Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2517
2007-11-21 18:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:
BOSNIA - FM ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF NATO
VZCZCXYZ0002 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHVJ #2517/01 3251841 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211841Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7400 INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0190 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002517
SIPDIS
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NSC FOR BRAUN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - FM ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF NATO
COORDINATION TEAM
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002517
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DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN
NSC FOR BRAUN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - FM ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF NATO
COORDINATION TEAM
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Given the current political environment,
keeping Bosnia on the NATO track is even more critical to
U.S. objectives here. Therefore, we are concerned by a recent
move by Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Sven Alkalaj to
politicize this issue by challenging Minister of Defense
(MOD) Cikotic's leadership of Bosnia's NATO accession
process. Under Cikotic's leadership, the MOD has developed a
reputation for apolitical competence that is unmatched within
the Bosnian government. By contrast, Alkalaj and his ministry
have been mired in one political controversy after another
since February. Alkalaj is also widely perceived as a shill
for Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, and
has developed a reputation for shading the truth. We suspect
that Alkalaj has manipulated a conversation with NATO
International Staff to justify his challenge, and believe
that the MOD remains more capable of maintaining leadership
of this process. End Summary.
ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF COORDINATION BODY
--------------
2. (C) On November 13, Goran Pranjic, the MFA's pointman for
NATO issues, shared with us an October letter from Foreign
Minister Alkalaj to Defense Minster Cikotic advocating a
change in the composition and leadership of Bosnia's
interagency NATO Coordination Team. The team, recently
established by the Council of Ministers, is currently chaired
by Deputy Defense Minister Igor Crnadak and has just begun
its coordination duties to prepare Bosnia for NATO
membership. Crnadak's performance to date has been uniformly
praised by NATO HQ and his Bosnian government counterparts,
and he recently led a Bosnian delegation to Brussels for
consultations with the NATO International Staff and permanent
representatives. In his letter, Alkalaj asserts that a senior
official from "NATO HQ Brussels" had raised concerns about
the Coordination Team, and had told him that the MFA should
take the leadership role in a reconstituted body. Alkalaj
advocated that the group should be reformed at the political
level to either have a Foreign Minister or triumvirate
chairmanship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Security. (Note: Two of these ministers are Bosniaks, and
Alkalaj, officially an "other" as he is Jewish, is
representative of Silajdzic's Bosniak Party for BiH. End
Note.) Such a change, would require the Council of Ministers
to take another decision reforming the group.
A SURPRISING REQUEST
--------------
3. (C) The Ministry of Defense was taken by surprise by
Alkalaj's request. MOD officials viewed it as an attempt to
take control of the coordination body, which would needlessly
disrupt Bosnia's progress towards NATO membership. Minister
Cikotic characterized Alkalaj's letter as "stupid" and said
he had no intention of responding. He hoped his silence
would be sufficient to allow the matter to die. Cikotic
argued that MOD was the only ministry capable of leading the
NATO accession process, adding that this was why the COM
decided to assign MOD the chairmanship of the Coordination
Team. Crnadak was also upset by Alkalaj's letter, noting
that he had worked hard to build an inclusive team and that
it was making substantial progress, most particularly in
preparing Bosnia's first NATO Individual Partnership Action
Plan (IPAP). NATO HQ staff in Sarajevo tell us that they had
no advance warning of Alkalaj's request and have quietly told
both Cikotic and Crnadak that the work of the team as
currently constituted should be continued.
MFA BEHIND THE NATO CURVE
--------------
4. (C) Alkalaj's request is somewhat puzzling, because,
despite his previous service as Bosnia's NATO Ambassador, he
has shown little interest in NATO issues to date and in
preparing the MFA to meet its NATO and PfP responsibilities.
A full year after Bosnia joined PfP and announced its
intention of NATO membership, the MFA still has only one
official, Pranjic, a mid-level diplomat, working directly on
NATO issues. For the NATO Coordination Team, Alkalaj
appointed his Assistant Minister for Visa and Consular
Affairs as deputy chairman, who has himself admitted to us he
has neither the background nor expertise to adequately
perform this role. NATO HQ Sarajevo has routinely complained
that MFA,s failure to adequately prepare for its NATO
responsibilities will impact the pace at which Bosnia moves
through the complicated accession process. The result is that
MOD has taken an atypically large role in the coordination of
PfP and accession activities. Recently, the MOD was forced
to take charge of moving the NATO-PfP Status of Forces
Agreement through the Bosnian government, an activity that
should have been fully within the capacity of the MFA.
FURTHER CONCERNS
--------------
5. (C) Aside from the institutional and organizational
issues, Alkalaj's performance as Minister raises further
concerns about his ability to direct the NATO integration
process in an effective, transparent, and apolitical manner.
