Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2648
2007-12-11 18:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK 
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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2648/01 3451804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111804Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7507
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0197
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002648 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ENGLAND, FATA, CAGAN, BEIN
DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER
CIKOTIC'S DECEMBER 17-21 VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2295

B. ENGLAND-CIKOTIC LETTER

C. SARAJEVO 2586

D. SARAJEVO 2296

E. SARAJEVO 2142

F. SARAJEVO 2047

G. SARAJEVO 1999

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002648 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ENGLAND, FATA, CAGAN, BEIN DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER CIKOTIC'S DECEMBER 17-21 VISIT TO WASHINGTON REF: A. SARAJEVO 2295 ¶B. ENGLAND-CIKOTIC LETTER ¶C. SARAJEVO 2586 ¶D. SARAJEVO 2296 ¶E. SARAJEVO 2142 ¶F. SARAJEVO 2047 ¶G. SARAJEVO 1999 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic comes to Washington December 17-21 for Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDCs) and other meetings ready to present his vision completing Bosnia's defense reform, expanding Bosnia's participation in coalition support operations, and expediting NATO accession. On defense reform, the Minister will seek assistance resolving defense property issues between the entities and the state, which have been blocked by the RS government. Cikotic will support the deployment of additional Bosnian forces to Iraq, including up to a company sized-unit, but will highlight that logistical constraints, mostly related to the unresolved property issues, hinder his ability to make a large commitment. He will present an ambitious agenda for accelerating the NATO integration process, possibly including on offer of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest Summit. The Minister's visit presents an excellent opportunity for senior US policymakers to engage on these important issues with one of our strongest partners in the region. We believe it is important to encourage Cikotic to maintain his and the Bosnian government's already strong commitment to full alliance accession and the defense reform agenda. End Summary. CIKOTIC: STRONG US PARTNER -------------- ¶2. (C) Though in office for only nine months, Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic has brought new energy to the NATO and defense reform agenda in Bosnia. He has a well-earned reputation as a competent technocrat and has become a model Minister. Under his leadership, the MOD has developed a reputation for an apolitical approach to policy, free from the ethnic infighting that plagues almost all other Bosnian state-level institutions. During the recent political crisis in Bosnia, Cikotic demonstrated his level-headed and even-handed leadership to
maintain a stable security environment. When he discovered that Bosnian Serb generals had met with RS Prime Minister Dodik while rumors of ethnic seperatism were gathering weight (Ref A),Cikotic quietly sought information about the substance of the meeting and elected not to make it a major issue that would further inflame both political circles and the public. (Comment. This approach was smart as both a political and practical matter, as the crisis seemed precipitated to raise regional tensions in advance of the Kosovo final status decision. End Comment.) Cikotic's experiences during the 1992-1995 war and his time as Bosnian Defense Attache in Washington have shaped his world view. He is strongly pro-American, a close ally on matters of bilateral defense and security policy, and a forceful advocate for a strong US leadership role in Bosnia. He is not shy about reminding his interlocutors that all major reform initiatives in Bosnia, particularly defense reform, have been US-led or directed. Cikotic can be expected to be well-prepared for his discussions with senior USG officials, and will present intelligent and pragmatic policy-prescriptions for issues on the agenda. LOOKING TO EXPAND OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS -------------- ¶3. (C) Cikotic is a strong proponent of increasing Bosnia's deployments to overseas peace-support operations. At his direction, the MOD recently drafted a comprehensive report on proposed overseas missions for 2008. Included in that plan was the continued deployment of Bosnia's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon in Iraq, which has supported OIF since ¶2005. The plan also contained the USG request for Bosnia to deploy an infantry "platoon-plus" or company (anywhere from 50-150 men) in mid- 2008 for fixed-site security in Iraq (Ref SARAJEVO 00002648 002 OF 003 B). The politics of expanded deployments remain fluid, and increasing Bosnia's contributions to the Iraq mission in particular is not a certainty. We encountered some resistance from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic to continuing the EOD deployment into 2007, but since his participation in the USG-organizied and funded trip to Iraq for the Bosnian Tri-Presidency in May 2007, his anxieties about the EOD unit's deployment have declined. Cikotic has told us on numerous occasions that he would also like to deploy forces in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan, and he may raise this possibility in Washington. THE SUCCESS OF DEFENSE REFORM -------------- ¶4. (C) Defense reform has been one of the greatest success stories of post-Dayton Bosnia. The US-led process successfully merged the two entity Ministry of Defenses and created a joint Armed Forces out of three formerly warring armies. External and internal observers alike have praised the