Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2373
2007-11-02 19:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: DODIK MEETS DAS DICARLO; REJECTS LAJCAK

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7322
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0178
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002373 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DICARLO; EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR
BRAUN; SECDEF FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DODIK MEETS DAS DICARLO; REJECTS LAJCAK
MEASURES

REF: SARAJEVO 2236

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES ENGLISH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002373 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR DICARLO; EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN; SECDEF FOR BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DODIK MEETS DAS DICARLO; REJECTS LAJCAK MEASURES REF: SARAJEVO 2236 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES ENGLISH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On the margins of the October 31 session of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC),the Ambassador and EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo met with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to register U.S. concerns with his reactions to High Representative Lajcak's October 19 measures and to the current political crisis. DiCarlo warned Dodik his actions were anti-Dayton and that consequences would follow if he did not accept the measures. Dodik said he opposed the Lajcak measures on principle because Bosnians, not the international community, should be responsible for managing the country and because they may lead to outvoting of Serbs in government. Although he claimed to support continued dialogue, Dodik asserted that he would be unable to control the outcome if the Lajcak measures were to be imposed. Dodik noted that Nikola Spiric, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, would resign on November 1, and that, while Serbs would withdraw from the government, they would continue to participate in Parliament. Dodik promised that, in the event of a Kosovo independence declaration, "nothing will happen" in Bosnia. The Ambassador urged Dodik to work toward a common understanding of OHR's measures and to add substance to the recent Mostar declaration on police reform to put Bosnia back on the path to Europe. End Summary. LAYING OUT THE U.S. POSITION -------------- ¶2. (C) Following the October 31 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) session, EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo and the Ambassador held a frank, hour-long meeting with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. DiCarlo highlighted the level of USG concern over the current political crisis in Bosnia and specifically Dodik,s role in fomenting the confrontation. Within the USG, and in European capitals, Dodik is being perceived as undermining European stability and this perception will inevitably roll back his achievements in the RS. DiCarlo questioned the motives for Dodik,s anti-Dayton stance particularly given his historical opposition to the nationalism of Milosevic. Dodik's response to the Lajcak
measures was disproportionate, and DiCarlo warned that consequences of a confrontation with the U.S. could include visa bans, economic sanctions, and decreased foreign investment. DODIK REJECTS LAJCAK MEASURES -------------- ¶3. (C) Dodik asserted his support for Dayton and insisted that he has maintained his basic political orientation regarding the state, and the U.S. role in Bosnia. Dodik said he was mindful of the U.S. role in providing security and stability in the country, and appreciated the consequences for Bosnia if a solution to the current crisis is not found. No one wants to see RS citizens, who suffered tremendously in the past, be subject to sanctions again. Dodik sought to downplay Serbia's role in the crisis, and in Bosnia in general, claiming that his frequent travels to Serbia were due to his personal ties there. ¶4. (C) Regarding High Representative Lajcak's October 19 measures, Dodik said he opposed impositions on principle, emphasizing that Bosnians, not the international community, should resolve problems in government. Dodik reiterated previous claims that the Lajcak measures could result in Serbs being outvoted in government but asserted he would support them with adjustments. Dodik claimed to support continued dialogue, noting that RS and OHR lawyers would be meeting shortly to discuss the Lajcak measures. While acknowledging that the High Representative would not abandon the measures, Dodik said that he could not control the consequences if they were imposed. SARAJEVO 00002373 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) DiCarlo reiterated that, pursuant to Dayton, the U.S. accepts the Entity structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, respects the existence of both the RS and the Federation and emphasized that the Lajcak measures do not undermine the entities. Despite its opposition to their imposition, even Russia agrees that the Lajcak measures are legal. DiCarlo reminded Dodik of U.S. opposition to the initiative to remove Srebrenica from the RS in the wake of the International Court of Justice verdict and to calls by Haris Silajdzic to abolish the entity. SPIRIC TO RESIGN -------------- ¶6. (C) Dodik noted that Council of Ministers Chairman Nikola Spiric would resign the following day. (Note - Spiric did submit his resignation to the Presidency on November 1. End Note) DiCarlo said such a decision by Spiric abrogating his responsibilities would be regrettable. It was ironic that Spiric had had long called for strengthening the office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, and would now resign as a result of changes that achieved precisely that outcome. Dodik suggested that Spiric,s health problems ) he battled throat cancer ) likely factored into his decision to resign. Dodik stated that the actions of Serb politicians will be "balanced" and that if SNSD officials withdraw from the government they will remain in Parliament so as to "not further complicate the political situation." KOSOVO -------------- ¶7. (C) In the event of a declaration of Kosovo independence, Dodik stated that, as long as he remains in his position, "nothing will happen" in Bosnia. Kosovo independence would result in demonstrations and public rhetoric but no escalation. Dodik reiterated the familiar RS position that if Kosovo independence is reached without consensus or a UNSCR, it would be problematic for Bosnia to recognize Kosovo. Asserting that Serbia could not address its economic problems if it continues to include two million Albanians, Dodik said he favored partition, suggesting that three or four compact municipalities with a large Serb population could join Serbia, while the remainder of Kosovo became independent. THE WAY FORWARD -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador urged PM Dodik to work with the High Representative. The meeting of legal experts and the Mostar declaration were positive steps, the Ambassador said urging Dodik to seize the political will expressed in the declaration to revive the reform process. If Dodik chose to work to return Bosnia to its path toward Europe he could count on U.S. partnership. Dodik listened, but made no substantive response. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Dodik resorted to the familiar tactic of claiming to be misunderstood and disavowing his provocative public statements. His professed support for Dayton notwithstanding, not twenty-four hours before this meeting, in his address to the RSNA, Dodik characterized Bosnia as an "imposed state" and an "experiment of the international community designed to create a Bosniak majority." Dodik is clearly aware of the potential consequences of his actions but appears to remain on a course of confrontation with the High Representative. Dodik's repetition of familiar, and false, SNSD assertions that the Lajcak measures threaten Serbs with being outvoted illustrate that he has not fundamentally altered the position that sparked the crisis on October 19. Although we welcome the announcement of further RS-OHR talks we have to be prepared for the probability that Dodik will reject yet another face-saving option to walk back from confrontation. End Comment. ENGLISH

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