Since assuming office in February, Alkalaj has done little to
dispel his reputation as Bosniak member of the Presidency
Haris Silajdzic's man in the Council of Ministers. Both
Presidents Komsic and Radmanovic routinely complain that
Alkalaj seems to work only for Silajdzic, and does not keep
the other Presidents informed of the activities of the
Ministry and some of his diplomatic dealings. Radmanovic
became particularly incensed in April when, at Silajdzic's
direction, Alkalaj quietly arranged, without formal
Presidency sanction, a state-level visit to the United
Nations to celebrate Bosnia's independence that Silajdzic
used to present his "interpretation" of the ICJ's Srebrenica
verdict to an international audience. Alkalaj also has a
record of leaking inaccurate information to the media about
the content of his confidential high-level diplomatic
meetings, including those with USG officials. Alkalaj's
ministry has bounced from one crisis or mini-scandal to
another in the past half year, all of which has served to
further internally polarize the MFA and greatly hinder its
effectiveness. Morale seemed to reach a low-point in
October, when the MFA's General-Secretary sent a letter to
the diplomatic community, complaining about Alkalaj's
management style and allegedly illegal initiative to reform
the personnel structure. The letter noted that it was sent
with the full support of the number two in the MFA, Deputy
Minister Ana Trisic-Babic. (Comment. As disappointing as
Alkalaj's performance has been, the performance of his senior
management has been equally troubling. The General-Secretary
has been linked to allegations of corruption, and Deputy
Minister Trisic-Babic, a confidant of RS Prime Minister
Dodik, has publicly engaged in partisan arguments with
Alkalaj on several occasions. End Comment.)
COMMENT: MOD MUST REMAIN IN LEAD FOR NOW
--------------
6. (C) As we discreetly told Pranjic when presented a copy of
the Foreign Minister's letter, we believe that Alkalaj's
proposal would be highly counter-productive. We have
consulted on the matter with NATO HQ Sarajevo, which shares
our concerns about the disruptive impact an overhaul of the
Coordination Team could have in advance of the Bucharest
Summit, where Bosnia hopes to highlight substantial progress
in defense reform and NATO integration. Considering the
political crisis in the country, with the Council of
Ministers in a "technical mandate" following the resignation
of Prime Minister Spiric, it would be highly unlikely that
the COM could quickly act to set-up a new coordinating
structure. We certainly recognize that at some point the MFA
must take a greater, if not leading, role in the NATO
ascension process, but, under Alkalaj, it remains a weak,
politically and ethically divided institution that does not
have the capacity to direct such an important activity for
the Bosnian state. Conversely, Minister Cikotic's Ministry
of Defense has established its bona fides as a professionally
run, non-partisan and competent institution. The Coordination
Team, under the very able leadership of Crnadak, must be
allowed to continue its important work free from the larger
political problems plaguing the country. End Comment
ENGLISH
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN
NSC FOR BRAUN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - FM ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF NATO
COORDINATION TEAM
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Given the current political environment,
keeping Bosnia on the NATO track is even more critical to
U.S. objectives here. Therefore, we are concerned by a recent
move by Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Sven Alkalaj to
politicize this issue by challenging Minister of Defense
(MOD) Cikotic's leadership of Bosnia's NATO accession
process. Under Cikotic's leadership, the MOD has developed a
reputation for apolitical competence that is unmatched within
the Bosnian government. By contrast, Alkalaj and his ministry
have been mired in one political controversy after another
since February. Alkalaj is also widely perceived as a shill
for Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, and
has developed a reputation for shading the truth. We suspect
that Alkalaj has manipulated a conversation with NATO
International Staff to justify his challenge, and believe
that the MOD remains more capable of maintaining leadership
of this process. End Summary.
ALKALAJ SEEKS CONTROL OF COORDINATION BODY
--------------
2. (C) On November 13, Goran Pranjic, the MFA's pointman for
NATO issues, shared with us an October letter from Foreign
Minister Alkalaj to Defense Minster Cikotic advocating a
change in the composition and leadership of Bosnia's
interagency NATO Coordination Team. The team, recently
established by the Council of Ministers, is currently chaired
by Deputy Defense Minister Igor Crnadak and has just begun
its coordination duties to prepare Bosnia for NATO
membership. Crnadak's performance to date has been uniformly
praised by NATO HQ and his Bosnian government counterparts,
and he recently led a Bosnian delegation to Brussels for
consultations with the NATO International Staff and permanent
representatives. In his letter, Alkalaj asserts that a senior
official from "NATO HQ Brussels" had raised concerns about
the Coordination Team, and had told him that the MFA should
take the leadership role in a reconstituted body. Alkalaj
advocated that the group should be reformed at the political
level to either have a Foreign Minister or triumvirate
chairmanship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Security. (Note: Two of these ministers are Bosniaks, and
Alkalaj, officially an "other" as he is Jewish, is
representative of Silajdzic's Bosniak Party for BiH. End
Note.) Such a change, would require the Council of Ministers
to take another decision reforming the group.