creation of a unified, multi-ethnic Armed forces and single Ministry of Defense, both of which offer compelling evidence that functioning state-level institutions necessary for Euro-Atlantic integration can be created and sustained. In 2007, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces, under the leadership of Cikotic and CHOD LTG Sifet Podzic, reinvigorated a defense reform process that had stalled in the last half of 2006 while Bosnia was preoccupied with national elections. Most notably, by December 1, the two men had stood-up the Bosnian Armed Forces' new force structure. DEFENSE PROPERTY A STICKING POINT; IMPACTS DEPLOYMENTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) While defense reform is unarguably a major success, it remains incomplete. Most importantly, the entities and state have yet to resolve defense property issues. In July 2007, the entity and state leaderships reached a political agreement on defense property that was to provide the basis for formal agreements that would transfer movable (arms, ammunition, vehicles, etc.) and immovable (land, bases) property from the entities to the state. Nearly a half year later, there has been little progress in finalizing a transfer agreement for either movable or immovable defense property. Recent actions by the RS government (Ref C) indicate that they are backing away from the commitments in the political agreement and seeking to maintain control over surplus arms and ammunition. This position is at odds with the political agreement signed by RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and raises profound concerns about RS intentions and commitments to principles laid down by NATO, OSCE and EUFOR 18 months ago that all weapons, ammunition and explosives would be transferred to the state. Minister Cikotic is particularly concerned about the apparent about face by the RS on defense property and will urge Washington to pressure Dodik to conclude an agreement consistent with the July 2007 political agreement as quickly as possible, which he will note is crucial to Bosnia's NATO aspirations and ability to deploy additional forces to Iraq. (Note. The Ambassador and High Representative Miroslav Lajcak are both making approaches to Dodik on this issue. End Note.) NATO: CIKOTIC LOOKS FOR USG SUPPORT AT BUCHAREST -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Bosnia has made significant, and perhaps unexpected, progress in its first year in PfP. The MOD and MFA have finished drafting Bosnia's first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and hope to have it approved by the Council of Ministers, Presidency, and Parliament by mid-February 2008. Bosnia completed its first Partnership and Review Process (PARP) survey in September, which received a positive assessment from NATO's International Staff. In a time of increased political polarization here, the NATO agenda has been uncontentious: NATO membership continues to enjoy wide support among the political elite and general public alike (including a majority of the Bosnian Serb population, according to polling data). SARAJEVO 00002648 003 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Cikotic will seek to enlist USG support for accelerating Bosnia's integration with NATO during his visit to Washington. Cikotic has told us that he plans to hand-carry a letter from all three members of Bosnia's Tri-Presidency to Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice detailing Bosnia's substantial accomplishments on NATO and PfP activities and urging a positive assessment of Bosnia's efforts at NATO's Bucharest Summit. Cikotic has told us that he believes Bosnia should seek a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at Bucharest (with full membership by the 2010 NATO Summit), and he may bring up this idea in Washington. At the least, Cikotic will urge, Bosnia should be mentioned separately from the other new PfP members in the Bucharest Communique, and be offered an Intensified Dialogue. Cikotic views the accession process as a unifying issue for the country. He believes progress towards NATO membership will encourage the government to undertake further structural reforms that would improve the functionality of the state. In discussing the issue with Cikotic, we have counseled pragmatism, and urged him and the rest of the Bosnian government to embrace plans and a timetable for NATO accession that is ambitious but sustainable for Bosnian institutions. COMMENT: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW MUTUAL SUPPORT -------------- - ¶8. (C) Cikotic's visit to Washington comes at an opportune time considering the number of important items currently on our bilateral defense agenda. Cikotic should be told that the failure to resolve defense property will be negatively viewed at the Bucharest Summit-- a message he can take back to Bosnia and share with Prime Minister Spiric and the RS leadership. He should also be encouraged to continue Bosnia's support for the Iraq mission, and look to expand the deployment along the lines already proposed by the USG. On both of the issues Cikotic will be an ally, and he can use the message from senior Washington policymakers to help make the case back home. Cikotic views securing USG support for an accelerated timetable for Bosnia's NATO integration as the most important element of his trip. A positive message at Bucharest (de-linking Bosnia from Serbia and Montenegro in the communique and invitation to begin an Intensified Dialogue) would boost defense, and possibly the broader, reform agenda here and further our objective of anchoring Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic institutions. In Washington, we must be encouraging, and, without over-committing ourselves, provide Cikotic the leverage at home to bolster his strong leadership on defense reform and NATO accession. ENGLISH

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