failed to unite behind a single Presidential candidate. The "Campaign Against the Croat People" -------------- ¶7. (C) In the past, the Bosnian Catholic Church has accused international community, including the U.S., of waging a disinformation campaign designed to cover-up the plight of Croats in Bosnia, and on one occasion he has even explicitly accused the U.S. of chasing Bosnian Croats out of Bosnia. The Church also frequently blames the international community and the U.S. (as well as local government authorities) for the low number of Croat returns to Bosnia. In fact, as the UN and local NGOs point out, the most critical influence on Croat returns was the deliberate policy of the Croatian government from 1995-2000 (and, secondarily, of politicians in Croat majority areas of Herzegovina) to encourage Bosnian Croats to permanently resettle either in Croatia or in Croat-majority areas of Bosnia. As you can surmise, the Croats feel forgotten by Zagreb, and with their dwindling numbers, fear that they are unable "to stand up to" the Bosnian Serbs and majority Bosniaks. ¶8. (C) If the issue comes up, it might be worth noting that the U.S. was one of the biggest donors for reconstruction of housing and infrastructure in Bosnia. Though assistance was not segregated by ethnicity as a matter of policy, Embassy Sarajevo estimates that at least 69 million dollars in USG funding was spent on projects in primarily Croat return areas between 1996 and 2005. Claims by Catholic Church officials (or others) that the U.S. did not support Croat returns are factually incorrect and politically mischievous. Obstruction by local government officials was and remains a real issue affecting returnees to areas where they are in the minority, but this obstruction affects all ethnic/religious groups throughout the country, not just the Croats. Church Building Permits: Bureaucracy Vs. Bias -------------- ¶9. (C) The Catholic Church in Bosnia has also expressed concern over property issues, specifically problems obtaining building permits and restitution for properties nationalized by Yugoslav communists. Catholic Church officials claim they have received only one permit to construct a new church since 1945, and they assert this is a violation of religious freedom. In fact, difficultly obtaining building permits is a common problem for all of Bosnia's religious communities as well as for homeowners and business people. Admittedly, these problems are more acute in areas where the applicant or SARAJEVO 00000288 003 OF 003 religious community is in the minority, but municipal authorities who handle permits are also slow, sometimes incompetent and occasionally obstructionist. This unfortunate combination causes long bureaucratic delays in the permit and restitution processes. ¶10. (C) Yet, there is no evidence of an explicit ban against any religious community that would constitute a violation of religious freedom. For example, the Catholic Church has applied for a permit to build a new church in the Sarajevo suburb of Grbavica and has encountered delays. The municipality has tentatively approved several locations, but neighbors have objected during the public comment period -- in one instance because the proposal involved eliminating the area's only public park. (Comment: There was a great deal of pre-election media interest in this story, but it has subsided since October 2006; possibly because the newly-elected Croat member of the Tri-Presidency Zeljko Komsic has promised to resolve the issue; possibly because concern over the permit was a pre-election effort to mobilize the Croat nationalist vote. End Comment) ¶11. (C) Property restitution issues are no less complicated. For example, in 2006 the Municipality of Travnik partially complied with a 2003 order to relocate a public school located on property previously owned by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese. The municipality returned half of the building to the Archdiocese for use as part of its Catholic School center, but it must wait until a replacement public school is built to return the other half. Negotiations on a timeline for the completion of this turnover continue. Bosnia has also drafted a state-level restitution law through which religious communities will receive compensation for lost property. If passed, this law would expedite the transfer of property in kind and/or financial compensation for all properties lost by religious communities since 1941. Bosnia's religious communities might work together on this issue, using it as a platform to promote inter-religious dialogue, but generally religious leaders have preferred to work independently on restitution issues. "Two Schools Under One Roof" -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The international community's attempts to reform education began as a means to foster return. When the Bosniaks began to return to Croat majority areas of the Federation in the late nineties, they found that their children could not even enter schools that Croats controlled. Instead, they were forced to set up schools in coffee bars, restaurants and other similar locales. To encourage confidence among returnees, OHR began negotiating deals with local authorities in these places to create "two schools under one roof." These would allow Bosniaks into the building, but otherwise keep them separate in almost every other way. This was meant to be an interim solution, but seven years later the situation has not changed in roughly 50 of these schools, which are mainly found in Croat majority areas in Central Bosnia and Herzegovacka-Neretva Cantons (Note: The latter includes Mostar. End Note.) ¶13. (SBU) When Bosnia acceded to the Council of Europe in 2002, it committed to end segregation in schooling. The 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education was supposed to address this issue, but to date many schools in Croat majority areas have simply ignored their legal obligations. Divided education is found in different forms in other parts of the country as well (i.e., instruction in the "Bosnian" or "Serbian" language only),but it is not as extreme as insistence in some Croat areas to what is in essence "a separate, but equal" policy. The big thrust over the past several years has been the administrative and legal unification of the "two-in-one schools" (i.e., getting them to have one principal, one school board, one administrative budget etc...). This effort has enjoyed mixed success. We have encouraged religious leaders to lend their moral authority to the campaign to desegregate Bosnia's schools, a point you might wish to make during your visit as well. MCELHANEY

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