A SURPRISING REQUEST
--------------
3. (C) The Ministry of Defense was taken by surprise by
Alkalaj's request. MOD officials viewed it as an attempt to
take control of the coordination body, which would needlessly
disrupt Bosnia's progress towards NATO membership. Minister
Cikotic characterized Alkalaj's letter as "stupid" and said
he had no intention of responding. He hoped his silence
would be sufficient to allow the matter to die. Cikotic
argued that MOD was the only ministry capable of leading the
NATO accession process, adding that this was why the COM
decided to assign MOD the chairmanship of the Coordination
Team. Crnadak was also upset by Alkalaj's letter, noting
that he had worked hard to build an inclusive team and that
it was making substantial progress, most particularly in
preparing Bosnia's first NATO Individual Partnership Action
Plan (IPAP). NATO HQ staff in Sarajevo tell us that they had
no advance warning of Alkalaj's request and have quietly told
both Cikotic and Crnadak that the work of the team as
currently constituted should be continued.
MFA BEHIND THE NATO CURVE
--------------
4. (C) Alkalaj's request is somewhat puzzling, because,
despite his previous service as Bosnia's NATO Ambassador, he
has shown little interest in NATO issues to date and in
preparing the MFA to meet its NATO and PfP responsibilities.
A full year after Bosnia joined PfP and announced its
intention of NATO membership, the MFA still has only one
official, Pranjic, a mid-level diplomat, working directly on
NATO issues. For the NATO Coordination Team, Alkalaj
appointed his Assistant Minister for Visa and Consular
Affairs as deputy chairman, who has himself admitted to us he
has neither the background nor expertise to adequately
perform this role. NATO HQ Sarajevo has routinely complained
that MFA,s failure to adequately prepare for its NATO
responsibilities will impact the pace at which Bosnia moves
through the complicated accession process. The result is that
MOD has taken an atypically large role in the coordination of
PfP and accession activities. Recently, the MOD was forced
to take charge of moving the NATO-PfP Status of Forces
Agreement through the Bosnian government, an activity that
should have been fully within the capacity of the MFA.
FURTHER CONCERNS
--------------
5. (C) Aside from the institutional and organizational
issues, Alkalaj's performance as Minister raises further
concerns about his ability to direct the NATO integration
process in an effective, transparent, and apolitical manner.
Since assuming office in February, Alkalaj has done little to
dispel his reputation as Bosniak member of the Presidency
Haris Silajdzic's man in the Council of Ministers. Both
Presidents Komsic and Radmanovic routinely complain that
Alkalaj seems to work only for Silajdzic, and does not keep
the other Presidents informed of the activities of the
Ministry and some of his diplomatic dealings. Radmanovic
became particularly incensed in April when, at Silajdzic's
direction, Alkalaj quietly arranged, without formal
Presidency sanction, a state-level visit to the United
Nations to celebrate Bosnia's independence that Silajdzic
used to present his "interpretation" of the ICJ's Srebrenica
verdict to an international audience. Alkalaj also has a
record of leaking inaccurate information to the media about
the content of his confidential high-level diplomatic
meetings, including those with USG officials. Alkalaj's
ministry has bounced from one crisis or mini-scandal to
another in the past half year, all of which has served to
further internally polarize the MFA and greatly hinder its
effectiveness. Morale seemed to reach a low-point in
October, when the MFA's General-Secretary sent a letter to
the diplomatic community, complaining about Alkalaj's
management style and allegedly illegal initiative to reform
the personnel structure. The letter noted that it was sent
with the full support of the number two in the MFA, Deputy
Minister Ana Trisic-Babic. (Comment. As disappointing as
Alkalaj's performance has been, the performance of his senior
management has been equally troubling. The General-Secretary
has been linked to allegations of corruption, and Deputy
Minister Trisic-Babic, a confidant of RS Prime Minister
Dodik, has publicly engaged in partisan arguments with
Alkalaj on several occasions. End Comment.)
COMMENT: MOD MUST REMAIN IN LEAD FOR NOW
--------------
6. (C) As we discreetly told Pranjic when presented a copy of
the Foreign Minister's letter, we believe that Alkalaj's
proposal would be highly counter-productive. We have
consulted on the matter with NATO HQ Sarajevo, which shares
our concerns about the disruptive impact an overhaul of the
Coordination Team could have in advance of the Bucharest
Summit, where Bosnia hopes to highlight substantial progress
in defense reform and NATO integration. Considering the
political crisis in the country, with the Council of
Ministers in a "technical mandate" following the resignation
of Prime Minister Spiric, it would be highly unlikely that
the COM could quickly act to set-up a new coordinating
structure. We certainly recognize that at some point the MFA
must take a greater, if not leading, role in the NATO
ascension process, but, under Alkalaj, it remains a weak,
politically and ethically divided institution that does not
have the capacity to direct such an important activity for
the Bosnian state. Conversely, Minister Cikotic's Ministry
of Defense has established its bona fides as a professionally
run, non-partisan and competent institution. The Coordination
Team, under the very able leadership of Crnadak, must be
allowed to continue its important work free from the larger
political problems plaguing the country. End Comment
ENGLISH